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
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EBY
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Presented to the

JOHN WATTS DE PEYSTER.

— 1898 —

Master of Arts, Columbia College of New York, 1872.—LL.D., Nebraska College, 1870.—Litt. D. (1892) and LL.D. (1896), Franklin and Marshall College, Pennsylvania.—Honorary Vice-President of the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Philadelphia.—Honorary Member Clarendon Historical Society, Edinburgh, Scotland; of the New Brunswick Historical Society, St John, Canada; of the Historical Societies of Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Northern Indiana and of Lancaster County, Penn.; of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, &c.; of the New York Burns Club, &c.—Corresponding Member of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, Canada, &c.—Honorary Member of the London Society of Science, Letters and Art, 1893, and recipient of the Gold Medal for 1894 for "Scientific and Literary Attainments," and of United Empire Loyal Association of Canada, 1895.—Hereditary Member of the Military Society of the War of 1813.—Life Member Royal Historical Society of Great Britain, London, Eng.—Member Maatschappij Nederlandsche Letterkunde, Leyden, Holland. First Honorary Member Third Army Corps (Army of the Potomac) Union.—Honorary Member Third Army Corps, Gettysburg Battlefield Reunion, and Member of the Honorary Committee.—Director of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, 1864 to 21st June, 1890.—Member American Historical Association, United States; of the Holland Society, New York.—Associate Member Military Institution of the United States, &c., &c.—Member, Life, Honorary and Corresponding Member of over forty State and Local Historical, Scientific and Literary Societies and Associations, &c., at home and abroad.—Recipient of Votes of Thanks from Legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania, and twice from the State of New Jersey.—Colonel N. Y. S. I., 1846—assigned for "meritorious conduct" to command of 22d Regimental District, M. F. S. N. Y., 1849.—Brigadier-General for "important service" (first appointment in New York State to that rank, hitherto elective), 1851, M. F. S. N. Y.—Military Agent State of New York, in Europe, 1851-53.—Authorized and endorsed by the United States, 1851-53.—Assisted in organization of present Police, New York, and first reported in favor of Paid Fire Department with Fire Escapes and Steam Engines, 1852-53, New York.—Adjutant-General State of New York, 1855.—Brevet Major-General State of New York for "meritorious services rendered to the National Guard and to the United States prior to and during the Rebellion," by "Special Act" or "Concurrent Resolution," New York State Legislature, April, 1866 (first and only General officer receiving such an honor (the highest), from State of New York, and the only officer thus elevated (Major-General) in the United States.)

C O N T I N U A T I O N
O F T H E
H I S T O R Y
O F T H E L A T E
W A R I N G E R M A N Y,
B E T W E E N T H E
K I N G O F P R U S S I A,
A N D T H E
E M P R E S S O F G E R M A N Y A N D H E R A L L I E S.

I L L U S T R A T E D W I T H A N U M B E R O F
M A P S A N D P L A N S.

P A R T I I
C O N T A I N I N G


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- S E C O N D. { O F T H E R I S E A N D P R O G R E S S O F T H E P A S S I O N S, A N D T H E I R A P P L I -
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B Y M A J O R - G E N E R A L L L O Y D,
W H O S E R V E D S E V E R A L C A M P A I G N S I N T H E A U S T R I A N S E R V I C E.

L O N D O N.

P R I N T E D F O R T H E A U T H O R, A N D S O L D B Y S. H O O P E R, T H E C O R N E R O F
M A P S B U I L D I N G S, S. M A R T I N ' S L A N E.

M D C C L X X X I.



J. Watts de Peyster :

L. L. D.

MASTER OF ARTS, Columbia College, of New York, 1872.
ROSE HILL, IN THE TOWNSHIP OF RED HOOK, NEAR TIVOLI P. O., DUCHESNE CO., N. Y.

September, 1874.

JUDGE ADVOCATE, with the rank of MAJOR, 1845.
COLONEL N. Y. S. I. 1846; assigned for "Meritorious Conduct," 1849;
BRIGADIER-GENERAL for "Important Service" [first appointment—in N. Y. State—to that rank,
hitherto elective] 1851, M. F. S. N. Y.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, S. N. Y. 1855.
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, S. N. Y., for "Meritorious Services,"
[first and only general officer receiving such an honor (the highest) from S. N. Y.,] and the only
officer thus brevetted (Major-General) in the United States.]
by "Special Act," or "Concurrent Resolution," New York State Legislature, April, 1866.

LAWS OF NEW YORK, Vol. 2.—59th Session, 1866, Page 9142.
Concurrent Resolution requesting the Governor to confer upon Brigadier-General J. WATTS
DE PUYSTER [de Peyster] the brevet rank of Major* [General] in the National Guard
of New York.

RESOLVED, (if the Senate concur,) That it being a grateful duty to acknowledge in a suitable
manner the services of a distinguished citizen rendered to the National Guard and
to the United States prior to and during the Rebellion, the Governor be and he is hereby author-
ized and requested to confer upon Brigadier-General J. WATTS DE PUYSTER [de Peyster]
the brevet rank of major-General in the National Guard of New York, for meritorious services,
which mark of honor shall be stated in the Commission conferred.

STATE OF NEW YORK, in Assembly, April 9th, 1866.
The foregoing Resolution was duly passed. By order of the Assembly,
J. B. CUSHMAN, Clerk.

STATE OF NEW YORK, in Senate, April 30th, 1866.
The foregoing Resolution was duly passed. By order of the Senate,
Jas. TERWILLIGER, Clerk.

MILITARY AGENT, S. N. Y., (in Europe,) 1861-'2.
HONORARY MEMBER, THIRD CLASS, of the MILITARY ORDER of the LOYAL LEGION of the U. S.
FIRST HONORARY MEMBER Third (Army of the Potomac) Corps Union.
MEMBER—10th June, 1872, DIRECTOR—of the GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION.
MEMBER OF THE NETHERLANDISH LITERARY ASSOCIATION
[Maatschappij der Nederlandische Letterkunde] at Leyden, Holland.
RECIPIENT, 1856, of Three Silver Medals from H. R. M. OSCAR, King of Sweden and Norway,
&c., for a Military Biography of LEONARD TORSTENSON, Field Marshal, Generalissimo;
of a Gold Medal in 1859, from WASHINGTON HUNT, Governor S. N. Y., for
"Efforts to improve the Military System of New York," &c. &c.,
and Suggestions for a Paid Fire Department with Steam
Fire Engines, &c. &c.

of a Gold Medal in 1859, from the FIELD AND STAFF OFFICERS of his Command, 9th
Brig., 3 Div., N. Y. S. Troops, "In testimony of their Esteem and Appreciation of his
Efforts towards the Establishment of an efficient Militia," &c.; in 1870, of
a Magnificent Badge, Medal and Clasp voted at the Annual
Meeting of the Third Corps (Army of the Potomac)
Union, held at Boston, Mass., Thursday,
May 5th, 1870, when

A Resolution was adopted to present a Gold Medal of the value of \$500, to Gen. J. WATTS DE
PEYSTER, of New York, as a testimonial of the appreciation by the Corps of his eminent
services in placing upon record the true history of its achievements, and in defending its
commanders and their men from written abuse and misrepresentation;
and of several other Badges, Medals, &c., for services in connection with the military service
of the State of New York.

HONORARY MEMBER of the NEW JERSEY and of the MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETIES,
and of the PENNSYLVANIAN SOCIETY of PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE, Gettysburg;
of the PHILOSPHIAN SOCIETY, Missionary Institute, Selin's Grove,
and of the EUTERPEAN SOCIETY, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania,
and of the GARMAN LITERARY SOCIETY, of Nebraska College, Nebraska City.

HONORARY MEMBER of the N. Y. BURNS CLUB.
(BURNS was a member of the *Dunfermline* Voluntary, of which Col. ARENT SCHUTLER DE PEYSTER,
8th or King's Foot B. A., was Colonel, to whom the "National Bard of Scotland" addressed,
just before his death, in 1796, his "POEM ON LIFE,")
and LIFE MEMBER of the ST. NICHOLAS SOCIETY of NEW YORK,
(of which city JOHANNES DE PEYSTER, first of the name in the *New World*, was *Scheper*, 1655,
Alderman, 1666, *Burgmaster*, 1672, *Deputy Mayor*, 1677. *Mayoralty offered and refused.*)

MEMBER
of the NEW YORK, of the RHODE ISLAND (Newport) and of the PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL
SOCIETIES, of the MILITARY ASSOCIATION of the STATE of NEW YORK,
and of the CENTURY CLUB, New York City.

LIFE MEMBER
of the HISTORICAL SOCIETY of MICHIGAN,
of the NEW YORK GALLERY OF FINE ARTS, and Director of the N. Y. INSTITUTION for the
INSTRUCTION of the DEAF AND DUMB,
and of the NUMISMATIC and ARCHAEOLOGICAL SOCIETY of NEW YORK.
LIFE MEMBER or FELLOW of the AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; PATRON of the
ASSOCIATION for the BENEFIT of COLORED ORPHANS, and of the NEW YORK
DISPENSARY; LIFE DIRECTOR of the AMERICAN TRACT, and LIFE
MEMBER of the AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, N. Y.

CORRESPONDING MEMBER
of the STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETIES of MAINE, of VERMONT, of RHODE ISLAND, (Providence),
of CONNECTICUT, and of WISCONSIN; of the LONG ISLAND and of the BUFFALO
HISTORICAL SOCIETIES; of the NEW ENGLAND HISTORIO-GENEALOGICAL
SOCIETY; of the QUEBEC LITERARY & HISTORICAL SOCIETY;
of the NUMISMATIC and ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY
of PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania;
etc. etc. etc.

T O H I S
R O Y A L H I G H N E S S
G E O R G E A U G U S T U S F R E D E R I C K,
P R I N C E O F W A L E S.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS,

THE exact attention which your Royal Father has given to, and the uncommon knowledge he has acquired, in every Department that can affect the interest and happiness of his People, and the honour of his Country; equally attentive to the minutest, as well as to the most extensive and important Objects in the Military Line; encourages me with the utmost humility and diffidence to lay this Treatise at your Royal Highness's Feet, from the pleasing view that your Highness is animated by that great example: humbly hoping that it will be
received

DEDICATION.

received as a mark of my zeal and gratitude to my Gracious Sovereign, and of the most profound respect for your Royal Highness; happy, should it prove, in the least amusing, useful, or explanatory of the great events of so remarkable a period in the Military History of Europe; and during which, the abilities, courage, and activity of the Monarch of a single Country, resisted the efforts and baffled the views of many hostile Nations.

I am, with the greatest respect,

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS'S,

Most devoted Servant

Brussels,
20th. May 1781.

H. LLOYD.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author has been advised to publish this Part of his Work as mentioned in his Proposals, for the Continuation of the History of the late War in Germany, &c. In the mean while the Remainder of that Work is going on with all Expedition; the Author being now revisiting the several Countries (the Subject of the History) in order to locate the Scenes of Action with more Precision.

The Preface to the former Volume being so immediately connected with the Subject of the present Publication, that the Author flatters himself will apologize to the Purchasers of that Work for its being prefixed to this.

IN order to elucidate in one View the particular Reflections and Descriptions contained in this Work, as well as in Military History in general, a Map on a large Scale is now engraving, that will comprehend the countries between the Meridian of Paris and that of Petersburg, and from the Latitude of the last mentioned Place, to that of Constantinople; on which will be traced the natural Lines of Operation, leading from the Frontiers of the respective Countries; as also the Lines on which the respective Armies did really act in the several Campaigns during the War we describe, which will enable the Reader to see and judge of the Propriety of their Operations.

This Map will be given to Purchasers of the Work; it is therefore requested, that Gentlemen will give their Names and Address to each respective Bookseller of whom they buy it, which will entitle them to the Map on producing this Note.

P R E F A C E.

THE various and numberless authors who have wrote on the art of war, may be divided into two classes, Didactical and Historical : the first are of great use, no doubt, but by no means comparable to the others ; particularly such as Xenophon, Polybius, Cæsar, and Ariæn, who had not only seen, but executed great things.

THIS enabled them to write on those transactions with judgment and propriety ; and their works will ever be regarded, by military men in particular, as a pure spring from whence the general principles of war may be deduced, much better than from any systematical author.

THE moderns, who have undertaken to write the history of different wars, or of some renowned Commanders, being chiefly men of learning only, and utterly unacquainted with the nature of military operations, have given us indeed agreeable but useless productions.

BOTH species of compositions are useful and necessary to those who make war their profession : they are, however, in my opinion, in many respects imperfect. The didactical

kind communicates its precepts purely and simply, without any application : so that they make but a weak and transitory impression on the mind, which time soon effaces. From whence it is become a proverb, that the road to science, by means of rules and precepts, is long and tedious ; that by example, short and agreeable.

A READER, no doubt, is much more attentive to real, than to imaginary transactions. He believes that it is possible, at least, to imitate what others have executed. There is besides, in every elevated mind, an emulation which encourages and animates us to tread the footsteps of those great men, whose actions and characters are justly the object of our love and veneration. For which reason, history has been ever recommended as the best, easiest, and most effectual method to instruct mankind.

THOSE historians, both ancient and modern, who have given us an account of different wars, though in many respects extremely valuable, are not as accurate as they might, and ought to be.

THEY do not describe, with sufficient precision and exactness, the countries wherein the wars were carried on, nor the particular spots upon which some great transaction happened ; the number, species, and quality of the troops which composed the respective armies are generally omitted,

as well as the plan of operations ; and the operations themselves, excepting those which appeared extraordinary. They do not explain minutely, as they ought, why, how, and where every operation was transacted. They only, in general terms, give the history of a campaign, without explaining sufficiently the motives by which the generals were actuated, how the various operations of it were conducted ; and lastly, what was the nature of the ground where they happened.

THE knowledge, however, of these points is so necessary, that it is impossible to form an exact opinion of the propriety or impropriety of any military transaction without it.

THE author of the following history has composed it upon a new plan, which he hopes will meet with the approbation of the learned. He proposes to give a clear and exact account of the most essential transactions which have occurred during the course of this important war. These will serve as a basis and foundation upon which he will write a commentary, wherein the various principles of war will be occasionally explained.

THAT the reader may be enabled to form a proper judgment of the conduct of the generals who commanded the respective armies, the author will, first, give some general

thoughts on the principles of war : secondly, he will explain the plan of operations of each campaign : thirdly, he will give a military description of the seat of war : and, fourthly, a particular one of the ground where any extraordinary action happened, with the plan of it, together with an account of the conduct of the action itself, and endeavour to point out the manœuvres that contributed essentially to the gain or loss of it.

By this means the reader will be able to form a proper and exact judgment, not only of such transactions, but likewise of the reflections and opinions of the author. It is with reluctance he finds himself obliged to speak of himself ; it is however necessary, lest he may be thought to advance things without a proper foundation.

HE has had the good fortune to serve several campaigns under the orders of general Count Lacy, now inspector general of the Austrian army, while quarter-master general of it, by which means he has been enabled to acquire an exact knowledge of the country, of which he has given a description, and to be acquainted with the motives and motions of the respective armies. In the campaign of 1760 he was intrusted with the command of a very considerable detachment of infantry and cavalry, with orders never to lose sight of the Prussian army ; which he punctually complied with, and was never unfortunate.

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THE two last campaigns he had the happiness to serve near the person of a prince, whose social and military qualities have gained him the love and veneration of the present age, and will, no doubt, transmit a glorious and immortal name to posterity.

THE author is persuaded, that his style is full of foreign idioms and expressions; and therefore hopes the critics will not give themselves the trouble to convince him of it, particularly, if they understand his meaning.

As to his opinions he believes them reasonable, but does not presume to think himself infallible; and, consequently, does not pretend to impose them upon others. He will think himself happy if his labours are attended with any advantage to his country.

REFLEC-

R E F L E C T I O N S
ON THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR;
AND ON THE
COMPOSITION AND CHARACTERS
OF THE
DIFFERENT ARMIES IN EUROPE.

IT is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult than that of war ; yet, by an unaccountable contradiction of the human kind, those who embrace this profession take little or no pains to study it. They seem to think, that the knowledge of a few insignificant and useless trifles constitute a great officer.

THIS opinion is so general, that little or nothing else is taught at present in any army whatever. The continual changes and variety of motions, evolutions, &c. which the soldiers are taught, prove evidently, they are founded on mere caprice.

THIS art, like all others, is founded on certain and fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable, the appli-

application of them only can be varied ; but they are in themselves constant.

THIS most difficult science may, I think, be divided into two ; one mechanical, and may be taught by precepts ; the other has no name, nor can it be defined or taught. It consists in a just application of the principles and precepts of war, in all the numberless circumstances and situations which occur ; no rule, no study, or application, however assiduous, no experience, however long, can teach this part ; it is the effect of genius alone. As to the first, it may be reduced to mathematical principles ; its object is to prepare the materials which form an army, for all the different operations which may occur : genius must apply them according to the ground, number, species, and quality of the troops, which admit of infinite combinations.

IN this art, as in poetry and eloquence, there are many who can trace the rules by which a poem or an oration should be composed, and even compose, according to the exactest rules ; but for want of that enthusiastic and divine fire, their productions are languid and insipid : so in our profession, many are to be found who know every precept of it by heart ; but, alas ! when called upon to apply them, are immediately at a stand. They then recall their rules, and want to make every thing, the rivers, woods, ravins,

ravins, mountains, &c. &c. subservient to them; whereas their precepts should, on the contrary, be subject to these, who are the only rules, the only guide we ought to follow; whatever manœuvre is not formed on these, is absurd and ridiculous. These form the great book of war; and he who cannot read it, must for ever be content with the title of a brave soldier, and never aspire to that of a great general.

THE first object of the mechanical part is to form the soldier, relative to the use to be made of him, and to provide him with those instruments of his profession which are of most general use, because he cannot be loaded with many of different kinds; and that he be instructed relative to the actions he is to perform, and nothing more. This is so evident, and conformable to reason, that I will presume to establish, as the first laws or principles of the art of war, what is already admitted in every other; *first, that a soldier be clothed and armed relative to the action he is to perform: secondly, that he be taught nothing but what is of use to him, in the different situations which can occur, before the enemy: thirdly, that he be taught every thing that is absolutely necessary for him to know, in every case that may happen.*

MANY will exclaim against these propositions, particularly those whose whole study has been applied to learn the
num-

numberless and insignificant trifles with which all the armies in Europe abound, and whose only science is reduced to adjust a hat, a button, &c. and such other important matters in which the merit of an officer intirely consists, according to their opinion of military deserts. They attribute the glorious victories of the king of Prussia to these and the like puerilities; and have therefore, with great care and diligence, even with a degree of madness, introduced the Prussian exercise into all the troops of Europe—nothing but Prussian will go down.

SHORT cloaths, little hats, tight breeches, high-heeled shoes, and an infinite number of useless motions in the exercise and evolutions have been introduced, without any other reason than their being Prussian; as if really these things could contribute to gain one battle, make a fine march or manœuvre, carry on the operations of a siege, choose a fine camp or position, &c.

It is impossible, one would think, that men can be so blind as not to perceive, that what makes the object of their study and veneration, has, in fact, no kind of connection with, or influence on the events of war; yet are they so infatuated with them, that they judge of every man as he appears to be expert in them, and esteem the rest of mankind ignorant, and worthy their contempt; but as, in my turn, I have no great regard for men who

are attached to such trifles, I shall be very indifferent as to the opinion they may be pleased to form of me, and of my productions.

IF the form of dress, now in use among the soldiers, be examined by our canon, it will be found, I think, very unfit for the purpose it is made for; can any thing be more troublesome and useless than the hat? it answers no one end: the face is exposed to the sun, the neck and shoulders to the cold and rain, which in a very little time sends numbers of the poor men to the hospitals.

THE coat and waistcoat are equally useless, because they leave the body totally exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and being tight, hinder the men from moving with ease and facility.

To these inconveniencies, which send every campaign, particularly if carried on in the winter, at least one fourth of the army into their grave, may be added, that if it rains for any considerable time, the soldier can with difficulty make use of his arms; and sometimes, in preparing them, he loses the happy and decisive moment. I would therefore recommend it those who have it in their power to invent some better form of dress, as well out of humanity, as for the service of their country, which is connected with these things much more than is generally imagined.

As

As to the arms made use of, the gun is, no doubt, the best that has been invented for the infantry, being of more general use than any other. It were to be wished, provided the musket is to continue solely in use, and without lances, that it was lengthened two feet, including the bayonet, which, it is thought, may be done without any sensible inconvenience to the soldier.

If it was constructed so as to be loaded at the breech, and the center of gravity thrown further back near the lock, it would not be so top-heavy as at present, and would be much more advantageous in action.

M. SAXE invented one of this kind, which he gave to his regiment of Uhlans ; but it had many inconveniencies, which may be easily remedied. This species of guns will be particularly useful to the cavalry.

THE infantry should have caïks and cuirasses, made of strong leather, which would last for ever, and defend them effectually against the sabre and bayonet, and even against balls, at a certain distance.

THE French have offered a great premium to any one who will prepare leather, so as to resist the effect of fire-arms.

than by any other method whatever. In coming out of a defile, you may instantly form the line without presenting the flank to the enemy, which must happen if you do it as the Prussians, by a conversion on either flank, in order to give room to those who follow to form upon the line without danger.

THE line may be formed, though ever so near the enemy, with ease, because you face him, and can with ease and safety protect and cover the motions of the troops, while they are coming out of the defiles and forming: and the same thing may be equally executed when a column is to be formed, in order to advance or retire; which is a point of infinite consequence, and should be established as an axiom, that no manœuvre whatever be executed, especially when near the enemy, unless it be protected by some division of the troops.

It is in the human heart to fear the dangers we do not see, and for which we are not prepared, more than those we do see, which is the case of all conversions; the soldier does not see the enemy, and by presenting his flank, is deprived of all means of defence.

NO movement therefore ought to be made near the enemy by conversion, excepting only to form the line on either flank, should they be attacked. As to the different evolutions

lutions now practised, I shall not here examine them ; but will establish as a rule, that must be generally observed, and by which alone it is possible to compare one evolution with another, and judge of their propriety.

THAT evolution is best, which with a given number of men may be executed in the least space, and consequently in the least time possible.

THERE is scarce any figure, geometrical or ungeometrical, which our modern tacticians have not introduced into the armies, without ever considering how far such forms were useful in practice.

IT is very possible to point out all the cases that may occur in war, as to the manner of fighting, which must finally be reduced to that in columns or in lines ; consequently that form or figure is best, which is best calculated for offence and defence, marching in all kind of ground, and may be soonest changed into a line or column, as the case may require.

IT is a general opinion, founded on the practice of all the troops in Europe, that a column cannot march without taking up twice the ground it occupied while standing, because the last man cannot move till the first has advanced the length of the whole column. This

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is, no doubt, true in practice, and Marshal Saxe thought it irremediable without the *tact*: nothing, however, is so easy to be remedied, nor deserves it more; because, as we have already said, marching is the most important point in all the military art.

A MAN posted in a line occupies nearly two feet, from one elbow to another, and not quite one foot from front to rear; that is, a man is not quite one foot thick, consequently, when the lines make a motion to the right or left, the distance between each man is above a foot, which is augmented by near two more, if they all begin the march with the same foot; so that all the difficulty consists in making the men march with the same foot, and keep time constantly, which is easily done, if the species of step you would have them march is marked by the drum, or any other instrument. This is often necessary after passing defiles, and when they march in irregular and unequal ground, which is apt to throw them in confusion.

THE article of marching is so essential, that it requires and deserves the greatest care and attention: it may be asserted, that the army which marches best must, if the rest is equal, in the end prevail. If what I here propose, and what is actually executed by the Portuguese army, with great precision, be once taught, so that several regi-
ments

ments formed in one column can practise it, an army of forty battalions, for example, will make a given march in less than half the time, which they now require, as may be demonstrated.

As to the different kind of firings made use of, they are for the most part dangerous or impracticable.

THE platoon firing is such, as must necessarily produce a general confusion, as well by the noise of those who command them, as by the breaking of the line and kneeling, which are three of the greatest inconveniencies that can possibly happen, and cannot be executed without imminent danger when near the enemy, and therefore must be totally excluded. Even the King of Prussia himself is of the same opinion; for he says, the platoon fire would, no doubt, be the best, *if it could be executed*. This is so dangerous and impracticable, that I will presume to establish the following rules on quite contrary principles.

FIRST, The utmost silence must be observed; and therefore the commanding officer of the battalion shall alone command the different firings.

SECONDLY, That a battalion, or regiment, in advancing to the enemy, must never be broke, unless forced thereto by the nature of the ground.

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THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, That the first rank must never kneel under pretence of giving the third an opportunity to fire with safety, because it is very dangerous if near the enemy; and moreover, fatigues the soldier in such a manner, that he is soon useless. To these many other things may be added, which are necessary for the soldier to know, as to retrench himself, make fascines, gabions, conduct a sappe, &c.

WHAT has been hitherto said, regards the soldier as well as the officer: what follows regards the last only.

As all kind of evolutions is founded on calculation, being a combination of space and time, it is morally impossible for a man to compute these two objects, without some knowledge of geometry and arithmetic.

THE first thing to be considered, in order to reduce all evolutions to a geometrical precision is, that a man occupies from elbow to elbow, when he has a gun on his shoulder, near two feet; and that when he marches a regular pace, he will make in every minute one hundred and ten steps, and that he measures each step about twenty inches; consequently as the space which a certain number of men occupy in order of battle is known, and the common velocity with which they move, it is easy to calculate

calculate the ground, and time required, to perform any evolution, with a given number of men.

A LITTLE experience, and a certain *coup d'œil*, aided by this theory, will enable a man to judge with great precision of the time and space necessary to execute any evolution whatever : a thing of the utmost consequence in a day of action ; because you will be able to make a thousand motions in the presence of the enemy, which are generally decisive, if done with precision and exactness, which you dare not even attempt, unless you are certain of being able to execute them.

THE ignorance of generals in this sublime and delicate part of war, is the reason why you see them quite suspended in time of action, incapable of changing their plan, according as new circumstances rise (which always do rise) because as the enemy approach, they very justly fear to make any motion in his presence, as they do not know, whether they have ground, or time enough to execute this or that manœuvre, though convinced of their usefulness. Hence it seldom happens that an action is won in consequence of the general's dispositions ; and that chance has generally much more influence on the events of battles than human prudence.

GENERALS form their dispositions in the cabinet, and suppose many circumstances which never happen, at least

just as they suppose them ; and during the action, few men have that sublime talent to see the new circumstances that occur, and take advantage of them.

THE knowledge of geometry is equally useful and necessary, in order to determine the impulse that bodies, animate or inanimate, make on each other, as this is in proportion to the mass and velocity : if your cavalry is of a lesser size than that of the enemy, you may render it superior, by giving it a greater degree of velocity. Upon this principle the Spanish cavalry, though very light, has generally beat the German, in their different wars with the house of Austria ; and upon this principle our great and heavy horse is certainly inferior to the hunter, particularly if you make these work more on their haunches than at present.

NOTHING contributes more to facilitate the evolutions of cavalry than this ; they will be enabled in one instance to set out on a gallop, without being obliged to pass successively from standing to trotting, and then to gallop. While this is performing, the light-horse is on your flanks, or flocks yours with a superior degree of velocity ; and therefore gains what he loses in the mass, and beats you.

THE march of armies cannot be calculated with any degree of precision without the help of mathematics : because
cause

cause whatever is not reduced to space and time, will in practice turn out very uncertain.

THE choice of camps depends on two principles ; the one geometrical, and the other is the effect of genius : the first consists in calculating the distances relative to the number and species of troops which compose the army.

THE other, in seeing all the different combinations that may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the choice of that precise combination which is most advantageous. This inacquirable and sublime talent is much superior to the other, and independent of it.

GREAT geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge, they see at once the causes, and its effect, with the different combinations which unite them : they do not proceed by common rules, successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps : no, the *whole*, with all its circumstances and various combinations, is like a picture, all together present to their mind ; these want no geometry, but an age produces few of this kind of men : and in the common run of generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid gross errors.

FORTIFICATION, another very extensive branch of war, is purely geometrical in the execution. The construction of every species of works ought to be reduced to geometrical

cal precision, and may therefore be learnt by any one ; but the choosing the ground advantageously is here, as in the choice of camps, the gift of genius alone, and subject to no rule. As the practice of fortification depends on one principle alone, we see a remarkable uniformity in the works of all engineers, which proves they knew only what they learnt, and indeed what alone could be taught them ; but that they had not one grain of genius, which varies infinitely, and forms new combinations relative to the new circumstances which must and do occur.

It is with the ground as with the features of men ; there are not perhaps in the whole world two features perfectly alike, nor two pieces of ground of a given extent perfectly similar ; and consequently, where the same species of works, or the same order of battle, would be equally proper for both. Genius alone can distinguish the most minute and imperceptible difference to the vulgar eyes, there is between different grounds, and occupy them accordingly. From hence appears how inconsiderate those great engineers and Tacticians are, who attempt to subject every kind of ground, though infinitely different, to one general rule.

THE perfection of our art would be, no doubt, to find a construction, or an order of battle, equally proper for all kind of ground ; but this being impossible, the only thing remain-

remaining for them to do, is to find such a construction, and such a formation of the troops, as may, with the greatest simplicity, and consequently velocity, be adapted to those numberless circumstances which occur. This ought to be the constant object of their studies, but can never be attained without geometry.

THE artillery, now become the soul of military operation, is nothing without geometry. The dimensions of pieces, as Mr. Muller very justly observes, ought to be regulated by the use you propose to make of them ; and I will add, by the nature of the country where they are to be used. For want of attending to this natural reason, imitation and caprice have been the only rules followed in determining the dimensions of pieces.

As the French, during the reign of Lewis the XIVth, gave birth to most of the customs and fashions of Europe, so in this important article were they imitated by every body ; 24 pounders of immense length and weight were made by princes who had neither places to attack or defend ; whose countries, for want of roads, did not permit the use of such heavy machines ; they were even introduced into armies, though no siege was expected.

It ought to have been considered, that the French made war in a fine open country, where the roads are good, and where there is a great deal of water carriage.

THAT

THAT Lewis the XIVth and XVth were, from the proximity of their own fortresses, enabled to form their magazines near the scene of action: and lastly, that in Flanders they could not make one step, without besieging some important place.

THE French artillery was formed relative to these circumstances. But why we, and other princes, that are not situated in similar circumstances, should imitate the French, I do not know. I am very glad to see Mr. Muller's opinion prevail, and hope that artillery, and every other machine relative to military operations, will hereafter be made in the most advantageous manner possible, for the use we can in our circumstances make of them. This gentleman has proposed many excellent things in his works, which makes it needless for me to say any thing on the subject.

I wish, for the sake of the public, he may give us the doctrine of sieges in all its parts, including the theory and practice of mines, in order to complete his most useful works*.

THE next, and indeed most important object of any, to those who aspire to the command of armies, is geo-

* The Author did not know that Mr. Muller had already executed this.

graphy;

graphy; not only *that* which consists in a general knowledge of a country, but a local one: a man must be thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country, and its productions; and particularly with those objects which are immediately connected with military operations, as the spring, course, breadth, depth, velocity, windings, banks, fords, bridges of rivers, whether they are navigable or not; whether they run into your country from that of the enemy, or on the contrary: in the first place, you must have a fortress as high up as possible, in order to hinder the enemy from taking advantage of the navigation, which is a very great one, and facilitates much the operations of an army; insomuch, that all great generals make it a point never to quit them if possible: and it is remarkable that the Austrians have generally been worsted by the Turks, whenever they have quitted the Danube.

If the river runs out of your country, you must have likewise a fortress, as low as may be, in which you must form your magazines, that you may at once enter your enemy's country.

If the river runs along your frontier, as the Rhine does with regard to France, you must endeavour to occupy two or three capital points upon it, with good and extensive fortresses; so that you may not only cover your own country, but also make it impossible for an enemy to penetrate

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netrate without giving you an opportunity to enter his, and cut off his subsistences : though the river be not navigable, it may however be of great use in military operations, particularly if it runs parallel to the enemy's frontier, and crosses the principal roads that lead into his country, because then they furnish good positions on their banks. If you make war on any river, you must be masters of both sides, if possible, otherwise they are of little use, excepting only to take positions behind them. When you have a strong place on a navigable river, you may with a handful of men embarrass a great army.

THE passing of rivers is justly considered as one of the most delicate and dangerous operations of war ; and yet it generally succeeds for want of being perfectly acquainted with them ; and for want of diligence and activity in those who oppose it, otherwise it cannot succeed ; for though an enemy cannot prevent your throwing a bridge under the protection of your artillery, if properly placed, he can, however, hinder you from occupying such an extent of ground as is necessary to develop your army, and may, without exposing himself to your artillery, attack any part of it, that has passed.

THIS method ought to be embraced rather than attempt to prevent a passage. A remarkable instance of this happened in Italy, in the war for the succession of Spain.

PRINCE

PRINCE Eugene wanted to pass a certain river, which the vigilance of his antagonist, the duke of Vendome, had for a long time prevented : at length, however, the prince having stole a march, threw over a bridge, and even a great part of his army had passed and intrenched themselves under the protection of the artillery on the other side, so that Vendome could not attack them without much loss and danger : he therefore posted his army as near as possible, ready to attack them, if they offered to quit their retrenchments, in order to form and extend their front, but it was found quite impracticable ; for the Duke had placed his troops in such a manner, that they formed a portion of a circle concave towards the enemy, so that the whole fire, both of artillery and small arms, could be directed and concentrated upon the retrenchments.

PRINCE Eugene having observed the duke's dispositions, was too wise to risk an action in these circumstances, with a river behind him ; he therefore ordered his troops to repass the river, and broke the bridge after them.

THIS example is the best lesson that can be given on the defence of rivers ; if the course of the river is convex to you, it will be extremely difficult to hinder an enemy from passing ; because, marching on the chord of the circle, he has much less space to go than you : he labours,

however, under one difficulty, which is, that generally speaking the banks of every river are higher on the side where its course is convex: if the banks are in the least elevated, no bridge can be thrown over the river; and they are always high alternately, if the river has a winding course; high on the convex side, and low on the concave of the curve it forms.

IN defending the banks of rivers, the army must be separated into two or more great corps, as the nature of the river admits, and disposed in such a manner as to be able to discover where the enemy passes, and strong enough to hinder him from occupying any posts far from the banks; because he will then have ground to form his whole army upon, and there is no advantage in fighting him. A due attention to what we have said, and a perfect knowledge of the river, will make it impossible for an enemy to pass it.

I AM surprized that no use is made of small rivers and rivulets to make inundations to cover camps, which may be executed on almost every spot with very little expence, and would render them no less strong than fortresses. All capital positions should, if possible, be covered by inundations, which are much more efficacious than all the retrenchments in the world. The sluices must be made as low as possible, and, moreover, covered with some good work or other.

If the country is mountainous, the roads must necessarily pass through many defiles, formed by the ravins, torrents, rivers, &c. consequently advantageous camps and positions are to be found on every spot.

THE knowledge of all this, when improved by superior talents, will enable a small army to make a successful war against one infinitely superior, as appears evident from the example Duke Ferdinand has given us in his glorious campaigns in Hesse.

MOST particular care must be taken to occupy all the mountains without exceptions, before you approach them with the army; for though there are few great roads in such a country proper for cavalry and artillery, you may however be certain, that if the country is well peopled, there is no mountain, however it may appear steep and craggy, nor any wood, though in appearance impracticable, but what, on diligent enquiry, will be found to have roads at least for infantry; and therefore you must never encamp in such a country without occupying all the mountains; which will not only secure your army, but will enable you to observe the enemy's motions, and prevent him from observing yours; a thing of so much consequence, that I will establish it as a rule never to let an enemy send a patrol near your army; on the contrary, you must always send yours on his flanks.

WHEN

WHEN the ground has been well reconnoitred, and the mountains occupied, you must always camp behind them, so that the enemy cannot see you, and that you may keep him in a state of incertitude, which is a great advantage in military operations: upon this same principle you must never camp near a wood, unless you occupy it entirely, otherwise the enemy covered by it, may make some decisive motions against you, which you cannot perceive till it is too late to prevent it. Had this maxim been observed at Malplaquet, Hastenbeck, and Torgau, things would have turned out otherwise in all probability.

NEVER approach a wood or a mountain, unless you occupy it entirely, is a rule that must be for ever observed, and cannot be transgressed without imminent danger.

Nor only an exact knowledge must be had of all fortified towns, but even of all the villages; particularly those through which the high roads pass, because they form defiles; which being occupied, put an effectual stop to an enemy, and give you time to make any disposition that may be judged necessary.

THE science of position, camps, marches, and even the project of campaign or plan of operations, must be regulated

lated by these points: it is on this knowledge only you can determine the number and species of troops that must compose the army; and consequently the quantity and quality of your magazines, and where they must be made; and every plan that is not founded on these principles, must fail in the execution, if your antagonist has common sense; so that the great and important parts of war, as well in the formation as in the execution, depend on the knowledge of the country; and wise generals will always chuse to make them the foundation of their conduct, rather than trust to the uncertain issue of battles. If you possess these points, you may reduce military operations to geometrical precision; and may for ever make war without ever being obliged to fight. Marshal Saxe calls battles the resource of ignorant generals; when they do not know what to do they give battle.

NEXT to this local geography of a country, the natural history and political constitution of it is an object that deserves the utmost attention; the quantity and quality of its productions, soil, climate, food, and form of government; because on these the physical and moral qualities of the inhabitants entirely depend. Those who inhabit the plains and rich countries, are generally effeminate and bad soldiers, impatient under the least fatigue, are soon sick, require too much food, and are less active than those
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of the mountains, and in every respect inferior to them. What did not the poor Highlanders do? What did they not suffer? They will live where an Englishman, though animated with equal courage and love of glory, will perish; merely from the difference of their situations before they become soldiers.

THE Croats in the Empress's service, seldom or ever camp, and are exposed to all the inclemency of the weather; yet, in proportion, much fewer of them die than among the rest of the troops, which can be attributed only to the difference of the countries from whence they come.

THE inhabitants of great towns are still worse than those of the plains, being long enervated with vice and its consequences, they are unable to support any fatigue; and moreover, too talkative ever to form a good and obedient soldier. The form of government produces no less variety in the characters of men than the physical qualities of the country.

THE subjects of a despotic prince being from their birth taught obedience and subordination (two essential qualities to form a good soldier, if not entirely alienated and weakened by oppression and poverty) are preferable to
those

those of republics, unless these are animated by the enthusiastic fire of liberty ; of which they are very susceptible, if conducted by an able hand, and become invincible ; but if destitute of this principle, they make but indifferent soldiers ; because their pretensions to liberty clashes continually with that blind subordination which constitutes the very foundation of a good army.

As the subject of a despot cannot possibly be animated with a passion for liberty, that can raise any degree of enthusiasm, their leaders must endeavour to substitute that of religion, which is superior to the other. When these two principles are united, the soldier is invincible. If we consider the force they have on the human heart, and how easily raised, we must be surprized to see the generals of our age neglect them entirely : this proves they want the most infallible and most sublime art of conducting mankind.

THERE is another species of enthusiasm much weaker than the former, and may be rather called a strong passion, whose object is the love of glory and riches ; both these principles are ingrafted in the human heart, and if cultivated with care, will produce wonderful effects, especially among the officers, who, by their situation, have the means of enjoying the fruits of them. These principles

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ciples are to be found chiefly among the subjects of a mixed and monarchical government, where glory and riches are attended with a real superiority and distinction.

FROM these moral and physical principles are formed national characters, whose influence is seen more or less in every army, as it is more or less subject to military discipline. If this is strong, and founded only on the principle of fear, it destroys national characters, and does not substitute any thing that is equivalent to it. Discipline should be founded on national characters, and both are improved by it: but as those who have the formation and conduct of armies, seem wholly unacquainted with human nature in general, and with its various modifications, according to the difference of countries and government, they find themselves incapable to form a code of military laws, founded on national characters; and are therefore forced to destroy these, and establish it on the weak, uncertain, and slavish principle of fear, which has rendered our armies much inferior to those of the antients, as appears evident from the history of mankind.

THE French are gay, light, and lively, governed rather by an immediate and transitory impulse, than by any principle of reason or sentiment: their sensations, from the nature of their climate, are very delicate; and therefore objects make a very strong impression, but momentary, because

because a new object, producing a new impression, effaces the former : from whence follows, that they are impetuous and dangerous in their attacks ; all the animal spirits seem united, and produce a sort of furious convulsion, and gives them a more than ordinary degree of vigour for that instant, but it exhausts the whole frame : the instant following they appear languid and weak, and changed into other men.

To this national character may be added, that their armies are recruited from the class of men that inhabit the towns, who of all others are the least proper for soldiers, being vain, impatient, talkative, and effeminate ; they advance as assured of victory, having a great opinion of themselves and contempt of others ; but if repulsed, their spirits are exhausted, shame succeeds, and humbles them to such a degree, that they are not easily prevailed upon to renew the attack ; and as their vanity will never let them confess they are in the wrong, they throw the fault on their leaders, become mutinous, and desert.

WHEREFORE it should be a maxim, in making war against the French, to keep them continually in motion, especially in bad weather, always attack them, never permit them to follow their own dispositions, force them to observe yours ; their impatience will soon reduce them to

commit some capital error. If their leader is wise and prudent, and refuses to comply with their unreasonable requests, they will treat him with contempt, grow turbulent, and desert.

THE present ministry endeavours to introduce the German discipline among them, without considering the difference there is between their national characters; and I doubt whether it will produce the effects they expect from it; Nature must be improved, not annihilated.

THE Austrian army is composed chiefly out of the class of labourers, vassals of the great lords; they are obedient and patient, and bear without a murmur the greatest hardships; and though their religion does not rise to any degree of enthusiasm, probably for want of being excited by an able leader, yet it keeps them sober and free from vice: objects must strike hard to make any sensible impression, which once received lasts long, because not easily effaced. By education and temper little disposed to reason about causes and events; and therefore very proper to form a good soldier, and superior to any other who are not raised by some species of enthusiasm.

THE Russians have all these qualifications, in common with the Austrians; and besides, such a fund of religion and respect, or rather veneration for their prince, which
inspires

inspired them with a degree of enthusiasm, that most necessarily render them superior to every other army that is not animated with similar principles. Their courage alone has rendered them victorious, in spite of all those difficulties in which the general ignorance of their officers involved them.

THE Prussian army, being composed chiefly of strangers of different countries, manners, and religion, are united only by the strong chain of military discipline; this and a most rigid attention to keep up all the forms and discipline established, constitutes a vast and regular machine, which being animated by the vigorous and powerful genius of their leader, may be justly accounted one of the most respectable armies in Europe; but should this spring, however, languish but for an instant only, the machine itself, being composed of such heterogeneous matter, would probably fall to pieces, and leave nothing but the traces of its antient glory behind.

THEY have a facility in manœuvring beyond any other troops whatever; and their victories must be ascribed to this chiefly; for all the genius of the leader can do nothing without it, and almost every thing with it.

THE Spaniards are brave and patient; and have besides a point of honour, which being improved, would make them

them good soldiers. Their army at present would make but an indifferent figure, for two or three campaigns, as their generals have neither that knowledge, founded on study and application, or that produced by experience.

THE English are neither so lively as the French, nor so phlegmatic as the Germans; they resemble more however the former, and are therefore somewhat lively and impatient.

IF the nature of the English constitution permitted some degree more of discipline, a more equal distribution of favours, and a total abolishment of buying and selling commissions, I think they would surpass, at least equal, any troops in the world.

THE Turks, and every government founded on military force, must necessarily decay, unless the same fanaticism which gave it birth be kept up by continual wars.

MAHOMET understood this principle so well, that he has made a religious precept of it, commanding his followers never to make peace with their enemies.

As the force of this army depends entirely on numbers and enthusiasm; if this last is ever extinguished, which now seems to be much the case, the other will avail them

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nothing ; and that immense fabric being no longer animated with the only spirit which could support it, must sink under its own weight.

THE principles which are only cursorily mentioned in this preface, will be examined and demonstrated in the following work.

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

1964

T A B L E

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OF THE
COMPOSITION
OF
DIFFERENT ARMIES,
ANCIENT AND MODERN.

PART THE FIRST.

CHAPTER I

WAR is a state of action. An army is the instrument with which every species of military action is performed: like all other machines it is composed of various parts, and its perfection will depend, first, on that of its several parts; and second, on the manner in which they are arranged; so that the whole may have the following properties, viz. strength, agility, and universality; if these are properly combined, the machine is perfect. Care must be taken that not any one of these properties be increased by diminishing another, but that the whole may be in proportion.

By strength in an army, I do not mean that force which arises from numbers, but that which proceeds from the mode in which troops are ranged and armed. This strength must be adequate to every purpose of war; equally proper to resist or attack an enemy, whether cavalry or infantry, in an open or in a close country.

By agility I mean, the celerity with which an army marches and performs the various motions required in the conduct of a campaign. This property is the most essential, and cannot be acquired but by continual exercise, nor even then, unless the original constitution of the troops be calculated for a facility of motion.

THE first problem in Tactics should be this: how a given number of men ought to be ranged, so that they may move and act with the greatest velocity; for on this chiefly depends the success of all military operations.

AN army superior in activity can always anticipate the motions of a less rapid enemy, and bring more men into action than they can in any given point, though inferior in number. This advantage must generally prove decisive, and insure success.

A BATTLE is a changeable scene, in which every circumstance is instantaneous and transitory, without activity, those favourable opportunities, which always occur in days of action escape, and perhaps do not return in twenty campaigns.

By universality I mean, that the mode and form in which the troops are ranged, should be equally proper to act in different kinds of ground, and against every kind of troops, to attack or defend; because an army once formed into a line, and near the enemy, cannot without much difficulty change the order in which it is formed, or indeed make any motion, but forwards; therefore when any change is required, recourse must be had to the second line or reserve, and generally without success: it is therefore highly necessary that the first formation of the troops should be so general as to be applicable to every particular case, and require no change during the action, unless in employing more or fewer men against any given point.

IF such are the properties (I mean strength, agility, and universality) which render an army perfect, it is evident that the arms made use of, the manual exercise, and the different evolutions in which the soldier is to be instructed, ought to be analogous to these principles, and whatever is not conformable to them should be exploded as vain and insignificant at least, if not, as very often happens, dangerous and impracticable.

I KNOW that it is much more easy to conceive and point out the principles which ought to guide us in the construction of a machine than to put them in practice ; for whatever passes through the hands of man participates of his imperfections. We should not however despair ; if the perfection we aim at is not attainable, to approach it is a great merit, and will in some measure answer the end proposed.

FOR want of certain and known principles in the constitution of an army, caprice and imitation seem to have been our only guides ; whence innumerable changes and novelties are continually introduced into our modern armies. Error and folly succeed each other like modes and fashion in dress ; what is to-day an object of applause and admiration, is to-morrow exploded, and succeeded by some new chimera equally absurd and transient.

A CERTAIN great prince, in the course of his reign, has undoubtedly performed some very extraordinary acts ; and therefore our military gentlemen have implicitly adopted the dress, exercise, evolutions, &c. used in his armies ; I believe without sufficiently weighing the matter, or considering that the success of his operations ought principally to be attributed to his situation, as a sovereign of uncommon abilities at the head of his armies, and to the particular circumstances of his enemies ; advantages which are but rarely com-

bined so as to produce that unity and vigour on which success in war almost intirely depends.

THE continual attention paid to the discipline of his troops, gives them a facility in manœuvring superior to that of his enemies, which certainly contributed to his victories ; his head and heart did the rest. Mode of dress, and a thousand insignificant objects with which he torments his army, had nothing to do in the matter. To obviate this phrenzy of imitation, and if possible to fix some certain principle for the composition and direction of an army, is the object of the following discourse.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY.

THE different operations of war, and the variety of the ground in which they are performed, indicate a necessity of different species of arms as well as of troops ; accordingly we find at all times armies composed of infantry and cavalry, and these armed with different kinds of weapons ; some carried missile weapons, others hand-weapons : by missile weapons, I mean those instruments with which a man throws darts, stones, balls, &c. at an enemy when at a certain distance. By hand-weapons (I cannot otherwise translate what the French call *ARME-BLANCHE*) I mean those weapons which a man holds in his hand while he strikes the foe with the other end ; such as swords, pikes, bayonets, &c.

It is needless to observe that there is a constant and invariable connexion, or at least there ought to be, between the species of arms made use of by the troops (infantry or cavalry) and the mode

of

of ranging them; because they must be formed in such a manner as to be able to manage their arms with advantage: though this principle is self-evident, and essentially necessary to be observed in the composition of an army, yet we shall find in the sequel it has been almost totally neglected by the moderns.

THE missile weapons of the antients were extremely weak, if compared with ours; the shield was sufficiently strong to parry, or at least diminish their effects; however they were found necessary, and generally adopted. It is evident that men armed with missile weapons could not be formed into one mass, or in a deep order of battle, because in that case they could not possibly have made use of their arms with any advantage; they were therefore left to themselves, that is, they chose the time, place, and object; and advanced or retreated only upon a general signal.

THE use of such troops was very considerable; they could interrupt and harass the motions of more massive bodies, though for want of consistency and strength they could not break them. No species of ground could be absolutely improper for those light troops, and a close country was particularly favourable to them; plains and cavalry were to be avoided; in every other circumstance they could act with advantage; but cavalry and massive bodies could neither move nor act but in plains and open countries.

No army could therefore be complete unless it was composed of three species of troops, viz. infantry, cavalry, and light troops; and accordingly we find the antients and moderns have adopted them in the constitution of their armies.

Of the antients the Tartars, and all the Asiatic people, thought that velocity was the peculiar advantage of the cavalry, and that this property might be exerted to advantage; it seems they fought pell-mell

pell-mell loofely, A LA DEBONDADE : at least the Romans did so very often ; for we are told that the cavalry dismounted in heat of action, and fought on foot, which they could not have done had it been formed into great squadrons, and attacked in a line in the modern European way.

A CAVALRY thus constituted was of great and general use, particularly in pursuing a broken enemy, who were necessarily exterminated, which is now the case with the Tartars and Spahi's. Their extreme activity and velocity prevent all disposition in the infantry for a retreat, unless they are favoured by a very broken ground, where cannon may be placed. As they move separately, and in very small bodies, they penetrate every where ; and as no road is impervious to them, they in an instant surround their enemy, whom they generally cut to pieces.

WE have endeavoured to unite mass and solidity to the velocity of the horse, but I think without success ; activity, the peculiar property of the horse, is diminished, and almost totally destroyed by the mode in which our cavalry is formed ; all bodies lose their velocity in proportion to the augmentation of their mass : though the advantages derived from cavalry and light troops, made the use of both absolutely necessary, yet as their manner of fighting was neither general nor decisive, the principal force of an army was thought to consist in a good body of infantry, and with reason if it is properly formed : its operations are, or may be more general, solid, and decisive, than those of the other bodies.

ALL troops, I believe, have been formed into squares, or parallelograms ; because these are the only figures or forms in which a body of men united can move or act. The circle which was used by Cæsar, and which is so much admired by Puysegur, could be proper only when it was surrounded, and confined to a particular spot, which was the case when it was used by Cæsar.

C H A P.

C H A P T E R I I I .

O F T H E P H A L A N X .

TH E Greeks ranged their infantry in a mass called a phalanx ; it consisted of about 16,000 men ; whether it was a square or an oblong figure is not material. This mass moved and acted in one body, when the nature of the ground permitted : necessity only made them divide it into smaller sections. It is evident,

FIRST, That such a mass could be armed only with hand-weapons, because none but the foremost ranks could possibly make use of any other, and even of these with little effect, the whole mass being formed in a close order with small if any intervals.

SECOND, The least inequality of the ground interrupted, or totally suspended its motions, and consequently by driving the phalanx into broken ground, and avoiding its shock and impulse, any troops formed upon more active principles would soon throw it into confusion, break and defeat it. The phalanx vanquished the Persians, because they, confiding in their numbers, fought in plains ; they were indeed likewise vanquished by the Romans ; but that was because the legion was formed on more active principles than those which modelled the Asiatic armies.

HENCE it is that no massive bodies, such as a phalanx, or the column proposed by Folard, can act or defend themselves against much smaller numbers armed with muskets, and that the use of missile weapons is incompatible with every deep and massive order.

T H E

THE advantages of massive bodies arise from their natural weight and strength, and from the hand-weapons which they must necessarily use : the foremost ranks pressed by those behind are forced to advance ; the slain and wounded are instantly succeeded, and though the number is diminished, the front is equally closed and extended, and the action is prosecuted with the same vigour, so that if the ground permits them to act at all, they must act with success when they can approach the enemy.

THE use of hand-weapons brings the men so close together, that no alternative is left but to die or conquer. Hence the victories of the ancients were so complete and decisive, that a battle or two concluded a war.

THE length of the Peloponnesian and Punic wars arose from other causes, which we shall explain hereafter. The phalanx could not abandon its original institution, nor deviate from the line on which it acted to pursue a broken enemy ; this was left to the cavalry and light infantry, which generally did the business so effectually that few escaped.

THE Grecian cavalry seems to have been good, but small in number. The country in general was improper for cavalry, and besides as it was divided into a great number of states, the territories of the contending powers were too contracted to admit of a numerous cavalry. Their wars were confined to excursions of a few days, and produced rather skirmishes than battles. The weaker kept within the walls of the capital ; the stronger ravaged the small dominions and retired ; and thus ended the campaign.

IN the course of the Peloponnesian war, so well described by Thucydides, which lasted above twenty years, no great battle was fought, which was the cause of its duration ; and the face of the
country

country was such, that an enemy could not be forced into action : to this we may add, that the armies on both sides were composed of confederates, which necessarily weakened or destroyed their own activity and vigour.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE LEGION.

THIS body of men formed a complete army ; it was composed of heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry, armed with missile and hand-weapons ; it was ranged like our troops in a rectangle, the more extended faces of which fronted the enemy. The legionary infantry was placed in the center, the cavalry on the wings, and the archers and flingers were distributed along the front of the line, and fought where they could, without interfering with the heavy infantry. They were very active in a day of battle, often mixed with the cavalry, and supported it, let no opportunity escape where they could annoy the enemy ; very unlike the light troops in Germany, who generally disappear on a day of battle, and very often cannot be collected in two or three days after.

MONTRECUCULI says, that it is absolutely necessary to intermix small detachments of forty or fifty foot with the horse, and that at the battle of Saint Gothard fought upon the Theisse, in Hungary, against the Turks, these detachments contributed much to his victory.

I AM so far persuaded of the utility of this method, that I am surprized it is not generally adopted, because a company of foot may be formed in such a manner as to oppose cavalry with success in a plain, as we shall shew hereafter.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE MODERN INSTITUTION OF AN ARMY.

CUSTOM is a tyrant, who governs mankind with more despotic sway than an Eastern monarch. To oppose *him* is treason and rebellion. An opinion, well or ill founded, is not to be eradicated by any direct argument; it can only be extirpated by time, and favourable circumstances. The modern philosophy, though for the most part founded on mathematical principles, has not in the course of more than a century been able to expel entirely the dreams and visions of Plato and Aristotle. It is no less odious than difficult to convince a man he is in the wrong, and that his opinions are absurd. Few have inclination to investigate their grounds, and still fewer have the capacity to investigate them effectually. Hence they prefer travelling in the known path, to the trouble of enquiring after a new one. In matters of religion and politics, I should not hazard any new opinion, because true or false it might produce doubt and discord, which a good subject ought to avoid. Peace and harmony should be the guide and principles of his actions; but in military affairs my errors can do no harm; they will be treated with contempt and vanish. I have therefore only to request the reader to examine impartially what I shall say on this important subject, before he pronounces judgment on my labours.

WE have already shewn, that the mode in which a body of men, whether infantry or cavalry, is formed, ought to be analogous to the species of arms they carry, and that the whole machine should be strong, active, and universally adapted to every operation of war. The phalanx was properly armed, and possessed the first property,

property, strength, in an eminent degree. The legion was likewise well armed, and was both strong and active; but as we observed before, it was defective in the arrangement of the whole: the cavalry placed on the wings could not support, nor be supported by the infantry.

WE can by no means determine whether or not our troops are properly ranged, till we have carefully examined the nature and effects of fire-arms, which are now the only weapons made use of by the infantry. The sword is a useless burthen to the soldier; and therefore it ought to be rejected.

OUR fire arms are certainly superior to the missile weapons of the ancients; and if we consider only their force, and the facility with which they are managed, it will appear surprizing that whole armies are not totally destroyed in a few hours: it is certain, however, that the musket is by no means so dangerous and fatal as the sword and pike. When the infantry was armed with these they came necessarily to close fight; the greater part of the vanquished, and many of the victors were of course slain or wounded, and the victory was more decisive; for a regular retreat was impossible. But the use of missile weapons and fire-arms has introduced a new mode of waging war, less bloody and decisive. A considerable distance generally intervenes between the two armies during a great part of the action, and sometimes during the whole; for the two lines very rarely join, and engage with swords and bayonets. This reciprocal situation enables the whole, or any part of an army frequently to change its position, or quit the field entirely, as circumstances may require, without difficulty or danger, and with little loss.

A MUSKET, and every species of fire-arms, are the most delicate instruments of war, and most uncertain in their effects. Independent of the quantity and quality of the powder, the manner of
loading

loading the piece, the state of the atmosphere, the agitation of the foldier, &c. cause such variations in the direction of the piece, as renders its effect very uncertain; infomuch, that by calculation it appears, that not above one shot in four hundred takes place. The distance between the two armies, and the uncertainty of the effects of fire-arms, are the causes why our battles are never decisive; few are slain, and the remainder have time to retire. Wars are not now as formerly terminated by battles, and complete victories. An army, though much inferior in number to the enemy, and even in point of goodness, when commanded by an able leader, will occupy some advantageous post, stop the progress of the mighty and victorious for years, till victor and vanquished are almost equally exhausted and ruined, and peace is become necessary to both parties, for want of means to prosecute the war. Hence, in our days, no kingdoms are overturned, no nation is enslaved. The subject alone feels the weight and calamities of war. The monarch, ignorant of their miseries, sits down in peace, enjoys his pleasures, regardless of the ultimate event, because it seldom affects his throne. He makes war or peace to gratify his own caprice, or that of a favourite.

IF the natural defects of fire-arms are such, and so many, that a good marksman, left entirely to himself, cannot once in ten times hit an object placed at any considerable distance, what can be expected from an ordinary soldier in the ranks, pressed before, behind, and on every side, his motions continually interrupted by those of his comrades; agitated by the cries of the dying, and by the terror of death floating before his eyes, himself and the object he aims at, if any, in perpetual motion? Very little can be expected from this man, as we have already shewn. When to all this you add the motions of the horse, it will appear evident that fire-arms, excepting a pair of pistols, when the enemy is near, are totally incompatible with cavalry, as well as with all massive bodies; be-
cause

cause neither can use them with advantage. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible to find out a method to range the infantry, so as to make use of fire-arms with any degree of success. If it is formed of several ranks, three or more deep, and likewise with the ranks and files close, as is now the mode, they cannot make use of their arms; and if formed in few ranks, with ranks and files open, they cannot fire at all; and being thus disunited, they can neither move nor act for want of strength. On the whole, therefore, it seems impossible to range a body of men armed with muskets so that they may have the properties required, viz. strength, activity, and universality. These difficulties have obliged the moderns to try several methods to diminish them, by introducing different manners of firing. Some have thought it was best to fire by ranks, others by files, as platoons, divisions, &c. Count St. Germain, in a valuable treatise published since his death, rejects both methods, and proposes it should be done by single files, beginning at the right or left. The firing by ranks, if you begin with the last, then the second, and first successively, is undoubtedly the most simple mode of any, and the least subject to difficulties and confusion. The last rank having fired falls back three steps, the second one, and the first remaining in their place. Then they close the ranks, and begin with their third rank as before, advancing gradually ten or twenty paces, and then halt to fire as before. The platoon firing, especially if done in small divisions, does not continue two minutes, it is all confusion, to which the noise of the officers in giving command does not a little contribute. The method proposed by St. Germain is subject to the same and greater difficulties. Whence it appears that a musket, and indeed every other species of missile weapon, can be used with advantage only by men placed singly. The firing by ranks in the manner proposed approaches the nearest to it, and therefore ought to be preferred to all others. It might be continued for several hours regularly, and without any interruption or confusion, which cannot be done in any other method. I do not propose

propose this method as perfect ; I believe it is impossible to find any that is not subject to numberless difficulties. This seems to me to have fewer than others.

IN whatever manner the troops are ranged, and in whatever manner they fire, it is certain the effect is confined within a very narrow compass. When the ground between you and the enemy is very close, so that they cannot approach you without much difficulty, or not at all, then indeed, the use of fire-arms is indispensable, and very advantageous ; the enemy must overcome the obstacles which they throw in his way, and which hinder him from making any great use of his arms, while yours are more or less covered, are fired with ease, and generally with success. But when the enemy can and will approach you, which he ought to do if he attacks, it is evident that the use of the musket ceases, and the combat must be finished by some other weapon, unless your troops are frightened, and run away before the enemy approaches.

FROM these premises I draw two conclusions : 1st. That the musket is not adequate to all the purposes of war : 2d. That the use of fire-arms is particularly adapted to a defensive war. In a plain and open country, where the enemy's cavalry or infantry can approach you, fire-arms soon become useless ; and in a close country you can find a thousand strong camps, which neither cavalry nor infantry can approach without much difficulty : then fire-arms are of infinite use, and the only arms which can be of any service.

BUT, as in war, it is necessary to attack as well as defend ; and it was found that the musket was proper only for the latter, and that every institution would be imperfect, unless a troop was armed with hand weapons as well as missile ; we have attempted to unite the advantages of both by adding the bayonets, but without success : for the whole is too short and cumbersome as a hand weapon, and the bayonet serves only to render the use of the musket more difficult, and its effects less certain.

C H A P.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DEFECTS

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MISSILE AND HAND WEAPONS.

LET us examine and compare the advantages and defects of missile and hand weapons: this will lead us to conclude, that both are absolutely necessary to form the institution of a complete body of men. Fire-arms are calculated for a defensive war, and to keep the enemy at a distance, which prevents a total overthrow; but are of no use when he can approach you.

HAND-WEAPONS, on the contrary, can be of no use at a distance; but are absolutely necessary when the armies approach each other. The former are proper for a close country, the latter for an open one. The effects of the one are precarious and undecisive; those of the latter certain and complete. The musket is the resource of prudence and weakness; hand-weapons are the arms of valor and vigor.

AN able general, at the head of troops armed with fire-arms, though inferior in number to the enemy, may protract a war many years, and finally prevail over a less able leader; which cannot be effected if the armies carry hand-weapons: for they must necessarily soon come to an action, and that action must, from the nature of the arms, be decisive: hence the art of war, among the ancients, was simple and decisive; and hence it is complicated and scientific among the moderns.

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THE art of war of the ancients was confined to what we call evolution, directed to the purpose of fighting only, which they considered as the sole means of finishing a war. In short, their whole attention was directed to discipline, to the exercise of the troops, and to the field of battle.

BUT we study camps, positions, and lines: our plans of operations are very extensive, and often embrace a hundred leagues, which we cover by occupying a given position: those of the ancients were contracted and confined within a narrow compass; seek the enemy, and fight him, was their favorite military maxim: they did not seem to think it possible to protract a war by skilful manœuvres: accordingly, their wars were of very short duration, unless some exterior circumstances, arising from the nature of the ground, that of the troops, and finally, from the different political systems of the contending parties, tended to protract them; which we have shown to be the case in the Peloponnesian war, and which, we shall hereafter see, was the cause that made the Punic wars so long.

THE principles of an active and defensive war were little known to the ancients. Jugurtha and Sertorius seem to have been the only generals of antiquity who understood and practised them: but none of these wars can be compared, for vigor and activity, with the late war in Germany; in which more battles were fought in two campaigns, than in any century among the ancients.

THE result was very different from the usual effect of ancient wars. A great part of the globe changed masters during the sixth century of the Roman republic; whereas the empire of Germany remained in its former state, at the peace of Hubertsburg: this difference arose, we think, entirely from that of the ancient and modern

modern arms, and consequently from the different mode of conducting a war.

WE are often obliged to act a defensive part to cover and protect an immense tract of country against a superior enemy : prudence requires that we should avoid a general action ; and when we think it advisable to risk one, aided as we are with fire-arms, a thousand strong camps may be found where we may engage an enemy with advantage.

A GIVEN position will enable a good general to harrafs and check the progress of an enemy during a whole campaign, whereas the ancients, armed with hand-weapons, came so near each other, that it was almost impossible to avoid a general action, which, from the nature of their arms, was decisive.

FABIUS, aided by a very close and mountainous country, with difficulty protracted one campaign without coming to a battle, because Hannibal's forces consisted chiefly in cavalry, which, in such a country, could not act with advantage.

THE result of what I have said is, that an army armed with fire-arms only, is slow in its motions, and undecisive in its actions ; it is characterized with science and art, and particularly adapted to a defensive war.

TROOPS, armed with hand-weapons, are rapid in their motions, and decisive in their actions ; less scientific than the former, but singularly proper for an attack.

It seems, therefore, that to render an army perfect, and adequate to every purpose of war, it should be provided with both kinds of weapons.

IF one species of arms cannot be made so as to serve the purpose of a musket and a hand-weapon, which I believe is the case, a body of men must be so formed as to manage both kinds of arms ; or, finally, different bodies of men armed differently, must be ranged in such a manner that they can aid and support each other. We shall examine this theory hereafter. How far modern armies are endowed with the perfection we aim at, will appear in the course of our investigation. I beg the reader's pardon for having dwelt so long on this subject, and for having used so many repetitions ; but I consider what I have been advancing as the foundation of all tactics, which alone can offer us some certain and fixed principles to form and conduct an army : I hope, therefore, and recommend to all military men, that what has been said in this chapter may be examined and weighed with the attention it deserves.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE FORMATION

OF

BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS.

THE moderns have adopted the musket as an universal weapon, and, of course, endeavoured to range the infantry relatively to its form and use ; but without success : for we have already proved, that a body of men, ranged three deep, cannot make use of fire-arms with advantage, which the experience of every battle, and the millions of shot fired without effect, prove to a demonstration. Besides, this mode of ranging the troops is attended with many inconveniencies, and is subject to some capital defects.

FIRST,

BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS. 11

FIRST, A line of three ranks wants strength : it cannot withstand the shock either of horse or foot, if the former act with vigor, and if the latter are formed on more solid principles, and are properly armed. This extreme weakness is the cause that two or three battalions cannot advance half a mile on a plain, on a day of review, without floating : one part or other always projects ; and you are forced to stop continually to rectify the line, and make it proceed regularly.

SECOND, This very thin order necessarily obliges you to extend the front, whose motions become more difficult in proportion ; and activity, the most essential quality an army can possess, is entirely lost.

A **LINE**, consisting of thirty battalions and fifty squadrons, occupies five or six miles from one end to the other. It is easy to conceive, that however open the country may be, so extensive a line must move with great slowness and difficulty ; and if the ground is close, and intersected with hedges, ravins, &c. it can neither move nor act at all ; and the whole is continually stopped, sometimes for many hours, before you can advance a single mile : and when at length you come near the enemy, your attacks are weak and partial, confined to some particular points, which are often not the most favorable : whereas a general effort should be made against the enemy's whole front, while at the same time particular ones are carried on against those parts which offer the greatest advantages.

THE slowness of your march gives the enemy time to prepare themselves for your reception, to change their position, or to retire so prudently, that these mighty preparations finish in a few inconsiderable skirmishes.

It matters not how numerous an army is, unless, by superior activity and disposition, you can and do bring more men into action against the different points you attack, than the enemy can oppose to you.

It was to this advantage only that the king of Prussia owed many of his victories in the last war ; for his army, except at the battle of Prague, was always inferior to those of his enemies : add to this, that such an extensive line must necessarily have many weak parts from unfavorable ground, of which an able general will avail himself, and attack you there with advantage.

FINALLY, your disposition being once made, it must be prosecuted, and the line must advance on its original track ; for its extreme length and natural slowness do not permit any alteration to be made near the enemy, however necessary it might be ; and if a brigade or a regiment is thrown into confusion, the whole line must stop ; and if some remedy is not instantly applied, drawn from the second line, the battle is lost : for the enemy penetrates through the interval, attacks your army, thus cut in two, on both flanks, and beats you ; which happened exactly in this manner at the battle of Prague, as we shall relate hereafter. Much more might be said to prove, that the modern method of ranging the infantry three deep, renders it totally defective in two essential properties—strength and activity.

THIS method of ranging the infantry three deep is likewise so far from rendering it universally proper for all operations of war, that it can march in that order only in a plain, at the risk of being cut to pieces by a resolute cavalry, or by infantry formed on more solid and active principles ; and it can fight only, when covered by a strong country, by intrenchments, &c. where an enemy can approach it with difficulty : so that, upon the whole, it seems defective

tive in three points, viz. strength, activity, and universality; in which we think the perfection of an army, and indeed of every machine, doth principally consist. This we give as our opinion only, without the least pretensions to infallibility: let the more able examine and decide.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE CAVALRY.

THOUGH I have not served in the cavalry, yet, as I have several times commanded considerable detachments of horse, I hope it will not be thought impertinent, if I presume to give my opinion upon this subject.

CAVALRY are generally, like the Infantry, ranged three deep, and armed with muskets, pistols, and swords. The difficulty with which the infantry manage the musket, proves that the cavalry cannot use it at all, particularly the two last ranks.

THE Hussars, and such troops as generally act singly, may be permitted to continue the use of muskets; but those who are formed and ranged to act in a mass, and sword in hand, ought not to carry them, because they are expensive, troublesome, and totally useless.

It will be objected, that if the cavalry do not carry a musket, a few Hussars, or other troops who do, will be able to harraßs, and
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perhaps beat double the number of the best cavalry, who can neither remain quiet on the spot, nor pursue in a line; the only method they have in acting against a scattered and light enemy. The musket, therefore, is necessary in the cavalry.

THIS argument appears plausible; but in fact has, in my humble opinion, little weight: for whether they carry muskets, or not, they will lose their labour if ever they pretend to skirmish with the light horse; their men and horses will be harrassed; and they will be finally beat back to their line, from which they ought never to depart.

CAVALRY neither can, nor ought to fight but with sword in hand; when the ground, or the troops they contend with, do not permit this to be done, they must be kept back, or else mixed with strong detachments of infantry, formed in such a manner as to be able to resist the charge of the enemy's cavalry; of course the musket must be laid aside.

THE ranging of the cavalry three deep is intended, no doubt, to enable them to resist the shock of an enemy; but as we have said before, they ought not at any time to wait for the shock, because even a light and weak cavalry, on full gallop, will break through any line of horse, however massive, if it waits the shock.

THE ranks being closed, the first overthrown, necessarily falls on the second, this on the third, and so on; and the whole runs away: but if the ranks were kept at some distance from one another, when the first was broken, the second might advance and attack the enemy, already checked and in disorder, and easily put them to flight. But being formed, ranks and files closed, there is no remedy at all for a disaster, except from the second line or reserve, as in the infantry:

infantry: and even this resource will fail of success, if the enemy pursues his advantages with vigour. For the first line will probably throw the second also into confusion, because there are not sufficient openings in the second for the first to pass through, which there ought to be: then indeed the second line, on seeing the first in confusion, ought to advance sword in hand, and might thus probably gain an easy victory. The broken line in the mean time recollects itself, and forms again behind the second, which is now become the first.

THE sword is too short, and particularly, as the soldier is taught to sit with long stirrups; he kills the horse by a dead weight, always bearing without intermission on the same parts: this may be graceful for aught I know, but it is very oppressive to the horse, and hinders the man from reaching the enemy. Pistols are necessary in case the man loses his sword, that he may not remain totally defenceless.

PEOPLE talk very much of the shock of the cavalry. If they mean that two horses push each other, and strike with their breasts, which the French, who abound in unmeaning words, call *COUR DE POITRAIL*, it is an absurdity; for the head and neck being projected in a right line before the horse's breast, it is impossible to strike with it; something, however, considerable is, and may be done, when a squadron either waits for, or encounters another.

THE horses being pushed on vigorously, and finding themselves checked by the head of those in front, endeavour to pass between them; and in such case, it is certain that the cavalry, which moves with the greatest velocity, whatever may be the opposite mass, will undoubtedly penetrate and overthrow it. Hence it is that velocity is every thing in the cavalry; if you are deficient in this, your

cavalry is not worth keeping. I saw once an example of this kind during the last war near Gourolitz in Lufitania.

ZIETHEN's regiment of hussars fell in with the Austrian carabineers, and was repulsed; but on seeing the King's army arrive they rallied, attacked the carabineers (who imprudently waited quietly on the spot) broke them, drove some hundreds into a morass, where they were killed or made prisoners in sight of the Austrian vanguard, consisting of eight or ten thousand men, who could not relieve them; for the action lasted only a few minutes.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE.

BY order of battle, I mean the distribution of the different species of troops of which an army is composed, not including those which pass under the denomination of light troops, as they never enter the line.

IN general, the whole is ranged in two or more lines; because, first, the being formed only in three ranks, it would take up so much ground, that it would be impossible to range or manage a numerous army. Secondly, to supply the defects and weakness of the first line, by supporting it, and replacing the whole or any part of it, which may be broken and thrown into disorder, by the second.

THE cavalry and infantry form separate bodies; the former are generally placed on the flanks of the latter.

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THE perfection of an order of battle consists, as we apprehend, first, in placing each body of men, where they can act with most advantage. Secondly, in bodies of different species, being so placed as to be able to support each other that the victory may be complete; otherwise it often happens, that while your cavalry are victorious, the infantry are beat, and the battle lost, or vice versa. Thirdly, in your armies being so ranged as to be universally adapted to different species of ground, so as to require no material alteration in marching up to the enemy, or during the action.

FIRST, It is evident, that if the cavalry are placed on the flanks of the infantry, they can neither support, nor be supported by it, which disposition I therefore conceive is a most capital defect.

SECOND, Both in marching, camping, and fighting, it may and generally does happen, that the infantry and cavalry are placed on improper ground, where, however, they must so remain; because it is in general impossible to change the original disposition; therefore, upon the whole, it seems deficient in all the points, which constitute a solid and active order of battle.

MOREOVER, as both lines are formed in a close order, if the first is broke and vigorously pursued, it overthrows the second for want of sufficient openings. This cannot advance with celerity, and in a firm order to stop the enemy; so that both generally go off together, and the battle is lost. Whereas, if at least the second line had intervals to let the first pass through them, and at the same time advanced in good order, while the enemy is in some degree of confusion, they would not only check them, but probably would gain an easy victory.

THE reason given for placing the cavalry on the wings is, to protect the flanks of the infantry, which I think is the most absurd

fund reason that can be alledged, because this may in a moment fortify its flanks against infantry or cavalry, by forming a square or a column, which the cavalry cannot do ; its flanks are naturally so weak, that they offer no kind of defence.

M. ST. GERMAIN, in a work published since his death, for this very reason advises, that the cavalry should camp behind the infantry, because, says he, if it is attacked in the night, it is totally defeated before it can be put in a state of defence.

NUMBERS, beyond a certain point, can add nothing to the force of an army, unless they can be made to act together ; they increase its inactivity, and render it altogether unmanageable. By thus separating the cavalry from the infantry, it very seldom happens that they can be brought to act in a proper place, and in a proper moment : they really, in a day of action, form two different armies, and act separately, and very indirectly contribute, if at all, to the support and success of each other.

If either is beat, the other must fall back and retire : whereas if they were formed on other principles, the whole must be vanquished, or none, because they would form only one army, though composed of different species of troops, and mutually support each other.

BEFORE I conclude this discourse, I must, first, beg leave to recapitulate, briefly, what we have said, that the reader may see it at one view, and be enabled to examine and form a clear judgment of it. Secondly, to give a description of a battle, which will corroborate and illustrate the opinions and arguments that I have endeavoured to establish.

FIRST, The general use of fire-arms, and of every kind of missile weapons, is not adapted to all the various operations of war, but is
singularly

singularly proper for a defensive war, and consequently for a close country, where the troops being covered and protected by the obstacles which such a country offers, the enemy can with difficulty approach you.

SECONDLY, That the use of missile weapons has rendered the art of war much more scientific than it was among the ancients, when it was confined chiefly to the arrangement of the troops, the exercise, and evolutions: what we call manœuvres, on an extensive line, seem to have been little known to them; and fighting was the only method adopted by them for finishing a war, which the nature of their arms soon brought to a conclusion.

THIRDLY, That our battles neither are nor can be decisive, and may be considered rather as great skirmishes than general actions, very few being slain in comparison with what happened when hand-weapons alone were used.

FOURTHLY, Though our infantry were formed three deep, with a view to the musket they carry; yet can they make but a very imperfect use of it, and the cavalry cannot use it at all.

FIFTHLY, That by forming both infantry and cavalry in three ranks, they are too weak to march with firmness and consistence, to attack or defend themselves against troops formed on more solid and active principles.

SIXTHLY, This method of forming the troops necessarily lengthens the line, so that it cannot march with any velocity in a plain, much less in a close country.

SEVENTHLY, That a line of five or six miles, does of course meet with improper ground for the kind of troops which may happen

pen to be placed there ; yet no alteration can be made in the line, however necessary it may be.

EIGHTHLY, That the whole front must advance together, which renders it totally inactive, and gives the enemy time to take their measures for fighting or retreating at their pleasure, which reduces the battle to an inconsiderable skirmish.

NINTHLY, That the general cannot possibly see and conduct all the operations of such an extensive line, so that, by the neglect, ignorance, or malice of the officers under his command, the action is always very imperfectly carried on, and fails of success in more than one point ; which may render that of the other attacks useless. It wants, in short, unity of action and activity in the execution.

TENTHLY, To prevent the line from being protracted without end, we are obliged to form several ; so that if we consider the few men who act together in the first, and that none at all act in the others, unless successively, and when it is commonly too late ; we shall find, that not a sixth part of the army is engaged at one time, and of that sixth part not one, perhaps, at the most eligible point of attack or defence.

ALL these defects, and many more which could be enumerated, proceed originally from our making the musket the general instrument ; and from our adapting both the formation of the troops and order of battle to that instrument, as we have clearly proved in the preceding chapters.

OF A BATTLE.

I CAN no way better expose the defects of our military arrangements, than by relating in a few words, how this great machine, an army, is brought into action, how a battle is fought and concluded,

cluded, and what are, in general, its consequences, which I have seen in the course of several campaigns.

AFTER many marches and counter-marches, which often take up the most favourable part of a campaign, a battle is at length resolved on: all those who are informed of this resolution, and too many always are, put themselves in motion to solicit some command, or to carry the news of the expected victory; in obtaining which favour and intrigue generally prevail, to the prejudice of the truly brave and deserving officer.

SEVERAL days are employed in examining the position of the enemy, which might be done in five minutes; for a general who cannot, in one instant of time, see and determine the manner of attacking any camp, is unworthy to command an army: during such delay, the enemy prepare themselves to receive you, fortify themselves, change their position, or retire; so that you have fresh and great difficulties to encounter, or perhaps you lose your labour, and must follow the enemy to seek another opportunity, which may not offer in a whole campaign; especially if under an able general, who wishes to avoid an action.

THE mode of attacking is at length fixed, which, ten to one, must be altered, because the enemy, while you lose your time in preparing yourself, have materially altered their position. If you are not apprized of this in time, and you march up to them, your original disposition is lost, and you are unable to form another that may be proper to answer the present circumstances, which may require that your cavalry or infantry should change the ground, and replace each other. Nothing of this can be executed before the enemy, without offering your flanks, and consequently exposing yourself to a total defeat. When any alteration in the order of battle is required, it should be done a day or two before you quit
your

your camp, otherwise such confusion will ensue as cannot be remedied.

THE battle of Lignitz, in 1760, was lost, and the brave Laudhon sacrificed to malice or ignorance, because the quarter-master general of M. Daun's army would, the evening before the battle, change entirely the original order of battle without any apparent reason. The consequence was, that the main army arrived upon the ground about ten hours too late, when we found Laudhon had been well beat, and the king ready to receive us; but as our original plan was frustrated, we could not form another, though we had sufficient time, and though with Laudhon's army we were above twenty thousand men stronger than the enemy, whom we permitted to continue his march to the Oder unmolested: the reader will pardon this digression.

THE different brigades of artillery generally precede the columns, to favour their developement; that is, to prevent the enemy from opposing the forming of the line, and because the general and the soldier think nothing can be done without it, though in truth it produces more noise than any real advantage. This prodigious train of cannon, and its concomitants, continually stop and retard the march of the troops by some accident or other, so that seldom or ever they arrive together, and in time, on the ground where the line is to be formed.

THIS is a very critical moment, if the enemy knew how to avail himself of it: for if he is perfectly acquainted with the ground between his camp, and that which you have left, he will know all the roads by which you march, and consequently by advancing to meet you, in order of battle, he can attack the heads of your columns, and defeat them all singly, without giving them an opportunity of ever forming the line, in the same manner as one attacks
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a rear-guard : but happily for you, he confides in the strength of his post, and suffers you to do what you please.

HIS army is like a set of china-ware on a chimney-piece, it must not be touched or moved, for fear of breaking it : after three or four hours cannonading and skirmishing your army is formed, and advances towards the enemy preceded by the artillery, which retards the march very much, and occasions the loss of many men, which could be avoided by marching rapidly to the enemy.

SUPPOSING the army consists of sixty thousand men, the first line will occupy five or six miles ; in this extent of ground a thousand obstacles both by art and nature occur, which necessarily retard your progress, because the whole line must advance together ; for if some parts precede at any, though small distances, the others, a vigilant enemy, by marching rapidly through the intervals, cuts your army asunder, takes you in flank and gains the battle ; which so happened exactly at the battle of Prague.

To avoid such an inconvenience, by keeping your army together, and advancing in a line parallel to that of the enemy, you are sometimes several hours in getting over a mile of ground, which ought to be executed in a few minutes. If by the firmness of your troops, and the inactivity of your enemy, you come up with him, and succeed in one or two points of attack only, the battle is won, though perhaps only two or three battalions have been displaced ; and if you fail in what you suppose the principal attack, you retire almost unpursued, and you have lost the battle.

IN the former case, the enemy has no resource in his first line, which can make no movement but forwards or backwards ; so that if you can maintain yourself on the ground you have gained, the

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enemy

enemy retires successively, and goes off. This is a critical moment also, if the enemy knew what to do.

If instead of endeavouring to regain the points lost, he advanced part of his second line to prevent your going farther, and oblige you to bring the greatest part of your forces to maintain the ground gained, which is generally done ; and if with the rest of his army he made some considerable effort on the rest of your line, in all probability he would succeed, and force you by this means to relinquish the advantages you had gained to prevent this part of your army from being cut off, which would certainly happen, if any other part of your line was driven back and defeated : sometimes, indeed, such a movement is made, but generally with a view only to favour a retreat, and seldom or ever to gain a victory.

As your attacks are successive, so must your advantages be, and you gain one part after another, or rather the enemy abandons them, you can make no general effort in attacking or pursuing the enemy, who has time to retire at his leisure.

Your army who have, perhaps, been twenty-four hours under arms, are so fatigued with that situation and with the combat, that they are unable to move, and much less to prosecute the advantages they have gained with any vigour.

The light troops are sent after the enemy, but with small success, for they are generally attentive only to plunder ; and moreover, a few battalions thrown into a wood or village put an end to the pursuit ; and the enemy, who probably have lost only a few cannon and prisoners, occupy a neighbouring hill, and your victory is reduced to nothing more than barely the field of battle.

SUCH

SUCH have been the victories I have seen, and such the consequences, which I can attribute only to the natural slowness and inactivity of our armies, which proceed, as we have shewn, from the use of fire-arms, and from the consequent mode of ranging the troops.

SOMETIMES, indeed, a commander of very superior abilities may, from such an imperfect victory as I have described, draw great and signal advantages, as it happened after the battle of Lissa, where the Austrians, in the course of a month, lost successively the greater part of their army, without any apparent necessity for the loss.

BUT when the commanders are nearly equal in abilities, a whole war may pass in skirmishes, without their ever coming to a general and conclusive action, which happened on the Rhine when Montecuculi and Turenne were opposed to each other.

INDEED our battles, as we have seen, are commonly nothing more than great skirmishes; and therefore, as I have said before, wars are not now, as formerly, concluded by battles, but for want of means to protract them.

CHAPTER X.

A NEW SYSTEM.

HAVING shewn, in the preceding chapters, that the use of fire-arms exclusively; the arrangement of our infantry and cavalry in three ranks in consequence of using those arms; and finally, the order of battle, are imperfect, and render an army inadequate to almost every operation of war; it remains, that we

should examine, whether and how a given number of men, horse or foot, may be armed and formed, and the order of battle so contrived, that it may be free from those defects to which our modern institutions are subject; and that it possess strength, activity, and universality, in which we make the perfection of an army to consist.

WHILE we make use of fire-arms alone, as is now the case in the infantry (for the bayonet and sword are of no use to the soldier) it is evident, that no system can be formed which will in any degree diminish the imperfections of our armies: if you range the men in two ranks, for example, that they may use the musket with more advantage, the line will be so extensive and weak, that it cannot be managed at all, or scarce be put in motion; much less will it be able to resist the shock of the enemy: and if, on the contrary, you range the troops in four or five ranks, all the arms they can carry will become totally useless.

It follows, therefore, that a certain number of men should be armed with pikes: this alone can enable us to form a number of men in such a manner, that they shall have strength to resist the shock of an enemy, horse or foot, and to act in every kind of ground with equal advantage; it must combine and unite the solidity of hand-weapons with the advantage of fire-arms. If this can be accomplished, we approach very near the perfection we aim at; and undoubtedly render an army, formed on these principles, superior to any other now existing.

THE use of hand-weapons necessarily requires defensive weapons, sufficiently strong to parry or diminish their effects; they are so connected, that they ought never to be separated, particularly in the cavalry, where the action passes sword in hand.

ARMOUR of any kind in the infantry, opposed to infantry, armed as it is at present, is less necessary, though always useful: it gives confidence to the men, and likewise diminishes, and sometimes destroys entirely the effects of a musket-ball when fired from a certain distance, or with a considerable angle, above or below the horizon and direct line. And as infantry may be, and very often is opposed to cavalry, and closes with infantry, I think it ought to be provided with such an armour as we shall propose hereafter.

It is well known, that a third or fourth part of an army, in the course of a few months, by death or sickness, goes off; of which diminution many causes may be assigned, as bad and scanty food, and neglect of the sick in the hospitals. The principal cause however is, I think, the dress, which does not cover the soldier against the inclemency of the weather, and seems calculated only for parade and shew, in a sunshiny day, before the ladies, like the dress of other petit-maitres. Whereas it is evident, that both the dress, arms, and exercise, should be made with a view only to health, and to the purposes of war: and it being impossible for the soldier to carry every thing which may, once in an age, be useful to him, we must fix upon such equipments only, as he will find always necessary and useful.

C H A P T E R X I.

OF THE DRESS OF THE SOLDIER.

HE must have three shirts of strong cloth, without those gewgaws ruffles; two pair of drawers; two pair of breeches made of ticking, and long enough to come almost to his ancles, such as the Hussars, Croats, and Hungarian infantry wear; two pair

pair of strong thread stockings; and four pair of socks, to keep his feet clean, and prevent them from galling and blistering, which is always the case when the wool is next the skin.

He must have two waistcoats of the same stuff with the breeches, and two under-waistcoats, unless the upper ones are lined, which I would prefer.

He must, for the winter, have the same number of woollen stockings, a pair of breeches, waistcoat, and coat of strong and thick woollen cloth. The coat must have a lapelle to come to the waistband of his breeches, and to button from top to bottom. The flaps of the coat and waistcoat must not be so open and gallant as the present mode.

He must also have a good great coat, with sleeves, to come below the calf of the leg, with a small cape or collar to button about his neck, and a hood to come over his head, under his hat.

ALL the winter apparel may remain with the depot of the regiment until September, excepting the great coat: that will keep him warm enough, though the rest of his cloaths are only of linen or cotton.

He must have a black leather stock, quilted within, to keep him warm, and at the same time to keep the stock in a proper shape.

He must, finally, have half boots, which are handsome, and much better than shoes; they prevent the wet in a great measure, and the dust, sand, and gravel, which always get into the shoes, and gall and cripple the man.

I WOULD

I WOULD have a button fixed on the waistband of the breeches, and a loop to the waistcoat, to keep the former up, without tying it too hard, which heats the loins, and hinders the free motion of the limbs. As part of the dress always remains at the regiment's depot, the soldier may carry the rest, and what he really wants, with ease. I have omitted speaking of the hat, that very useless, if not ridiculous piece of dress, because I intend substituting in its place another, which will both cover and protect the head, neck, and shoulders.

CHAPTER XII.

OF DEFENSIVE ARMS OR ARMOUR.

THE first part naturally to be covered is the head. For this purpose, I would have a hat made of strong leather prepared in the same manner as that of which jack-boots are made, such as the couriers abroad use: it must be quilted within to make it fit easy. The brim must be three inches broad to cover the face and carry off the rain: to this brim I would have fixed five or six small chains, made of strong wire, to hook to the breast-plate or cuirass, which he must also have. Such a hat will effectually protect the upper part of his body against the sabre, in whatever manner it is used, either by striking as the Europeans, or pushing horizontally, as the Turks and Asiatics do.

I WOULD recommend that a plate of brass be put on the hat, signifying the number or name of the regiment, battalion, and company, all which must be numbered. It is incredible how much this trifling circumstance would contribute to enforce discipline and valor.

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HAVING thus clothed and armed our soldiers, we must now proceed to range them, and in such a manner, that they may make use of their arms to advantage. I would have the infantry formed in four ranks, and the three foremost armed as I have directed with a musket and short lance only; the fourth and last rank with the long pike, sword, and a pair of pistols.

THE shortest men to be placed foremost, and the others successively, according to their size; so that the fourth rank be the tallest. This disposition will greatly facilitate the use of their arms; whereas the method used has a contrary effect; it is absurd, and calculated for shew only.

THE three foremost ranks, protected by the pikes when they approach the enemy, will, if they fire by ranks and with temper, do it effectually, and when at a distance, before they have fixed on the lance to their musket, can manage it with great ease, and consequently with effect.

IT is needless to observe, that a body of men ranged in four ranks march more steadily than in fewer, and faster. It is true the line will be shorter by a fourth part; but this circumstance is so far from being a defect, that on the contrary, it renders the line stronger and more active, which we reckon the greatest of all advantages. But it may be said, if your line is shorter, the enemy will attack one if not both your flanks. This objection will fall to the ground by the general arrangement of the whole, as will appear hereafter.

FOR the present let it suffice to prove, that a body of men formed three deep cannot resist the shock of one that is four deep, and armed with lances, muskets, and pikes, and the quantity of fire is nearly equal; for that part of the enemy's line, which extends beyond your flanks, is of no use while at a distance, as the men in a line cannot be brought to fire on the right and left, so their fire is
lost;

lost; and when you approach the enemy, you must march rapidly up to him, which will soon put an end to the dispute. But this OUT-FLANKING of you cannot happen, by the mode in which we propose to range our battalions.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS.

I WOULD have a battalion consist of five companies, one of which is to be called light infantry; the other four heavy infantry, all armed alike, excepting that the lance, which is to serve instead of the bayonet, may be made a foot longer for the light than for the heavy infantry, because they generally act singly, and therefore can manage it with ease.

EACH company of the heavy infantry is to consist of one hundred and twenty-eight men, rank and file, not including officers and under officers; the company of light infantry being much oftener called upon duty, should be much stronger, they might even amount to two hundred, for they would decrease probably much faster than the others.

EACH company of heavy infantry will form a front of thirty-two men, the battalion consisting of four companies, one hundred and twenty-eight files, to whom I allow one hundred yards or something more of ground; because I would not have the files close and pressed, as that situation hinders them from using their arms.

Four companies of heavy infantry will make	-	512
One of light infantry we will suppose	-	200
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A REGIMENT

A REGIMENT of two battalions will make eight companies of heavy infantry, and two of light, which in the whole amount to about one thousand four hundred. It will be asked, why so many light infantry? My answer is this:

LET the regiment be formed as in the annexed plate, with an interval of one hundred yards between each battalion, who must have on their flanks, one three or four pounder, and one seven or eight inch howitzer.

THE two companies of light infantry will be placed opposite the opening between the two battalions, and on the flanks. As these may extend themselves at leisure fifty yards to the right and left or more, and even the interval between the two battalions may be made to extend one hundred and fifty yards without inconvenience or danger, it is evident that the whole ground occupied by our regiment, though formed in four ranks, greatly out-flanks the same number of men in three only.

THE fire of our two light companies will alone produce a greater effect than that of the enemy, for this obvious reason, that our light infantry acts where and how they please; aims at their leisure, crosses their fire along the enemy's whole front, goes upon their flanks, &c. in short, it acts with all the advantage of real and expert chasseurs. If to this you add the solid fire of the heavy infantry, it will appear undoubtedly true, that upon the whole, we shall in this be superior to the enemy, as we shall be in the extent, strength, and activity of the line. Vide Pl. I. fig. 4. & 5.

I ASK, what will the enemy do? Will he advance within that portion of circle, and come to the shock? What chance has he with his short musket and bayonet against my musket and lance, and a row of pikes, which project six feet beyond the first rank,
and

and prevents him from approaching it, and much more from breaking it? If he waits your approaching him, he is overthrown in a moment : when you can come up to him you must conquer.

SUPPOSING the country is much inclosed, it is evident that here likewise you have the advantage ; for he cannot possibly drive you from behind a hedge, ditch, or an entrenchment ; and if you attack him, having come so near, to be within reach of your pikes, he must fly : and finally, if you cannot approach him with your line, the two companies of light troops may get on his flanks, and force him to abandon his post, however strong : therefore, in whatever species of ground you act, you must necessarily prevail over the enemy.

So much for infantry opposed to infantry. Let us now examine, whether formed and armed on our principles, it may not likewise be opposed with equal success to cavalry, in a plain and open country. If this can be done, then we may declare, that our institution is perfect.

• LET each company be divided into four parts, and form a column of eight men in front, and sixteen deep ; and let the companies, thus thrown into columns, be ranged as in the plate, with the light infantry and cannon. Vide Plate I.

I SUPPOSE this battalion is attacked in a plain by ten squadrons. My light infantry and cannon keep off the cavalry, probably effectually ; particularly, if the first and second ranks advance one after the other, and fire like the light infantry, which they may do without any risk, at the distance of twenty or thirty yards ; because if they are pressed they resume their post, and the light infantry fills up the intervals between the companies.

I WILL

I WILL let the cavalry advance full gallop, undismayed by the fire of the columns ; and I oppose to them eight ranks, the three first armed with the musket and lance ; the fourth and fifth with long pikes, while the sixth, seventh, and eighth can fire at the enemy, who is so much higher, without any inconvenience to themselves, or danger to the preceding ranks, as is evident.

Now I would ask Seidlitz, were he alive ; I ask Wagnitz in the Hessian service ; I ask Sir William Erskine in ours, Whether they think they can, at the head of two thousand Elliots, break this column ? They can. Well, I will join the four companies, and form a complete square ; can they break this ? No ; they will not say they can : for, exclusively of the musket, lances, and pikes, I will venture to say, that no body of horse, with any degree of velocity, is able to break through a body of infantry of sixteen ranks, because the quantity of action produced by a horseman on full gallop (for one only shocks at a time) is not equal to the resistance of sixteen men placed behind each other, so near as to support in a mass the shock of the horseman.

I CONCLUDE therefore that, armed as I propose, a battalion of infantry will beat in the open field twice the number, or indeed any number of horsemen formed and armed as they are at present.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE CAVALRY.

THE more I consider the cavalry, the less I am able to say or write any thing which can satisfy myself, much less those who are better informed than I am in this branch of military knowledge.

WHETHER it is ranged in three or in thirty ranks, it is always certain that the first rank alone can act, be they armed with fire-arms, or with swords, or with both. And if the first rank is broken, and thrown into confusion, the whole must give way.

SECONDLY, That if a body of horse remains on the spot, any troop, cavalry or infantry, armed with a musket, will beat it, and force it to retire, or to advance sword in hand, which avails nothing against infantry covered, or against light cavalry which skirmishes, because it cannot approach the former, nor reach the latter, without breaking the line: then it is inferior to them; because their superior velocity enables them to baffle every pursuit of heavy cavalry. If these charge, the foremost rank alone can use their weapons; the others are of no use, but to supply the place of the slain or wounded in the first; so that a third part only of your cavalry can act at the same time, and two-thirds remain idle spectators. Activity is the most essential property of the horse: in the present mode of forming it there is none.

IT is an axiom, that you ought to bring as many men into action at once as possible; but though the ground is quite favourable, you can bring only a third part. How is this to be remedied? I don't know. In whatever mode the cavalry is ranged, it is impossible to diminish

diminish the defects above-mentioned ; and if to these you add those which arise from the difficulty of the ground which the enemy may chuse, so as to render your cavalry useless for a whole campaign, one would be tempted to abandon it almost entirely, excepting such a number as is required to patrol, keep guard before the camp, &c. because the expences of it are immense, and its utility insignificant.

IF the infantry, such as we propose, is superior to the cavalry even in open ground, it seems evident that a much smaller number of cavalry, than what is commonly used in our armies, would be sufficient, and we shall establish the proportion between the one and the other accordingly. But whether the cavalry be few or many, how are they to be ranged and distributed ?

WE have shewn that the present mode is bad. Must they then, like the Turkish and Asiatic cavalry, scatter and disperse themselves over the whole country, skirmish with the enemy's line at a distance, surround it, draw it into improper ground, wait till it is in motion and broken, and then attack it sword in hand ?

I CANNOT resolve this question ; but certain it is, that in such a case, ten squadrons acting in this manner produce more real action than fifty formed and acting like ours.

NOR do I see how a line of horse can extricate itself from troops who act like the Spahis, whether it remains on the spot, or advances : this light cavalry will not resist the shock of our line : granted. It will not wait for the shock, but disperse itself, harrafs you, and wait for a more favourable opportunity.

BUT it will be objected, when the light cavalry retires, ours may attack the enemy's infantry, and defeat it : No ; if it is formed as

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we propose : but if the enemy's infantry is broken, a few of our squadrons will drive them off the field. Very well ; but light cavalry will do that much more effectually ; so that which-ever way I consider this subject, I am at a loss what to determine.

I LAY it down, however, as a maxim, that the cavalry should be ranged, and distributed so, that it may act more or less in every kind of ground. Secondly, That whenever any part advances to attack, each individual horseman should really act, and not the foremost rank only, as now is the case.

I AM conscious I walk on a slippery path ; however, I think the order of battle I shall propose will, in a great measure, procure us the advantages we aim at.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE FORMATION OF A SQUADRON.

I WOULD have a squadron consist of 160 men rank and file, not including officers and under-officers ; because, if it is less numerous, it will soon be reduced to nothing, either the horse or man, or both, being ill, you will have no force to take the field.

A REGIMENT shall consist of four such squadrons, and of one of light cavalry, which may amount to 200 men, as these are obliged to greater duties than the others ; so that the whole regiment will amount to something more than 800 men. Each squadron, armed as we have already proposed, shall be formed into four ranks, which make forty files ; and these shall be divided by eight : so that

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each

piquets of both armies, and disappearing when these come to a battle.

BUT according to our plan, they will perform all the duties commonly done by light troops; and likewise in a day of action, they shall be employed in such a manner, as will enable them to render more real service than the heavy infantry, as will appear from the inspection of our order of battle. The same reasoning will equally hold good for the great number of light cavalry; and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat it.

My army shall consist of sixty battalions and forty squadrons. The former will amount in all to about 42,000, and the latter to above 6500; consequently, the whole army will be 48,500 men, which number we think equal to every operation of a campaign. What it may want in numbers, is amply compensated by strength and activity; in which properties we place the greatest advantages an army can possess.

As we shall employ the light cavalry, and the infantry of the same species only to patrol and reconnoitre the enemy, and always together, very few men will be sufficient for that duty. A hundred foot and forty horse will do it more effectually than ten times the number; because a few may approach the enemy unnoticed, which cannot be done by a corps consisting of thousands.

A FEW may know always where you are, mask your great corps, and perform any manœuvre they please without your knowledge; whereas, if a thousand men are placed properly before your front in the most hidden and covered places, they must inevitably be observed. They must carefully avoid being seen on the high roads,

roads, but must place themselves so as to be able to observe whatever passes there.

GREAT corps, like an army, are more anxious to prevent the enemy from observing them, than to observe him; they are afraid of being attacked, which their whole attention is directed to prevent: but the small detachments which I propose cannot be attacked; for when they see a superior force approach, they disperse and retire to the right or left, or to any quarter. The enemy cannot pursue them.

I ESTABLISH it as a maxim, that light troops are not to fight when placed before the front of the army, but to see what the enemy does, and give notice in time. If this doctrine is followed, very few of them will be necessary, and even these must be made useful in a day of action.

THE author of this work, at the head of two hundred chasseurs and a hundred dragoons, did, during the whole campaign of 1760, keep so near the king of Prussia's army, that he never lost sight of it for an hour, though the Austrian army, and the corps he belonged to were generally two or three marches off: and though he was always in sight of the enemy, and scarce a day passed without some skirmish; yet, in the course of the campaign, he did not lose twenty men; and one only was taken prisoner, who got drunk, and staid behind.

THE author does not give this military anecdote to shew his particular merit, far from it; he considers it as a matter of course, which any man of common sense, with activity and vigilance, can equally perform: in fact, there is nothing more simple. Detach thirty or forty chasseurs, who place themselves in small parties along the road to the right and left, covered with hedges, woods, walls, &c.

For these reasons, I do not by any means approve of the modern fashion of employing so many horse. Generally a fourth or fifth at least of the army must be composed of cavalry; I think an eighth will be sufficient, provided the infantry is good, and formed on the principles we have proposed, and that the cavalry be ranged, and placed where it can act; and where it is always supported by artillery and the infantry, which we have endeavoured to combine in our order of battle.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE.

LET any given number of infantry be divided into twenty battalions, and let each of these, formed into three ranks, occupy one hundred fathoms: these will have a front of

of	—	—	—	2000
Let three thousand horse be formed likewise in three ranks: these will amount to a thousand files, each at half a fathom, which will amount to	—			500

For the small intervals generally left between the battalions and squadrons, I allow	—	—		300
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The whole extent of such a line will amount to	—			2800
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Let the same number of foot be ranged in four ranks, each battalion will occupy only seventy-five fathoms: the twenty will occupy	—			1500
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I leave an interval equal to the front, which will be consequently	—	—		1500
				3000

Out of which deduct seventy-five, because there are only nineteen intervals	—			75
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				2925
				My

My line of twenty battalions, consisting of the same number of men, will surpass the other by one hundred and twenty-five fathoms.

THE Plate N° II. represents the two orders of battle; the one, fig. I. according to the usual mode, the other, fig. II. according to our principles. Let us analyse them.

IN the first place, ours outflanks the other by one hundred and twenty-five fathoms, which enables us to attack the enemy's flank, while it is likewise attacked in front.

SECONDLY, Our intervals are filled by three or four thousand light infantry, who fire at their ease, chuse their time and object; and if they are directed to fire obliquely along the enemy's line, and fix the officers in particular, it is probable that the fire of these alone will produce a more real effect than that of the enemy's whole line. If to this you add the fire of the battalions by ranks, as we propose, they will undoubtedly have a very great superiority over the enemy.

THIRDLY, When the two lines approach each other, and come to hand-weapons, it is not presumed that our modern battalions, armed with their bayonets, and three deep, can resist a moment the impulse of four ranks armed with pikes and lances, and likewise protected by their defensive armour, so that in the use of missile and hand-weapons, ours have most certainly the advantage.

I CANNOT imagine any mode by which a modern line can be put on an equality with that which we propose. If it abides by its fire alone, it is unequal; if it comes to a shock and the use of hand-weapons, it is still much more so. Will it break its

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line

line and send detachments after our light infantry? This is in fact adopting our plan, and confessing it cannot be beat but by one similar.

IN our case this will not avail, because should they send such a detachment, our two companies to the right and left of our battalions will form a column, which will take such detachments on both flanks, while the company of light infantry, placed as in fig. 2. attacks them in front, and when they are thrown into confusion, which must soon happen, a squadron or two placed opposite the interval, as marked in the plan, will advance sword in hand and attack them pell-mell, that is, ride through them, which must in a few seconds exterminate them.

I SAW at Silistria, in Turkey, two squadrons attack a column or mass of above six thousand Turks, in this manner, whom they defeated and dispersed in less than three minutes; and had they not covered themselves under the banks of the Danube, whither the cavalry could not pursue them, they would have been all cut to pieces. Colonel Carleton was present at this event.

IT may be objected, that it is not easy for the two companies to form the columns proposed; to which I answer, that such an operation does not require twenty seconds: and moreover, supposing it was not done at all, my company of light infantry, supported by a squadron of horse, armed with the musket and lance, will be more than a match for the enemy's detachment, which, in fact, admits not of the least difficulty till a flank is formed; for the operation is made under the fire of the two remaining companies, and one of light infantry.

I CONCLUDE, therefore, that a modern one is in every respect inferior to that which we propose. I may be prejudiced in favor of
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of my principles; I therefore earnestly intreat experienced gentlemen of my profession, to examine this subject with attention, and if they differ in opinion, I shall be extremely obliged to them if they will communicate their sentiments. Truth is my object.

So much for infantry opposed to infantry. Let us now examine that part of the line which is opposed to the enemy's cavalry. Many people will suppose that our four ranks, though armed with lances and pikes, are not sufficiently strong to resist the shock of a line of horse in three ranks; I am of a different opinion, and fully convinced that they are; because one horse alone can come to the shock at once; and if killed, wounded, or stopped, the other two behind cannot advance, so that the united force of our four men is in fact opposed to that of one horse only, and if these forces are mechanically computed, it will be found that the latter is by much inferior to the former; and if to this you add the effects produced by the fire first, and then by the lances and pikes, no doubt can remain; for the horse has nothing but his weight and velocity. However, be this as it may, I will admit that my infantry is in fact too weak; I will, therefore, form a column of each company, whose front is eight men, and flank sixteen. I hope no one will think this too weak to resist a line of horse, or rather, as we have shewn, one rank, which alone can act.

ACCORDING to our proposed plan, seven battalions, and as many squadrons, are opposed to twenty squadrons; these battalions have seven howitzers, and as many field pieces. The light infantry is placed before the intervals, and my seven squadrons behind them. The first and the artillery keep up a constant fire against the cavalry. Now I ask, will it support this fire, and for how long? I believe not long, it must either advance or retire when you approach it; I suppose the former, which can be done only between my intervals.

vals. My light infantry and my cavalry post themselves as marked in the plan. Only part of the enemy's cavalry can pass at once, and these will receive the fire of two columns in their flanks, and when they have passed will be fired at by the light infantry in their backs; in that instant my seven squadrons will attack them in flank and rear, and I think totally disperse them.

INDEED, I am so persuaded of the superiority of my infantry ranged and armed in the manner proposed, that I do not think any cavalry, however resolute, can approach, much less break it; in-somuch, that I would venture to attack it in an open country. If the enemy's cavalry retires, you must send yours after them, who pursue them, not in a line, but like our hussars.

THE second plate shews our order of battle advancing to the enemy, and whoever considers it with attention, will perceive, that though there are intervals between our battalions, the enemy cannot avail himself of them, for he dares not penetrate between them without ruin, as he will be opposed by our light infantry and cavalry. Moreover, he must break his own line, and leave an interval, which cannot be guarded but by the second line, which is generally too far off. In the mean time the disposition of our line enables it to advance without any interruption, as no inconvenience can arise from one part's being more advanced than another, for that part is protected by the cavalry and light infantry. Even, if many of our companies or battalions were broken, the enemy cannot pursue them without breaking his line, and exposing such detachments as he may order to advance, to be attacked in front and flank. And lastly, the march of the whole is infinitely more rapid than if the line was close as usual. I therefore conclude, that our order of battle is much superior to any other, and probably is that which has the fewest defects of any which can be invented, and in which

which are combined the many advantages of missile and hand-weapons.

THE next plate shews our order of battle, when our troops approach within thirty or forty yards of the enemy, which they can get over in as many seconds.

THE meaning of this disposition is obvious. The two columns on each flank of the battalions, when they have broken the enemy's line, fire on the flanks, while the other two companies continue to fire before them on those who run away, and pursue them without intermission, while the cavalry pursue those who fly, with vigour. The light infantry advances very little before the intervals, and leaves the pursuit to the cavalry.

IF our line advances in this manner with rapidity, the enemy's first line will be cut to pieces, and the second share the same fate, if it does not retire in time. The same superiority of force and activity will always prevail, and the victory must from the mode of attacking be complete and decisive.

BY my order of battle, all the infantry is placed in one line, and all the cavalry in the second: different in this as in many other things from the modern, as appears from the inspection of the plan in plate N° II. My reasons for this arrangement are;

FIRST, That I think it sufficiently strong to overturn a modern line formed and armed on weaker principles.

SECONDLY, Because all my infantry acts at once, and my cavalry is brought into action only when the enemy's line, infantry, or cavalry is thrown into disorder, when mine can act with advantage.

THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, That every species of troops, infantry, cavalry, light infantry, and artillery, support and assist each other: so that the total quantity of action produced by my line is greatly superior to that of the enemy, and consequently must conquer. As according to the constitution of our army, it consists of sixty battalions, and forty squadrons, if the first are formed in one line, it will be extremely long and difficult to manage; we therefore propose, that forty battalions only should be united in one corps; these will occupy a space something more than forty battalions and forty squadrons of the enemy.

THE remaining twenty battalions I would have formed into separate corps, as marked in the plan, plate III. fig. 1. to attack the enemy in flank, while the forty attack him in front. The advantages of such a disposition are too obvious to require an explanation.

IF notwithstanding what we have said, our order of battle is thought too weak, being in one line only; then we propose that the twenty battalions should be divided; viz. Seven should be placed behind the right wing, seven behind the left, and six behind the center, as it is marked in the plan, No III. fig. 2. with the cavalry in the second line. This disposition will satisfy those who are accustomed to two lines and a reserve: but I prefer the other disposition for many reasons, which will occur to every person who will examine the two plans with attention. I shall only observe, that the first disposition is most proper for attacking, and the second for defending. The first has however two great advantages. First, That all your infantry act at the same time, and not successively as in the second. Secondly, That you necessarily attack the enemy on both flanks, as appears by the plans themselves.

It seems needless to observe, that if the enemy opposes cavalry, as probably he may, to the corps, A. B. This must be thrown
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into columns, as we directed, and as is marked on the first plan, N^o I. but if opposed to infantry, no alteration to this reference is required.

WE have already shewn, that the modern mode of ranging an army, and the use of missive weapons, renders it totally inactive, and proper only for a defensive war, and to fight at a distance, to receive an enemy rather than attack him. To increase this inactivity, the general, as well as the soldier, seem to place all their confidence in the artillery, rather than in the valour of the soldier; accordingly the cannon is become the soul of our military establishments.

AT the battle of Prague there were above five hundred pieces of heavy cannon, which at a moderate computation, with the train, cost more than forty thousand foot would have done; and yet they did not produce any effect proportionate to such an immense expence. I have three capital objections to this abuse of artillery—the expence of it, the number of horses required to attend it, and the great delays it always occasions in the motion of the army.

IN sieges there cannot be too much, nor in the field too little artillery. In this last case, the use of heavy cannon is very much contracted, it can be carried but in few roads, cannot advance with the line, and must be employed only to protect the heads of the columns while they come out from a defile, and form the line, to form a battery against some point of attack, or to defend an intrenchment.

If the enemy is at all acquainted with his business, he may order his men to lie flat on the ground till your troops advance, and then attack them, or wait till they come up, in which cases the artillery has little or no effect; and by a quick motion he comes up to
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your intrenchment, and attacks it sword in hand, which will render your cannon useless. When a battery is directed against a defile, you may almost always avoid it, by turning to the right or left.

A good van-guard with the field pieces will protect the heads of your columns better than all the batteries you can raise; besides, if the defiles you pass through are within reach of the enemy, he may either oppose artillery to artillery, or, which is much better, advance rapidly and attack them. The instant he approaches, the cannon ceases to be of any use.

UPON the whole, therefore, I conclude, that when you propose waiting for the enemy in some fortified post, as in a fortress, you must have abundance of heavy artillery: but as we place the greatest perfection of an army in its velocity, and our system is, we think, particularly calculated for that, and the use of hand-weapons, which renders missile weapons of every kind less useful, we reject of course that prodigious quantity of artillery, and we think thirty or forty twelve pounders more than sufficient for an army of fifty thousand men.

IN ten campaigns, you may not find an occasion where these are necessary, and where common field pieces would not do the business equally well. As we have said already our troops have much confidence in a numerous artillery; merely to indulge them in this opinion, though erroneous, I conceive that each battalion should have a field piece, and a seven inch howitzer, until they are accustomed to the use of hand-weapons, and to face the enemy, then they will perceive, that artillery in general is so far from being useful, that it retards their marches, and exposes them, during these delays, to much greater losses and danger, than if they left their artillery behind them, and thus disincumbered advance rapidly to the enemy.

GENERAL

GENERAL REFLECTION.

WHAT we have said regards an army in the field. It remains we should examine how such an army is to be prepared for action during peace, and how supported while in the field.

ONE of the greatest difficulties which occur, is in supporting the army in the field, I mean in furnishing recruits and cloathing. In a campaign or two, recruits are wanted, and the troops are almost naked.

THE first are raised in the country, very often at a great distance from these at of war ; so that many perish before they arrive ; others are totally unfit for service, and the few remaining placed in regiments, are quite raw, and before these can be rendered useful, many go to the hospital ; hence one may safely affirm, that not one fourth part ever arrives to a state of maturity and become real and useful soldiers. What a waste and destruction of men ! Forty years peace and a good government will not atone for the calamities and losses of a six years war.

DURING the late war in Turkey, the Russians raised above three hundred thousand recruits, and yet the principal army under M. Romanzow, at the conclusion of it, did not amount to above thirty-six thousand ; and that in Crimea, under Prince Dolgorouki, to about twelve thousand, and all were in want of many necessary articles, which is always the case, particularly if contractors are any way concerned.

WHAT prevention of these evils can be found, it will be naturally asked ? The best I can think of is as follows :

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LET the regiments have what we call perpetual quarters ; that is, they must always during the peace, remain in one fixed place : and these places must form a chain on that frontier, which most probably may hereafter be the seat of war. For each regiment must be built a small town in separate caserns, to prevent fire from communicating to the whole. A certain quantity of land must be assigned to them. If the frontier is subject to sudden attacks from small parties of the enemy, I would have a good intrenchment drawn about the caserns or barracks, with a good ditch well palisaded, where the peasants may remain in safety with their cattle, &c.

THE recruits must be delivered to the regiments who are to take care to have them exercised. All the materials which serve to cloath the troops, must likewise be delivered into this depot, and there worked and made up by the soldiers and their wives, which would produce a vast saving to the sovereign, and the soldier would be better cloathed.

IN time of war, a battalion remains here to train the recruits, and provide the cloathing for the whole regiment.

ALL the sick and invalids, wounded, &c. officers and soldiers, must be sent to this depot, where they can always be of service, though unfit for military duty in the field. If a sufficient quantity of land is assigned, it will maintain them comfortably with their pay ; and the state is not burthened with half pay, or to turn numberless poor creatures adrift, which is now the case.

IN this system, the soldier may and ought to be permitted to marry, that his children may supply the immense losses occasioned by the war. The women may help to cultivate the lands, and support the community, whereas they are now the pest of the army.

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OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE

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The army will receive the recruits formed and healthy, and will be always complete and fit for action ; whereas now half the campaign passes in exercising them, before you dare approach the enemy : and in case of a considerable defeat, a battalion may be sent to the depot, and replaced by that which was there :

Each male child, when he arrives at ten years of age, must have a portion of land allotted him ; and he becomes a soldier. In short, by this method, the whole army becomes military colonies ; and each soldier having, by this means, a certain, honourable and good retreat in his old age, serves cheerfully and well, becomes a member of the state, and has something to lose. No greater misfortune can happen to him than to be turned out of his regiment, which, in fact, is dispossessing him of his inheritance. Moreover, a man accustomed to live in a certain community, is more upon his guard than when he is continually strolling from one quarter to another ; inasmuch, that a regiment seldom passes through a village in its march, without leaving traces of insolence and disorder behind it.

WHAT I have said of the infantry holds equally good for the cavalry ; each regiment of which should be composed of six squadrons ; one remains at the depot, and performs exactly the same duties as the battalions ; so I need not dwell any longer on the subject.

OF CONTRACTORS.

THERE is nothing performed by contractors, which may not be much better executed by intelligent officers. I object to contractors for the following reasons :

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FIRST, They make immense fortunes at the expence of the state, which ought to be saved.

SECONDLY, They destroy the army, horse and foot, and even the hospitals, by furnishing the worst of every thing.

THIRDLY, It is always in the power of the contractors to check, and intirely stop the progress of an army.

AND, finally, Men so extremely covetous, may be easily induced to take money from the enemy, for revealing the secret, which they can guess at from the disposition of the depots, or for not furnishing the provisions in time.

IN an army, there are always men of honour and activity to be found, who would do all the contractors do much better, save millions, and serve the troops effectually. These must be employed, and these only.

PART THE SECOND.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE GENERAL.

IN the preceding part, we have considered an army as a machine, with which the different operations of war, are to be performed; and endeavoured to point out the method which appears to us most adapted for the construction of it, so that it may have the properties required to render it perfect. An army, however, differs essentially from a pure machine: this is formed in such a manner, that when applied, it must necessarily produce a given effect, in proportion to its strength. It can have but one principle of motion, whereas in an army, each individual part has, within itself, the spring and source of action, which it may exert or not at pleasure. It follows, therefore, that however advantageously the parts, that is, the men are ranged, the whole will remain motionless, if the leader, who has the direction of their forces, cannot offer such motives as will induce them to act, and in the manner he prescribes. He cannot create action in individuals, he cannot force them to act, he can only persuade and direct. His orders are ineffectual, the instant an army, or a great part of it, chuses to disobey. Coercion can have no room against superior forces. Authority, in which alone the strength of the general consists, vanishes
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the instant it is not acknowledged ; he must not therefore rely upon it intirely. In the common course of things, as our armies are constituted, it does very well ; but upon many, and indeed upon all extraordinary occasions, he will find it deficient, unless he possesses the art of persuading, which can be done only, by offering such motives to the troops as naturally tend to raise their courage when depressed, and check it when violent or insolent, so that he becomes intirely master of their ~~inclinations, and disposes~~ of their forces with unlimited authority. This is what I call the philosophy of war, which, in my opinion, is the most difficult and sublime part of this or of any other profession. It supposes a perfect knowledge of the passions, because it is from that source, a general must draw his arguments to persuade or dissuade, as circumstances may require.

No author has treated this subject so far, as it regards the conduct of an army, though it appears evident from history, that all the great captains of antiquity practised it ; of which we shall give some examples in the sequel. If, as the matter is new, we shall discuss it imperfectly, we hope the reader will excuse it, overlook our errors, and await himself of the few truths we shall propose to his consideration.

AN army, like the sea, is sometimes calm and stothful, at others, furious and outrageous, wholly ungovernable ; both extremes are to be equally avoided. It must have such a degree of motion as is required to perform whatever is prescribed, and no more, that it may be confined and directed to a certain end.

EXTREME rapidity is incapable of direction, and often overwhelms those who attempt to moderate it. When the whole, or a great part of an army is disaffected, sullen, or breaks out into open disobedience, it is obvious that compulsion is impracticable :
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This reaches only individuals ; you must have recourse to persuasion, which supposes uncommon abilities and personal authority in the leader : if deficient in these points, he will find, that his orders will be ineffectual.

ARMIES are corrupted equally by good and bad success, and by idleness ; from whatever causes the corruption and discontent proceed, a general must know how to calm the fury, as well as raise the spirits of his men : he must above all take care, that no cause of complaint can be imputed to him, nor even the least neglect, for both destroy his credit with the men ; and it will be extremely difficult to pacify them, if they are personally prejudiced against him : it is no less dangerous to impute the evil complained of to them, unless they have, by some shameful act of cowardice or disobedience, brought it on themselves.

IN that case, even the general must have great personal authority over them, and reprimand them with much delicacy and circumspection ; for a harsh expression will exasperate them, and aggravate rather than cure the evil. It is difficult to know what to say to an enraged multitude, animated perhaps against their leader, who, notwithstanding his probity and abilities, may be suspected and hated, and fall a victim to their wild and ungovernable fury.

CICERO, in describing the character of a perfect orator, supposes him a complete master of every science. If such extensive abilities are required to controul and guide the passions of an unarmed and peaceable assembly, subject to no fears, nor intimidated by the presence of any immediate danger, surely much greater wisdom, fortitude, and abilities are necessary to allay the fury of an armed multitude, to inspire the depressed and unfortunate with fresh courage, bring him unreluctantly, and even with confidence, to face and engage the victorious enemy, affront the greatest danger with alacrity,

alacrity, court the toils and perils of war with the same assiduity others do their pleasure.

To induce men to act a dangerous part, is much more difficult than to persuade them to adopt an opinion, which, for the most part, does not engage in any hazardous enterprize.

IN the senate, the orator is prepared, and his auditors more or less disposed to hear him, his mind free and undisturbed; whereas a general is surrounded with difficulties and dangers. The soldier is a rude, ignorant, untractable being; and when many are united, an expression misunderstood puts them in a flame; argument, and a long chain of reasoning, have no influence over them. No fault, words, or actions escape their notice and censure; whence, if once disaffected, misfortunes, which proceed from the cowardice of the soldier, neglect or ignorance of the officers, even those caused by accident, a torrent, breaking of a bridge, &c. are all imputed to the general. His reputation and his authority over the soldiers depend entirely on success, which, notwithstanding the most extensive abilities, wisdom, and heroism, does not always answer our expectations; because the concurrence of a great number of persons is required; and if one or two only of the principal officers, from malice or ignorance, fail in executing the part assigned to them, the whole project miscarries. What penetration in the choice of his principal officers, what dignity and popularity to conciliate their esteem and affection, as well as those of the army in general!

It is not enough that they know, and can perform what is prescribed to them, they must be desirous and anxious to second your intentions at the risk of their lives; they must be determined to succeed or perish in the attempt.

To infuse such sentiments into all ranks of men under your command, from the general to the soldier, demands uncommon qualities,

qualities, some of which we shall endeavour to trace, and give an imperfect idea of what we think the leader of an army should be.

I TAKE it for granted he is perfectly master of the mode in which men ought to be armed, and ranged to the greatest advantage ; and that he knows how to direct and execute every operation of war without exception. The object we have here in view, is to shew, how he must acquire that degree of personal authority, as will enable him to gain the respect, confidence, and affection of those under his command ; and render him so entirely master of their inclinations, that his will is the only rule of their actions.

His conduct must be irreproachable, and free from all kind of vice, and even of any remarkable weakness either of body or mind. If he is given to women, gaming, or debauchery, his example will be followed, and a general dissipation will ensue, which will spread, infect, and corrupt the whole army. These vices are not only pernicious and shameful in themselves, but very often lead men into crimes in order to procure the means to pursue them. They weaken the mind and corrupt the heart, render him unable to perform the duties of his employment, lay him open to the wicked designs of bad men, expose him in a fond or jovial hour to betray the secret of his projects, by which they miscarry ; and above all destroy his credit, reputation, and influence on the troops, whose good opinion, however, is the only solid foundation of success and glory. These are not only vices, but fatal in their consequences, when a commander is infected by them : avarice and rapaciousness are crimes of the deepest die, at least are the source of them. They cannot be satisfied but at the expence of somebody, and probably of such as are least able to support the fraud ; and when gratified at the expence of the poor soldiers little pittance, or conniving at the abuses and frauds of the contractors, to partake of the plunder, there is no punishment adequate to it. The person
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guilty of it ought to be banished from the sight of men. It would seem incredible, if daily examples did not prove it, that a general should be so absurd as to prefer such unlawful gain, which he cannot want but for his vices, to the satisfaction and advantage of being respected and beloved by his army, whose affections he most certainly forfeits, if once suspected on this head.

PRIDE is an affectation of superiority over others, which always offends, and makes men enemies : they will obey no farther than they must, to avoid censure or punishment ; and so far from exerting themselves to obtain the victory, will secretly rejoice at your defeat, and perhaps contribute to it, when they can do it without danger. It is inconceivable, that any man in his senses should act in a manner which, upon the least reflection, he must know will give offence to those very people, on whose good-will success depends : however elevated his rank and station may be, he can offend no man with impunity, particularly in an army, where the affection of all is more or less necessary. Pride arises from immoderate self-conceit, and an opinion of our superior abilities. Be it so, you are what you imagine yourself to be. Avail yourself, however, of what talents your inferiors possess, encourage them, they will improve by your instructions and example, and gratefully acknowledge the superiority of a modest and humane commander. Ostentation and pride are no proof of merit ; actions alone shew it. No man is sufficiently impartial to judge of himself ; he must abide by the sentence of the army, which, I believe, is always just ; it is madness to pretend to force men to respect and love you, if your conduct is weak, irregular, and insolent. Benevolence and affection create similar sentiments ; pride is fullen and disdainful ; vanity is open, and loquacious to intemperance ; both proceed from the same origin ; a high opinion of one's self, and contempt of others, both are equally pernicious, hateful, and equally to be avoided in every station

station of life, and most so in a person placed at the head of others.

ENVY and jealousy are inherent to low minds, and to men of moderate abilities, who aspire to great commands, incapable of doing any thing that is praise-worthy, which can intitle them to the esteem of mankind, they are continually plotting against men of merit. When princes, and persons invested with great power, are infected with these passions, they degenerate into open cruelty. In persons of lower rank, calumny and intrigue are the weapons they use to destroy those they hate, for no other reason than because they have merit, and deserve their esteem and friendship. These passions are more common than one would imagine, in so much, that few are exempt from them. There is something absurd in this passion, that a general officer should be jealous, and consequently endeavour to crush and destroy those men who are most capable of promoting his designs, appears to me the excess of folly: yet so it is, few men have magnanimity enough to suffer, much less acknowledge, equal or superior merit in others. This vice makes a man unhappy in himself, obnoxious to others, and for the most part leads him to injustice, which finally becomes fatal to him. It throws him intirely into the hands of artful, base, and low people, who can be of no service to him, and alienates the affections of all good and sensible men, and in time those of the whole army, in which chiefly we lay the foundation of success.

A SULLEN, fulky, and morose temper is totally unfit for any command, it will soon produce an universal hatred, as levity, affectation of wisdom expressed by the nods of the head, or other such grimaces, expose him to contempt and derision. Above all things, a general must avoid warm, harsh, and intemperate expressions, or any word or motion which savour of insolence or contempt, which generally give greater offence than the most severe treatment.

Such is human nature, particularly in men of sentiment and education, nothing hurts more than the idea of being despised: it is an insult never to be forgiven, and waits only for an opportunity to revenge itself. A warm temper blinds a man of his judgment, and exposes him to say and do a thousand rash and inconsiderate things, which will involve him in dangers and inextricable difficulties.

Thus far we have only shewn what a general should not be, if he pretends to deserve that name; it is not sufficient he should be free from the vices and crimes above-mentioned; every man should be so for his own sake; he should be possessed of eminent and useful virtues, great qualities, by which alone he can acquire true dignity, that personal authority and supreme ascendancy over the minds of men, which the scepter cannot give.

HONOURS and riches may be conferred on any man, though undeserving of them; but reputation and glory can proceed only from ourselves. High birth, and other accidental circumstances, if properly applied, contribute much to acquire and establish personal consequence, because they place a man in a situation where he can give scope to his genius; whereas another, though possessed of the most extensive abilities, if deprived of these advantages, is continually checked and kept under by the superior influence, jealousy, and malice of the great, who think they have a right to every thing, without being at the trouble to acquire the knowledge and science necessary to fulfil the duties of the employments they aspire to. Hence it is that obscure merit, particularly in monarchies, seldom or ever raises a man to any very eminent post, unless the extreme distresses of the state call him to the helm, which he is permitted to guide only while the storm and danger last; when these subside, tranquillity and vigour restored to the state, he must
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give way to some intriguing courtier, retire and sink into oblivion, of which we have too many examples, antient and modern.

WHEN a general has acquired personal authority, is esteemed and beloved by his army; when they have confidence in his wisdom and abilities, experienced his valour, and seen his conduct crowned with success, there is no enterprize, however difficult, above his reach; whereas, destitute of these advantages, though otherwise a man of merit, he can undertake nothing of consequence without trembling for the event.

BUT how is this personal authority, this ascendancy over the soldiers to be acquired? I answer, first, by being free from vice: secondly, by shewing, by his words and actions, he is as much superior in merit as in rank, and in every respect worthy their confidence and affection; brave without ostentation, as a thing of course; unmoved by the presence of the most imminent danger; calm, serene, a chearful and open countenance at all times, chiefly in a day of battle—This inspires the soldiers with courage and confidence, and insures a victory.

IN any very great danger, the soldier looks up to his officer, and if he perceives the least sign of timidity, anxiety, or doubt, he concludes all is lost, and generally consults his safety by flight. The general must share the toils and dangers of war with his men as circumstances may require, and they ought to share the advantages of the victory with him: but, alas! they have nothing to expect; above all things, he must be just in the distribution of those favours which pass through his hands; if merit alone is attended to, he conciliates the affections of all good men, and even the bad will endeavour to deserve his protection; a general emulation will ensue: whereas, if he suffers himself to be influenced by any authority whatever, or seduced by the intrigue of courtiers,
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his followers, and sycophants, a general discontent will follow; he is deserted, abandoned, and hated by every one; the ordinary duties of the army are performed with reluctance; murmurs and mutiny are not seldom the consequences of the injustice of a general.

FAVORITISM is always, sooner or later, fatal to every man who gives himself up to any individual, because, independent of the weak or wicked counsels, a favorite may give his superior, it makes him odious, and deprives him of the support of good men. If he consults the opinion of his army, he will seldom be deceived in the choice of his friends and advisers; they never love or esteem any man that is not in some degree deserving of it: but a general, like a sovereign, is surrounded by a class of men, whose interest and influence depend on keeping him in the dark, and preventing the least ray of light from penetrating into his recesses; he employs this or that man, not from any personal knowledge he has of his abilities, but from the recommendation of some artful and ignorant favorite. If, in spite of fate, and the malevolence of these people, an officer's endeavours are crowned with success, all is in an uproar; his victories are depreciated, his conduct criticized and calumniated, until he falls a victim to their jealousy.

MANY things must be connived at and dissembled, others are remedied by private reprimand, if few are concerned, and publicly if many. None but great and capital crimes must be punished rigorously; and in that case I would have it done publicly in the Roman manner, in the presence of the whole army, or at least, in that of the corps to which the delinquents belong, and not by an obscure court-martial, where a brave man is often sacrificed to the envy and jealousy of some great person, and many a villain escapes. Rewards should go rather beyond, and punishments below the mark. No man is infallible, and errors must be forgiven.

EVERY

EVERY man under your command must partake of your kindness and generosity, when he is in want and needs it, particularly the poor soldier, and poorer subalterns, who often have nothing but their pay to subsist upon, to whom the loss of a horse is a capital misfortune ; the general should have a particular list of these, and should omit no opportunity to relieve them ; he must pay the most scrupulous attention to the management of hospitals, where some general officer of humanity should preside ; must not shut himself up like a sultan, and appear only in state and pomp to display his greatness : on the contrary, he must not fail to appear before the line every day, if possible, with one or two adjutants only ; stop at each regiment, enquire into, and see the state of it (I do not mean that they are well curled) ; but whether they have their allowance of bread, provisions, &c. and that these are of the best kind which can be procured ; and if he finds there is the least prevarication on this head, punish the authors, contractors, and colonels with the utmost rigour, and force them to refund their criminal gain, hang or dismiss them for ever. It is a certain truth, benevolence creates affection. The poor soldier is beyond all men grateful, and repays a thousand fold the kindness shewn him by his superiors. It is the duty and interest of the general to be just, humane, and kind to those he commands, and particularly to those of the lower class.

I HOPE the reader will excuse the length of this discourse, which gives some, though very inadequate idea of the qualities which a general should possess ; these applied properly will enable him to perform great things, and on many occasions, supply the want of military skill, and repair errors to which all men are subject :—whereas the most extensive knowledge of the art of war will miscarry in its projects, if the army does not heartily concur in the execution.

IN the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to point out some of the moral qualities which a chief should possess: we proceed now to shew what men are, and from what sources he must draw such arguments and motives, as may induce them to exert their faculties to the utmost of their power; it is not enough they know how to perform this or that operation; they must be willing and desirous to do it; success will be the consequence.

OF THE PASSIONS.

IT is needless to discuss minutely and metaphysically the number and variety of the passions. Suffice it to trace their source and origin, and indicate those motives which appear best adapted to raise and excite, soothe and calm them, as circumstances may require; so that an able commander, by applying them properly, be always master of the actions of the troops committed to his care.

FROM sensibility arise agreeable or disagreeable feelings, and from these pleasure and pain; such as are indifferent to us produce only a transitory, or no impression at all, and consequently leave man, or other animal, in the same state he was before: whereas agreeable or disagreeable feelings necessarily put him in motion, or at least inspire him with a desire to act. Fear of, and an aversion to pain, and the desire of pleasure, are the spring and cause of all actions both in men and other species of animals. They have two origins, interior and exterior. The first is inherent to all animals without exception, because it proceeds from sensibility. The second is peculiar to man, and proceeds from his position in society with his fellow creatures; were he alone in a desert, he might perhaps differ from other animals, perhaps in sagacity, and perhaps not.

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PAIN and pleasure, arising from interior and mechanical causes, and the gratifications of these wants, I call sensual or animal; and those which proceed from the position of a man in society, I call social. The first are few and limited, and may without much difficulty be gratified, which reduces animals of all kinds to a state of sloth and indolence, until their wants are renewed, and pain forces them to action.

In proportion as society is imperfect and uncivilized, man will be found to resemble the most common animal; a savage and a slave differ very little from animals, being moved to act by their sensual wants alone: however, as man is always placed in some kind of society, natural or civil, where his animal wants are satisfied, there is in him a principle of action, not to be found in other animals, which characterizes and distinguishes him from all others; this principle of social action is, I think, general, and to be found in every man, more or less: it is the desire of pre-eminence and superiority; though the means, by which it is obtained, may and do vary according to the different situations in which men are placed, yet is pre-eminence the ultimate object of social action, and operates upon him when his animal wants are gratified; whether it is coveted as a means to satisfy sensual pleasures, as Helvetius supposes, or, as I think, more probable, to secure our independence, which cannot be done otherwise, than by a real superiority, or both, is not material; it is certain we affect and desire to hold a superiority over men much more than over women, though the former cannot contribute to gratify sensual pleasure.

GLORY, acquired by great actions, study, mathematics, eloquence, &c. do not tend to gratify the senses, yet are more anxiously sought after, than those objects which do; this proves, that intellectual pleasures and pains affect the human heart more than those which proceed from the senses alone. The desire of pre-

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eminence increases, as man rises in society: in whatever position a man is placed, if above want, he aims at some advancement in that class, of which he is a member; when arrived at the top, he wishes to enter into a superior class, and so on to the end of his career.

WHEN a man is placed low in society, and intirely taken up in procuring food and raiment, he is precluded from the hopes of obtaining social advantages, and approaches to the condition of animals: also a rich and powerful man at the head of society, enabled to gratify his wants without labour; his desires, activity, and principles of action are stifled in their birth; his attention is directed to vary his pleasure of sense, or some trivial amusements, as gaming, hunting, drinking, &c. In the midst of plenty and superfluities, he is unhappy, and is surprized at it; whereas he should consider that pleasure derives from some degree of pain, which creates, in us some want or desire, and therefore the immediate gratifications of them, whether they proceed from animal or social origin, necessarily destroys the pleasures of enjoyment, and consequently that activity by which they must be obtained; for this can be exerted only during the interval, which intervenes between the time we wish for such a thing, and the enjoyment of it: hence it is, that the greatest degree of social activity is always in the intermediate classes, between the extremes of poverty and of riches.

By social activity, I mean that which tends to advance our rank in society: by animal activity, that which tends to gratify those wants on which our preservation, or that of the species depends: it is vain to preach ambition, glory, honours, &c. to a man oppressed with misery; heroism, valour, courage, are incompatible with extreme poverty, consequently these and other such affections of the mind can be found only in men placed above want, on whom
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alone the desire of pre-eminence operates ; the mode of acquiring it, and the object vary, according to the different positions of men ; in order to increase their activity, you must propose means and objects, analogous to their different situations : the ambition of a merchant is different in its objects from that of the soldier, clergyman, philosopher, &c. whence the several classes, in which society is divided, have their peculiar characteristics.

CHAPTER II.

OF ANIMAL FEAR.

ANIMAL fear arises from the apprehension of some danger, which man and other animals feel inimical to their preservation, and therefore avoid it with the utmost care and caution : the natural effect of fear is flight, unless restrained by superior fear. No animal can be induced to encounter danger without compulsion ; when the danger is great, and the hopes of escaping it entirely lost, then despair inspires courage, which produces the utmost exertion of our forces, and generally is crowned with success.

ANIMAL wants always produce action in some degree or other. Extreme fear and pain, arising from want, produce extreme exertion ; it is dangerous to contend with man or other animal animated by such powerful motives.

WHEN the soldier really is, or thinks himself, placed in a dangerous situation, without a possibility of escaping, every thing may be expected from him ; placed between death and victory, he becomes a hero ; but if you expose him for a long time to great danger, and there remains a possibility of avoiding it by flight, he will

fly ; because the idea of present danger will prevail over the fear of a more remote punishment, which he may hope to elude. Moreover a considerable body of troops are not susceptible of the fear of punishment, because they cannot be all punished, and individuals suppose each in particular is, that they are not to be sacrificed : hence it appears, that fear is not a powerful nor effectual principle of exertion, unless extreme and desperate ; whereas the desire of gratifying our wants is ; I am therefore surprized to see generals act upon the contrary system ; they suppose fear the only principle of action in the soldier, as if he were an animal of a different species ; for, surely, they will not acknowledge it as the motive of their own actions.

IN our armies, the soldier is in fact reduced to the condition of an animal, and like them moved to action by bodily fear and animal wants, being totally excluded from the advantages of society : I ask, is it necessary it should be so ? No, every man is by nature susceptible of passion, his position in society may increase or diminish the ardour with which he pursues a given object ; but all men, when free from danger, and their animal wants gratified, are perpetually in search of something, from whence they expect to derive pleasure ; no class of men is exempt from the general influence of ambition, consequently all by some motive or other, analogous to their situation, may be excited to perform great actions, if the class to whom a man belongs is susceptible of it, and in proportion as it is elevated above others.

CHAPTER III.

OF HONOUR AND SHAME.

HONOUR proceeds from a desire to gain the public esteem ; shame from the fear of losing it. The particular qualities esteemed honourable are peculiar to each class ; valour and contempt of danger in a soldier ; wisdom in a statesman ; piety and learning in ecclesiastics, &c. because these in each class are most useful to the community at large.

WHEN the principle of honour and a sense of shame are firmly established in the human heart, they operate more forcibly than the fear of death, and are the source of all great and heroic actions : the more elevated the class to which a man belongs, and his position in it, the greater will be his exertions to gain the esteem of the public. A man buried in obscurity is little affected by honour or shame ; the desire of pleasing ceases, and he degenerates into a savage, and approaches to the state of animals : hence it is that gentlemen are in general more anxious and delicate in what they suppose concerns their honour, than members of other classes ; instead of depressing that class of men called soldiers, as we do at present, every method possible should be used to raise and exalt it : as the difference of classes produces more or less activity in the pursuit of those objects which are peculiar to them, so does that of government, which stamps on the whole nation a certain character different from that of others ; some tend to promote honour and virtue, others to depress them.

IN despotic governments, there is but one class of men, viz. that of the soldier, the rest are an aggregate of individuals, whose
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condition is nearly on a level with that of animals, and like them is totally occupied in procuring the necessaries of life.

THE ambition of the soldier, confined to his class in time of peace, having no motive or opportunity of exerting itself, sinks into sloth and indolence; hence that lethargy and inaction which prevail in this kind of government, where a man cannot, by any exertions, obtain the public esteem; where it is dangerous to attempt it, fear will be the only ruling principle which tends to inaction; honour and sense of shame are utterly unknown.

IN monarchies the subjects are divided into several classes, more or less distinguished; all may, however, partake of the public esteem in some degree. A man is excited to exert himself by the emoluments peculiar to his class and situations, and by those which he may reap from society in general, and consequently many and powerful motives concur to promote honour, virtue, and activity, when the sovereign is a man of genius; but if weak and indolent, the activity of the subject will be directed to parade, and extravagancy, art, and intrigue will supplant virtue; the talent of pleasing will be deemed the most important; that which is agreeable prevails over what is useful.

GREAT exertions are seldom found in monarchies, because they are not always the most sure means to obtain the esteem of the prince; that of the public, which is the most powerful incentive to great actions, is unknown: the prince is every thing, the rest are nothing; the esteem of the former is the only object of attention, and may often be obtained by very inconsiderable exertions, and by means inconsistent with honour and virtue.

THE class of soldiers being considered as the most honourable, those of the higher rank in it are restrained from committing any unworthy

unworthy actions by the sense of shame ; but as the great emoluments and rewards are peculiar to the nobility, they expect them from their connections, the favour of the prince and his ministers or favourites, rather than from any exertions of their own ; hence it is, that the certainty of obtaining them in the nobility, and the equal certainty of not obtaining them in the other classes, diminishes, or rather extinguishes the principles of heroism in all.

IN republics, where all are equal, pre-eminence can be acquired only by personal and superior merit ; public esteem is the reward of great and useful actions : hence it is that republics, antient and modern, have produced more great men than all the monarchies put together.

IN these, favour procures every thing ; in those, nothing. In republics the utility of the whole is considered as worthy of rewards. In monarchies the pleasure of the prince and of his favourites is the path which leads to pre-eminence. From the different modes of obtaining pre-eminence arises the prodigious difference we observe in the characters, manners, and exertions of men, as they are influenced by the different species of governments.

WE have seen that motives arising from bodily fear, and the necessity of gratifying our animal wants, unless extreme, do not produce any great effects, and that they are not either constant or general ; and therefore cannot be always applied with advantage. Those which arise from the position of a man in society, are indeed numberless and permanent, but not applicable to all ; pre-eminence, and the means by which it is obtained, are within the reach of few persons and classes only ; those of inferior rank are excluded entirely ; so that like animals, it is by fear and want they can be compelled to act ; we must therefore seek for a more general motive which operates on every class of men, and on every individual.

CHAPTER IV.

OF RICHES.

WHEN a people is corrupted by luxury, vice, and folly, the influence of riches is superior to that of every other passion, because they are an universal medium, by which they may all be gratified. Whoever possesses great riches, is the master of others in proportion as he can and will satisfy their wants, according to the expression of Virgil, "*Nam Deus, mihi semper erit, qui,*" &c. The rich and powerful are treated and adored like a divinity by his worthless votaries: as the influence of riches increases, that of honour and virtue declines; insomuch, that not the least traces of them are to be found. However, as we cannot form men to our wishes, and must take them as they are, it is necessary to apply that motive which is analogous to their ideas of good and evil, that we may secure their submission, and induce them to exert themselves in over-coming difficulties and dangers to which the soldier is particularly exposed. As in our system he is excluded from the advantages of society, viz. honours, rank, &c. we must apply that only medium left us, which can excite him to perform great actions, pecuniary rewards; they must however be transitory, and the recompence of victory and some extraordinary act of valour; they must not be excessive, and such as put the soldier above want. Lands should never be granted to a soldier, but when he retires from the service; when by successive victories an army is become rich, loaded with spoils, baggage, &c. it is soon corrupted and ungovernable. I approve of the example of Alexander; Burn them all, dismiss the old soldier, and send him home rich. The toils and dangers of a soldier are great, his rewards and enjoy-

enjoyments must also be great and intense, but of short duration; his hopes must for ever be kept alive, and his wants sometimes gratified, even to excess.

THE Greek and Roman soldier, was animated to encounter dangers, by the hopes of plunder, and the prospect of obtaining all the honours of the state, to which military virtue most certainly led him; the Mahometans by plunder and enthusiasm; the Tartars and free-booters, in the American seas, by plunder alone; all have performed such actions of valour and heroism, as appear incredible to us.

WHEN we compare the motives which inspired the different nations, with those applied by us, we cannot be surprized at the prodigious difference we find in the effects: the cane may make a tolerable slave, but can never form a hero; besides these motives of exertion, drawn from fear of bodily pain, from the advantages of society, as honours and pecuniary rewards, there are others less general, but more powerful in their effects, viz. Liberty and Religion.

CHAPTER V.

OF LIBERTY.

THE love of liberty and independence is inherent to all animals without exception; their existence depends upon it; they must all enjoy it in some degree; they must seek their food, and be able to preserve themselves by resistance or flight. Man has subdued a great part of the animal species to his dominion; the greatest, or rather all the human species, is also brought

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to submit to the yoke of the few whom nature had made equals : habituated to his situation, man submits with patience, because he knows not the advantage of liberty. In the animal creation those individuals, who are not subdued by man, enjoy absolute liberty ; but the human species, constituted in natural or civil society, cannot enjoy that degree of liberty, nor yet be reduced to absolute slavery ; he must like other animals have some degree of liberty to preserve his life, but he can never attain to absolute independence ; born and bred in society, he is necessarily connected with many persons by the reciprocal wants and succours, which each in particular stands in need of : no man, however low or exalted his station may be, can live absolutely independent ; their wants, both natural and social, chain them together, and this is the cause and origin of society, of which man alone is susceptible ; other animals aggregate, but are independent of each other : man associates because his wants cannot be gratified by his own industry alone : our wants and our dependence increase together, and produce a voluntary submission to the will of him or them, who are enabled to gratify them ; he obeys unreluctantly, because it is a medium by which alone he obtains what he wishes for ; but when he expects no advantage from his compliance, every command is considered as an oppression, in proportion as it tends to deprive him of liberty, property, honour, &c. he will hate the authors, and embrace the first opportunity of shaking off the yoke, and resume his natural liberty. There is in the nature of man a certain degree of sufferance only, beyond which power cannot be exerted with impunity ; it produces despair, which, if supported by any, the most trifling fears, and conducted with wisdom, is invincible : tremble, ye mighty monarchs, and beware, the effects of despair are terrible.

A PEOPLE reduced to the necessity of taking up arms against their sovereign, is obliged to exert itself by the fear of a revengeful

vengeful master, death and slavery, and by the hopes of independency, and all the advantages which attend it; such powerful motives generally render their efforts successful.

THE first cause and object of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or supposed; the second is to provide for future security, which can never be effectually done than by destroying the sovereign authority: it is during this contest that the greatest efforts are made, because there is no alternative; freedom or slavery is the result of it. In proportion as the revolters succeed in their attempts, and their danger diminishes, their exertions will also decline, and if left to themselves, will probably go no farther; but if you persevere in attacking them, and treat them with cruelty and contempt, they will not be satisfied with any conditions you may grant them, but, moved by revenge, which is a very active principle, pursue their oppressors to destruction.

HAD Tarquin, had the Spaniards given the revolters time, and dissembled their resentments, a more favourable opportunity of regaining their lost power would have offered, and perhaps the Roman and Dutch republics would never have existed. It was the sense of danger, with which they were threatened, which rendered them invincible, and finally crowned their endeavours with success.

FROM all we have said, it follows, that the sovereign in conducting such a war should, by a moderate conduct, diminish the idea of danger, and leave room to a solid and hearty reconciliation; and that the leaders of a revolt, on the contrary, should shew, that no confidence or reliance can be had in the promises of an irritated master, which are only snares to divide, and then punish and enslave those whom he cannot conquer. Men truly animated with the enthusiastic fire of liberty, if properly conducted, are always

superior to those who fight for the power and emoluments of a master; the difficulties are all in the beginning of the contest. When on one side is an army disciplined, and abundantly provided with every thing which may render its operation successful and victorious; on the other, nothing but courage and despair, which arise from a sense of injuries.

CHAPTER VI.

OF RELIGION.

ALL religions are not equally calculated to produce a spirit of enthusiasm, some lead to an active, others to a speculative life; the Mahometan is among the first, and the Christian among the latter. No religion, I know of, offers more powerful motives to action than the Mahometan, none less than the Christian. The former promises rewards analogous to the nature and inclination of men in general, and particularly adapted to the manners and mode of living of the oriental nations.

VICTORY is rewarded with the spoils of the enemy; death in the combat expiates all crimes, and, moreover, leads to pleasures, which in this world, are considered the greatest man can enjoy, and in the next, are believed to be infinite in intensity, variety, and duration, embellished with every beauty which a heated imagination can bestow on them. Inspired with such powerful motives, it is no wonder the Arabs performed such wonderful achievements.

THE rewards proposed by the Christian religion are vague, indetermined, and incomprehensible, no way analogous to the wants and situation of a human being: the general tenor of it is peace and submission,

submission, and therefore extremely well adapted to promote the designs of tyranny and despotism in whomsoever power is lodged.

THE Christians take not arms, like the Mahometans, to propagate their dogma which prohibits it.

THE ambition of the clergy has, however, covered the earth with blood and slaughter; violated rights, oppression real or supposed, were the pretext, but generally ambition was the true cause. Whenever religion is made a motive of war, the effects are more vigorous and decisive, than when it proceeds from other causes.

ETERNAL pains and pleasures are motives which act more forcibly than any other derived from human and transitory origin. These wars are generally cruel, and every means to destroy the enemy are esteemed lawful; hence treachery, assassinations, breach of faith, &c. are common in such wars. They fight for the honour of the Divinity; to murder his enemies is a grateful sacrifice: against men animated by religious enthusiasm, much caution is required, particularly against the attempts of individuals; avoid the first impulse, victors or vanquished, trust them not.

IGNORANCE, the only foundation of clerical power and influence, is greatly diminished in Europe, and a spirit of toleration prevails. If the people are suffered to enjoy their opinions in peace, they will no longer be made the tools of the ambitious and intriguing clergy, to disturb and subvert the state. The clerical order, in most religions, is very dangerous, and must be watched with a vigilant eye; unless he is totally subordinate to the civil power, he will disturb and usurp it if he can; he must be strictly confined to the exercise of his pastoral functions, and never suffered to interfere in public affairs.

CHAPTER VII.

OF WOMEN,

AND THEIR

INFLUENCE ON THE HUMAN HEART.

THE origin and foundation of that attachment, which the two sexes feel for each other, is without doubt in our animal wants, and if confined to this alone, would upon gratification, as in other animals, be immediately dissolved; but our social wants cement that union by habit, and in proportion as they can, will aid and support each other. It is observable, that this reciprocal attachment and friendship are much stronger in the lower and middling classes of society, than in the more elevated. The first by their situation are, in a great measure, precluded from the pleasures and amusements derived from general society, being chiefly employed in procuring the necessaries of life; confined within a domestic circle, it is there alone they must find content and happiness. They stand in need of each other continually for the support and pleasure of life; habit confirms the union, friendship, calm and peaceable friendship, succeeds that tumultuous and transitory passion called love.

PEOPLE of high rank, are much less attached to each other, because they stand less in need of each other; so that when their sensual wants are gratified, they do not feel that mutual dependence, which is the only chain by which man and woman, as well as society in general, are tied and linked together; hence it follows, that they recur to foreign aid (if I may so call it) for pleasure; the domestic

domestic chain is broke, a general dissipation and reciprocal coolness ensue, and nothing but the appearance of an union between man and wife subsists. The great have such a facility in obtaining the objects of their wishes, that they anticipate pleasure, and by that means debilitate, and finally destroy the powers of enjoyment, which reduces them to a state of apathy and insensibility; hence that ennui and melancholy is the cause and origin of suicide.

THERE are two periods in a man's life, in which the influence of women is great and almost irresistible; youth and old age: in the former our sensual wants, and the passion arising from them, make the gratification of them a physical necessity, which, like other passions, increase in proportion to the obstacles we meet with, so that it may produce rage, fury, and madness.

THE passion of love, that is, the desire of enjoying a particular woman, arises from the difficulty of obtaining her; would she instantly comply and gratify our wishes, our attachment would cease, unless by her art in managing our other passions, she can substitute social wants, which never die, to those extinguished by a too easy gratification.

MEN advanced in years are thrust out of general society, which obliges them to live within the compass of a narrow circle of acquaintance, much at home, man is in continual want of support to prop him up like an old tree. In these circumstances, his wife, or some other favourite, has a powerful influence over him, and directs all his measures. The result of all this is, that if women lived more retired, their influence would increase in proportion, as they keep men at a distance, as we see in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, &c. Our manners in Europe are incompatible with the power which women might

might enjoy in the state; could they be made the recompense of honourable actions, we should see great exertions to deserve their esteem and favour.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MUSIC.

THE power of music, over the heart, is very great and might therefore be made use of to raise or calm the passions. It were to be wished some able musician and philosopher would make experiments, by executing different pieces, to a promiscuous audience of men and women of different ages, soldiers in particular; the result would shew what species of harmony was most adapted to raise courage in the troops. I would recommend this to Mr. Harris of Salisbury, whose abilities and penetration are known and esteemed by all: a treatise, the philosophy of music, would be a new and important work worthy his pen.

PART

PART THE THIRD.

OF THE

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT
SPECIES OF GOVERNMENTS

AND

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

AS our armies are armed and disciplined in the same manner, it is natural to conclude, that the final success of a war depends intirely on the goodness of the troops, and the abilities of the commanders. Though this may be true in general, there are, I think, other causes which must concur with those above-mentioned; for, in the history of various wars, I find that some very extensive and apparently powerful empires have been easily subdued; whereas other inconsiderable states have made an incredible, and often successful resistance.

WHEN I consider the wars carried on by the Persians in Greece, with those of Alexander the Great in Asia, between the Romans and Carthaginians, those of the Tartars in China and other parts of Asia, those of the Mahometans in Asia and Europe, I perceive a prodigious difference in the duration and final success of them;

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from

from whence I infer, that the difference of government contributed as much towards it, as the goodness of the troops, or the genius of the commanders.

WE must investigate the reason, why in such circumstances, and against such an enemy, a victory or two have been followed by the conquest of an empire, whereas twenty obtained against a much weaker in appearance, have produced no decisive advantage. For want of examining this subject, we consider all enemies as perfectly alike, we have but one mode of acting, though surely there is an essential difference, both in theory and practice, between despotic, monarchic, and republican governments, which operates continually on every branch of administration, civil and military; it will therefore be highly necessary to shew, that this difference ought to be considered as a principal circumstance in forming a plan of war, because on weighing it maturely, we shall find it to be the main spring of military operations, and that, as this is strong or weak, active and rapid, slow or languid, so will finally be the results of them.

CHAPTER II.

OF DESPOTIC GOVERNMENTS.

IT is by no means easy to define the meaning of words, and without exact definitions, our reasonings will be vague and unconclusive. Montesquieu defines this species of government, "a government by caprice," as if the edict of a monarch, a plebiscite, or an act of parliament might not equally be the effect of caprice, as an order of the sultan. This definition, like many others of the same author, signifies nothing.

THE

THE sovereign power, whether placed in one or more persons, is by its nature arbitrary and absolute; the mode in which it is exercised varies, which gives a peculiar character to each government. This difference in the mode of administering the sovereign power arises, first, from the different manner by which it was acquired, and must be analogous to it, varied more or less, according to the physical and political mode of existence of the subjects.

DOMINION is acquired sometimes by dispossessing the sovereign only; the conqueror assumes his place, the people submit, and the conquest is complete. This always happens in despotic governments, where the whole power of the state, or rather, I may say, the state itself, is centered in the person of the sovereign: when he is destroyed, the war is finished; for there is in the power of no other man, or body of men, a right, or a sufficient power to collect new forces capable of making the least resistance. Submission is the common lot of all. In such circumstances there can be but two classes of men, the one slaves, and the other armed, composed of the conquerors, comparatively less numerous.

THE country can be no otherwise kept in subjection, than by distributing the troops in the different provinces, whose first object is to destroy whatever may give suspicion of a revolt, the next is to raise tributes. The manner of putting these instructions in practice, must necessarily be arbitrary, and depend totally upon the will of the Pacha, in whom, like the Roman proconsuls, in conquered provinces, all power, civil and military, is vested. The people possessing nothing by any species of right, there is no room for laws, or any tribunals to interpret them; the will of the governor is the law, from whose decision there is no appeal, for this supposes rights, laws, tribunals, &c.

THE different provinces, are not in Asia, as in European governments, united to the throne by the ties of general laws and mutual obligation, which form a common center, to which all tends, and a general system of union and intercourse between the different parts ensues, which makes what is called a NATION. It is not a society political or civil, but a simple aggregation of individuals, like a flock of sheep, whose existence depends on the will of the Pacha or governor. Hence it is, that the despot does not himself, and by general laws, govern his dominions, nor do the different provinces form one political empire, but so many tributary provinces, whose chiefs, under different characters, govern them with an absolute sway, on condition of keeping them in subjection, and paying yearly a certain tribute.

THE situation of the Pacha being precarious, he has no interest in the welfare of the subject, his administration tends only to enrich himself, that he may secure an interest at court, which often produces a contrary effect; he is sacrificed to appease those whom he has plundered; his treasures are his real crime.

FROM conquests arose every where a kind of foedal system: hence the nabobs in India, the timariots in Turkey, and barons, counts, &c. in Europe, among whom the conquered lands were distributed on different conditions; at first at the pleasure of the prince only, as now in Turkey, but in other parts, as in Germany, and the rest of Europe, they became hereditary; we make acquisitions, but no conquests.

IN making, as well as in securing conquests, it is evident that the whole force of the state is placed in the military, which, indeed, is the only class of men, united by some general rules, whose object can be no other than military discipline and subordination.

IN time of war the soldiery is kept in order by the fear of the enemy, and the hopes of plunder, induced to obey, and execute the commands of his superiors unreluctantly ; but when the conquest is made, and the country totally subdued, no longer awed by the presence of an enemy, nor kept together by any sense of danger, he feels himself the master, both of the enslaved people, and of his sovereign, grows slothful, insolent, and formidable to both. An attempt to enforce order and discipline is followed by a mutiny ; the commander's head must be taken off to appease it. That once formidable and victorious army is now degenerated into a tumultuous rabble. The sultan is indeed perfectly secure against the subjects, but exposed to much greater danger, which continually threatens him from his own troops.

THE governors of the distant provinces, cannot by force, be kept in due subordination, and from fear of punishment, which they know they deserve, are often tempted to revolt. In this case, the sultan is obliged to dissemble, and recur to assassination, or oppose a successor ; he dares not march in person at the head of his guards to quell a revolt, being equally afraid of an armed force, wherever assembled, and by whomsoever it is commanded.

To preserve the tranquillity of the state, and keep danger far from the seraglio, is in this government a maxim of state ; for this purpose, the troops are dispersed in small bodies over the empire ; so that there is no where any considerable force, excepting in the capital, who, feeling themselves the masters, are dangerous to the prince and his ministers, and intirely corrupted by sloth and indolence.

AN army cannot acquire strength, discipline, and subordination, unless the troops are kept together in time of peace, continually exercised

exercised in the garrisons and in the field, and often engaged in actual war; all which is incompatible with the principles of a despotic government. All armies degenerate by a long peace, and chiefly those of a despot. Dispersed, as they are, over an immense country, it is with great difficulty they are collected together and brought into the field, which is always very late, and never until the corn is grown, to feed their numerous cavalry. For the same reason they cannot continue long in any given spot, and the campaign lasts only a few months; they must retire for want of provisions.

THE greatest part of the Turkish army, like our ancient militia, serve only for a certain time, when this is elapsed, they go home, and abandon the posts confided to them, whether they are relieved by other troops or not, which happened at Georgowa and Ibrai-low, on the Danube, a few days after they had repulsed the Russians with very considerable loss. Unaccustomed to the discipline and subordination of a regular army, they do not act on a constant and regular plan; they march, camp, and fight in a loose and disorderly manner, inasmuch, that if attacked briskly, they can never form, so as to make any tolerable resistance.

CHANCE, the caprice of a Pacha, or of a few men who advance to skirmish, very often bring on a general engagement, or rather a multiplicity of partial actions, without any unity of object or design. In their attacks, from ignorance and the irregularity with which they are made, totally unconnected with each other, they are the more violent and impetuous, and extremely dangerous, if not opposed with vigour and firmness. The defeat of this or that body does not, as with us, prevent the others from advancing and breaking your line if they can; and if they succeed in one or two points, the great number of horse, who act singly,
gives

gives them a prodigious activity. They over-run and spread themselves over the whole country ; no ground is impervious to them ; so that an army, once broke, can scarcely avoid a general destruction, unless favoured in its retreat by some particular circumstances, and an uncommon firmness and conduct of the general. For these reasons such troops are formidable and dangerous in their assaults ; but weak, when attacked, and easily thrown into confusion, broke, and totally dissipated if pursued with vigour, but with great order and caution ; for sometimes strong parties will stop short, and if they perceive you are in disorder, will attack you with impetuosity, and often with success.

THE Asiatic troops generally carry into the field all they possess, which greatly embarrasses them, and in case of a defeat, makes their loss irretrievable ; for not being able to make any kind of disposition for a retreat, camp, artillery, equipage, &c. is abandoned to the victors, and all without exception seek their safety in flight ; a great part goes home and returns no more. At present, that enthusiasm, which rendered them for the most part victorious, is totally extinguished ; plunder is now the only motive which spurs them to action ; if successful, they are extremely formidable ; if otherwise, they despond, and can with difficulty, and generally not at all, be brought a second time to face the enemy. A defeat, for the most part, is followed by the disgrace and banishment or death of the Vizir, to appease the troops who cannot be punished, and must not be supposed guilty. A new general, a new army, much worse than the former, is collected with difficulty, and brought into the field very late in the season. This, intimidated by the defeat of the former, scarce can be induced to approach the enemy, and far from attacking or opposing him with vigour, retires, or rather flies as he advances, abandoning one post after another, and finally the whole province ; so that you have
nothing

nothing to do but march to the capital, which you will certainly find deserted.

THE Sultan, corrupted by ignorance, flattery, and a false opinion of his greatness and power, is terrified at your approach, intimidated by the clamours of the rabble and a mutinous army, has no other resource for his personal safety, but in a precipitate flight. The instant the despot disappears, resistance is at an end; as the whole force of the state is placed in the army. This being defeated, if pursued with vigour, the conquest of the empire is rapid and complete, which nothing can retard but want of provisions; these being secured, proceed with confidence and be assured of success.

IN general, despotic empires are very extensive, from whence arise two bad consequences: first, their frontiers must be weak, in proportion to its extent. Secondly, That their armies come late into the field, and being loaded with equipages, and moreover accompanied by a crowd of followers under different denominations, subject to no order or discipline. The country is soon exhausted, so that they cannot keep the field above three months; if you can check their operations in the beginning, they retire and leave you at liberty to prosecute your plan without any opposition.

FROM ignorance, or rather from design, they have no strong places; so that nothing can retard your operations but their army, or want of subsistence, and that being defeated, and this subsistence provided, you meet with no other obstacles but such as arise from the nature of the country. As these armies are very numerous, particularly their cavalry, it is dangerous to act against them by detachments, unless they are intimidated by a previous defeat, then indeed it may be done with less danger, but never
with

with success, and you are prevented from acting vigorously in any part if you pretend to act in many at the same time.

ROMANZOW followed another plan, and lost many detachments, and if the Turks had known any thing of war, his whole army would have been destroyed separately. By this preposterous mode of making war, it was protracted till the Russian empire was entirely exhausted, inasmuch, that the whole force, which could be collected against the Turks in 1774, did not exceed 50,000 men, though above 300,000 recruits had been raised during the course of the war. When the peace was concluded, there was subsistence only for six weeks. Poland was totally ruined.

IN the winter previous to the last campaign, the author of this work, then a general officer in the Russian service, had the honour to present a plan for the ensuing campaign, to the empress, shewing the necessity of passing the Danube, as the only means of obtaining an honourable peace, which a battle or two at most would procure.

THE plan was adopted, and had the most complete success. Two vigorous actions, the one conducted by lieutenant-general Kameniskoi, and his subsequent operations, and the other by the author of this history, forced the Vizir to conclude a peace within a month from the opening of the campaign; had not some political reasons, and the interior disturbances raised by Pugacheff interfered, the Russian army might in a few weeks have been in possession of Constantinople.

THE conclusion of what we have said is, that a defensive war cannot be made with success against this species of troops, and consequently you must always attack them with all your forces, guided

by prudence and caution, and supplied with provisions, success and conquest will be your reward. In despotic governments resistance diminishes as you approach the capital, where it vanishes entirely.

CHAPTER III.

OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS.

THOUGH in this species of government, as well as in those called despotic, the whole power of the state, legislative and executive, are united in one and the same person; yet they differ totally in the mode of exercising the sovereign authority. This difference arises from many causes.

FIRST, From the different state of the conquered people; if these are civilized, enjoy fixed and hereditary property, and of course are governed by known and permanent laws, the civil government will be in a great measure preserved, as in China, India, and England, in the conquest of which countries the sovereign was displaced rather than the nations conquered; for in all of them property was fixed in somebody, and the civil government more or less preserved. If the subjects of a conquered country were slaves, they continue in that state because the victors are more intent on securing their conquests, than in forming a code of laws.

SECONDLY, From the different condition of the conquerors, if these were slaves and mercenaries, the new government will be military and arbitrary; the chief will be considered as sole and universal proprietor of the country and the people subdued; but if the victors were a free people, a certain degree of freedom will prevail in the government of the conquered country.

THE

THE northern people, who subdued the southern parts of Europe, were an aggregate of free tribes, or small nations, each conducted by its particular chief, subject in the field to one elective general. When the conquest was made, the lands were divided among these chiefs, and sub-divided by them among their followers; the vanquished were made slaves. The victors preserved their ancient rights and liberties, exercised every species of jurisdiction within their respective domains.

THE king had scarce any authority over the lords, nor could any public measure be adopted without the consent of parliament. The king, like them, lived on the revenues of his private patrimony; for it seems there was not then, as now, a constant and public revenue; wherever the property is fixed and hereditary, civil liberty must subsist, and be an insurmountable barrier to despotism, and, vice versa, a military government will necessarily ensue, when property is fluctuating, uncertain, and dependent on the will of any one person. This is the true and only characteristic by which these different species of governments are distinguished. In the first case, the sovereign authority is administered by known and general laws. In the other there can be none; and every operation of government is particularly isolated, and adapted to a given circumstance, without antecedent, or consequent, in the same manner as in the conduct of an army in the field.

THE clergy, by their great possessions, and their influence over the people, became very powerful and formidable, when their religion was embraced by the conquerors. As they alone possessed the little learning then known, they were placed every where at the head of affairs.

THE Roman law was introduced into all courts of justice, and it may be truly said, that the popes were the universal legislators

of the christian world. Having acquired fiefs, the heads of the clergy of course had seats in the national assemblies, like the temporal lords, and exercised the same jurisdictions within their domains.

As all the landed property was in the lords and their followers, it is evident that the government was an aristocracy, like that of Poland, where the king is nothing, and the people in general are slaves; so far from encroaching on the rights of others, the king could not preserve his own, but by opposing parties to parties, and fomenting the quarrels then very frequent among the great, because the executive power was too weak to controul them.

It is easy to perceive, that the military art was then at a very low ebb: in this anarchy Europe remained for some centuries; at length industry produced a new order of men; the people became free, acquired riches, privileges, and power; towns were incorporated, and shared in the legislative power; a system of rights was established; the influence of the crown increased with that of the people, while that of the lords was diminished and reduced within proper bounds; violence and disorder vanished, a certain degree of vigour in the administration of affairs prevailed, which of course produced peace and tranquillity in the state.

SUCH a distribution of the sovereign power in king, lords, and commons, seems the most perfect of any which human wisdom can invent, provided they are kept separate and independent of each other; whereas nothing could be more absurd and inconsistent with the happiness of mankind, than the fœdal system, which supposes the slavery of the greatest part, and where the violence and oppression of the few could not be checked, punished, or controlled.

THE happy system of government above-mentioned continued for some centuries throughout all Europe; a just distribution of power

power secured political and civil liberty to all in some degree. At length, however, the king, in whom the executive power was lodged, by time and perseverance, destroyed in most states the feudal and hereditary jurisdictions; by keeping standing armies, introducing pomp, parade, and expence, he reduced the nobility to want and a total dependence on the crown; what would never have been executed by force, was imperceptibly and peaceably done by luxury alone; neither nobles nor burghers participated any longer of the legislative power, they retained their civil rights and some personal privileges, ad honorem only; so that the whole power of the state, legislative and executive, was made hereditary in one family, and of course political liberty vanished.

Thus a free government, the most perfect of any that ever subsisted, was destroyed, and that of one man substituted in its room, which must generally happen, “because the executive power acts constantly and systematically against the legislative, and being in possession of the forces and revenues of the state, will, by force or seduction, reduce it to dependence and servitude, which is proved by the history of all republics.”

Though the monarch possesses all the powers of the state, like the sultan, yet he cannot exercise them in the same manner; for in monarchies the subjects enjoy the same civil rights, privileges, and immunities, which they possessed while the government was free, excepting those by which they partook of the sovereign power: hence it is, that the different mode of acquiring the sovereign power, and the different situation of the people in Europe and Asia, necessarily oblige the monarch to exercise his powers by general laws; whereas the despot must act occasionally as circumstances require, that is, in a military manner.

WHILE

WHILE the foedal system prevailed, and even for some time after, the third state, or the burghers, participated of the legislative power. The militia was connected with the state, but raised and armed only at certain times when thought necessary. The revenue of the crown was not sufficient to maintain an army constantly, nor did the nature of that kind of government admit it. The crown or executive power, which in every government is inimical to liberty, pretended to find that the militia was ineffectual to defend the state; every method was used to abolish it, and substitute a standing army in its room, which should depend intirely on the will of the king.

THIS scheme succeeded, and from that moment political liberty vanished, and civil liberty became often precarious. The army as such, is no longer a class in the state, but a mere instrument of power in the hands of the crown, and the more dangerous when composed of men without birth or fortune, because they depend more intirely on the will of their leader. It is now formed of two species of men, the highest and lowest in the state.

THE nobility deprived of that consequence, which they enjoyed by the foedal system, very naturally resumed the profession of their forefathers and took to arms; they retained many of their ancient privileges, and by attaching themselves to the sovereign, acquired new honours, employments, and riches; he alone was therefore considered as the fountain of all advantages which could be acquired in the state.

THE manners of a court naturally produce great expences, which render those connected with it totally subservient to the will of the prince.

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THE nobility and gentry form the first class in this species of government, and are immediately connected with the monarch.

THE class of the law derives its importance from the laws, and is therefore attached to their due execution in opposition to government; who always considers them as an obstacle to arbitrary administration: whenever this class of men are reduced to few, easily intimidated or corrupted, a civil tyranny (the most barbarous of all tyrannies) will ensue, as in Rome during the government of the Cæsars.

THE other classes of the state look up to this as the only protector of their rights and liberties; individuals may be seduced, but this whole body cannot be so for any considerable time; it is against its interest, because it would be destroying the source of their existence and importance.

THOUGH in monarchies the armies are mere mercenaries, yet will they concur to enforce arbitrary power only to a certain length, because the greatest part of the officers, chosen from the nobility and gentry, enjoys privileges which give them consequence independent of the prince, and unite them in some degree to the state; these are perpetual and hereditary, whereas the advantages they derive from the prince are temporary and personal, and when put in opposition to each other, they first prevail, particularly if any attack is made, which affects the body of the nobility and gentry.

THESE circumstances, we conceive, prevent a monarchy armed with a numerous band of mercenaries from degenerating into a military and despotic government, which always happens in those states, where the soldier is unconnected with the state, and intirely dependent on the monarch.

differ. Their wars, when carried into distant countries, are without plan or vigour; parry only the first impetuosity, their efforts will successively diminish, and at length vanish intirely.

CHAPTER IV.

OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT.

FROM what we have said of the military state, it appears that republican governments are not in general analogous to it, particular circumstances may however give them the activity required to operate with vigour abroad and at home; if pressed they seldom want it.

IN democracy there can be no standing army, nor mercenaries, such power lodged in the hands of one man, which we think essential for the command of troops, is incomparable with the safety of the state; the military force must be formed out of a militia of citizens, who from their situations cannot act far from their country, nor for any considerable time. An offensive war is, therefore, contrary to the principle of existence of a democracy; even a defensive war, unless the dominions are extensive, would soon exhaust the state, because the taking great numbers from their daily labours would soon reduce them for want of subsistence.

THE wars of such a people are generally of short duration, and confined to an excursion of a month or two, which may be repeated for many years, as in the Peloponnesian war, a great battle, which seldom occurs, puts an end to the contest, if the dominions are much contracted, which was the case in Greece and in Italy; during
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the first five hundred years of Rome, we read often of a war being finished in a very few days.

FROM what we have said, it appears, that a republican government is by no means calculated for long and distant wars; the main spring is too complicated to produce that vigour, unity, and perseverance required to conduct military operations; accordingly we find that such enterprizes have been generally fatal. But as every citizen considers himself as closely united to the state, they concur heartily in its defence, and always exert themselves in proportion as they are pressed, and dispute the last inch of ground with more vigour than the preceding. The idea and advantage of liberty recur in their full force, and very often excite an ardour and enthusiasm not to be overcome, which is verified by a thousand examples; a democracy, therefore, is of all others the best calculated for a defensive and the least for an offensive war. Particular circumstances, and for the most part local, determine and stamp a character on each republic, according to its mode of existence.

CARTHAGE, situated on a barren shore, confined on the land side by various and powerful nations, was necessarily forced, like the Dutch in our own times, to turn their thoughts to industry, commerce, and navigation, which led them by degrees to explore, and then to conquer, or acquire settlements in Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, Minorca, &c. which often involved that republic in wars, which could not be carried on at such a distance without standing armies, the people almost wholly employed in arts and trade could not compose those armies, which in time became a checkered multitude of mercenaries and allies, of various nations, which wanted unity, on which chiefly the force of armies depends: they were, however, sufficient against the different people they contended with, particularly when their operations were confined to the

islands and the coast, because their fleets could co-operate with success, and had they carried their views no farther, they might probably have existed many ages longer; but long and distant wars, supported only by money and mercenaries, brought on necessarily their distress and final destruction.

THE power of a republican government being very complicated; loses its force in proportion as it is extended, like the spring of a watch, and acquires vigour as it is compressed; moreover, distant and military commands require and assume greater powers than are compatible with the safety of the state: hence those eternal jealousies and intrigues against their commanders, which always weaken his operations, and often render his victories useless, because in fact they might become dangerous.

It is easy to see, that confederate republics being more complicated, are still less proper for war, either offensive or defensive; their total want of unity, or rather total separation of views and interests, render their resolutions slow, and their operations languid; inasmuch, that if any member of the confederacy is pressed or subdued, he seeks his safety in submission, rather than expect the support of his confederates.

SWITZERLAND, aided by the nature of the country, and by a good militia, formed in the arts of war at the expence of European princes, is an exception to this rule, and, I am persuaded, would make successful efforts against any invader.

SUCH being the mode of existence of a confederate republic, I am surprized Rousseau should think it possible to give it a force and energy equal to that of the most powerful state. If many, or all, are placed in a country accessible at all, by occupying any post,
you

you will cut off the communication between them, and prevent them from ever uniting their forces, and by pressing one member alone soon break the confederacy, which is proved by the examples of the several Grecian confederacies.

THE resistance and final success of Lewis the Fourteenth arose from the nature of his enemies, the defection of a principal ally rendered ten successful campaigns fruitless, in the war 1740. The languor and fear of the Dutch, the nature of a confederate army, opposed to a monarchical one, independent of the difference of ability in the commanders, gave that war the issue it had.

THE superior talents of a chief may give force and unity to an army composed of troops of various nations, as Hannibal did; but nothing can for a considerable time, particularly if unsuccessful, give it to a confederate army, when the numbers of the confederacy are nearly upon an equality.

THE views of the different parties seldom coincide in the various points, which occur in a long and extensive war; when opposed to such an army, temporize, use insinuations and seductions; some one or other of the parties will grow tired and fall under the temptation, or attack vigorously the dominions of one of the members; this will create a powerful diversion, and probably bring on his defection, which will soon break the confederacy.

It is dangerous to oppose such an army in front the first campaign; emulation and hopes of success give them vigour; it were expedient to anticipate their union by occupying some capital post, and prevent them from joining at all, which is easily done, as the motions of such troops are generally very slow, and recruits, stores, &c. brought from different places, and often from a great distance.

ROME

ROME in its infancy, surrounded by many different people, was placed in that critical situation, where it was necessary to perish or conquer. It happened, as it generally does with men thus situated, they conquered successively all their adversaries; they acquired by the sword, and must preserve their acquisitions by the sword.

THIS celebrated people, if placed at the mouth of the Tiber, thirty miles from the spot they occupied, would have become fishermen at first, and perhaps a small commercial republic, and disappeared; but placed where it was, their existence depended on the sword alone.

AFTER the expulsion of their kings it became a democracy, and every citizen was bred and trained a soldier; it was the only trade; the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief occupation was war, which continued without intermission for near five hundred years, attacking or attacked; scarce a year passed without some military operation.

NECESSITY first made that republic purely military, their particular form of government rendered it so afterwards; the right was in the people, but the power really in the senate; the continual abuse of it occasioned those disputes and contentions which disturbed the tranquillity of the state, and more than once brought it on the brink of destruction.

THE senate, far from desisting from encroaching on the people, became daily more wanton in their oppressions; to secure their usurpations the most proper method was, to engage the people in continual wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a distance.

THIS

THIS was a temporary remedy, but in the end proved fatal to the republic; for the force of the people was great, and wanted only a head to direct it, which, sooner or later, must be found. Marius and Cæsar, or any leader with superior talents and ambition, must, aided by such forces, easily overcome the senate, whose power was founded in opinion, art, and cunning only.

A PEOPLE thus constituted, trained in the practice of war during the space of six hundred years, must acquire a degree of art and address infinitely superior to that of other nations, who made war only occasionally. The necessity of a vigorous discipline and subordination must appear evident; from being always in the presence of the enemy, it became a habit, and continual exercise made every operation of war familiar and easy. To their superior knowledge were added superior motives to exert their talents. Victory was a means which led to pecuniary advantages, to a pre-eminence and advancement in the state.

THE virtue and prowess of the soldier exalted the condition of the citizen, no human reward was refused to great military merit. With that knowledge the fruit of ages, and with every motive which can excite a man to a vigorous exertion of his forces; such a people must necessarily become finally superior to every other people placed in different circumstances.

THIS difference alone rendered Rome a military republic superior to Carthage, a commercial one. The first species of republics must probably fall by the hands of a citizen, the last by those of a foreigner.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER V.

OF AN ARISTOCRACY.

THIS species of republics, whose authority is supported by opinion, rather than force, is obliged to adopt many of the maxims of despotism, particularly if confined within narrow limits. Jealous and suspicious, private executions are employed oftener than public. They fear each other, the people if numerous, and likewise their neighbours.

THE command cannot with safety be committed to the care of an eminent citizen, nor even to a stranger of superior abilities; he must be watched and environed with spies as well in peace as in war.

THE necessary powers to conduct an army with vigour, and enforce discipline and subordination, cannot be granted him, both himself and the troops must be kept low in the opinion of the public. Hence it is that such troops do not deserve the name of soldiers, being calculated only for show and parade, are totally incapable of action. However, if the people have been governed with moderation and wisdom, they may be induced to exert themselves strenuously in the cause of their masters, and more than once have shewn uncommon vigour, when the republic has been threatened with great and imminent danger.

WARS in general, and particularly those carried on at a distance, conquests, &c. are incompatible with an aristocratical republic. In this sort of government the people must be caressed, protected, and
treated

treated with humanity and an equal distribution of justice, the nobles awed by fear, and the neighbouring powers kept friendly by policy: to these maxims the ancient and most illustrious republic of Venice owes its glory and duration.

MIXED and limited monarchies are in fact republics, must be governed on the same principles; as the executive power is here much more uniform, simple, and strong, so the state has more vigour abroad and less convulsions at home. Sooner or later the equilibrium is lost, and the balance intirely on the side of the executive power, which, contrary to the opinion of Montesquieu, ought for ever to be separated from, and dependent on the legislative power, and in no case whatever be made a part of it; that is to say, the same person or persons entrusted with the executive power must not be likewise a part of the legislative, otherwise it will finally become an absolute monarchy.

ALL general assemblies centre finally in few, and perhaps in one person. The army is commonly mercenary, and totally dependent on the chief magistrate, yet the complicated principles of the government puts the executive power often in opposition to the legislative; so that the measures of the former, however wise and just, are thwarted, and the operations clogged with so many restrictions, that it wants the necessary vigour to prosecute a war with success, particularly in the beginning. A common and pressing danger, however, gives them unity and consistency, so that, contrary to what happens in despotic and military governments, more vigour appears in the prosecution of a war than in its beginning. When by great successes it draws towards a conclusion, new intrigues, factions, and disputes arise, the principle of action subsides, every body grows tired, and peace at any rate, even a bad one, must be had.

CHAPTER VI.

OF CIVIL WARS.

WHILE the fœdal system prevailed in Europe, it was almost a continual scene of civil wars, discord, and contention; the great lords were too powerful, and the crown too weak to preserve the peace or restore it when disturbed. Within these two centuries industry has raised a new order of subjects; the crown has continually increased in strength.

THE fœdal system and a national militia have disappeared, and a regular army substituted in its room. The nobility, formerly the tyrant of the vassal, and a terror to the prince, is now become the most abject tool of unlimited prerogative, which can be checked and controlled by no one. The whole force of the state being centered in the prince alone; his authority, thus supported, knows no limits but his own discretion; it is therefore almost impossible there should be any civil wars in Europe.

ON the least appearance of an insurrection, troops may be instantly dispatched to disperse and dissipate the few who have had the temerity to assemble. The nobility having no longer any influence over the people, and by excessive luxury reduced to a blind obedience to the court, neither can nor will disturb or oppose its operations, and the people in general dispersed, and without a chief, cannot be united or brought to act on any regular plan of opposition.

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SOME transitory efforts and discontent may arise in great cities, but on the appearance of a regular army must vanish. The rabble acts for a moment only, there is no possible means of keeping them together, or to direct them on a given plan: those who possess any thing recur to the protection of the state, and are happy, if permitted to enjoy what they have in peace.

VARIOUS circumstances may occasion a revolt, and render it dangerous, when the motives are permanent and of great importance to the whole community. Such as religion and liberty, men will unite in the defence of both, and exert themselves in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened. It is not a partial or transitory evil, but a general one, and the greatest of all calamities they fear, and, therefore, while the least probability of a successful resistance appears, they will to the last moment defend themselves, and the more so, as a war carried on upon these principles leaves no room for a reconciliation.

THERE is no medium between eternal happiness and damnation, a total submission or a total independence; the one or the other of the parties must be intirely conquered. Notwithstanding such powerful motives, it would be very difficult they should produce unanimity and come to a head, if in the beginning government acts with vigour: on one side there are strength, authority, opinion, armies ready collected and prepared for action; on the other a total want of all these. It would therefore seem impossible that in such circumstances any rebellion should be formed at all, much less become dangerous, unless neglected at first, particularly if the province is contiguous and within reach of government, but when they are placed at a very great distance, intercepted by the seas, or any very difficult mountains, the people numerous, and animated by the motives above-mentioned, they will have time to

confer together, unite, form some plan of government, and act upon some certain line. They are prepared in some measure to oppose in any attack to be made on them ; the more extensive the country, the more easily defended, because those who attack must act on one line only, whereas they who defend themselves may oppose you on many.

THERE is scarce a point in the whole country, from whence supplies of some kind may not be drawn, whereas the assailant can draw it from one alone. These advantages are so very considerable, that in the end, those possessed of them must finally prevail, if they confine their views to a defensive war ; unless you contract your line of operation by a great and decisive victory (which gives you a sufficient tract of country to subsist upon, that you may proceed gradually to subdue the whole) no solid operations can be executed. They will be confined merely to fruitless excursions, and at the end of every campaign you will find yourself less able to prosecute the war, which grows languid, is neglected, and finally abandoned for want of means to continue it, and the people are separated from you for ever.

SUCH has been, and generally must be, the issue of wars prosecuted at a great distance, unless the first campaign gives you a decisive superiority ; it follows of course, that the success of such enterprises depends intirely on the vigour of your operations : if in the beginning they are not decisive, they never will be so hereafter.

VICTORY, terror, and a general pardon may force the people to submission, re-establish union and the public tranquillity. If the people in general have not from personal motives revolted, but have been excited by the ambition and authority of a few considerable men, means may be found to sow dissension among them ; a pardon may then incline them to disperse.

FROM

FROM whatever motives the revolt proceeds, the authority of the sovereign must be supported sword in hand. There can be no negociation between the sovereign and the subject; the first must never speak in vain, nor the last resist with impunity, otherwise government is at an end. With what caution then should the sovereign avoid every measure which may possibly bring his authority in question, when the contest must finish in the ruin of his subjects or himself. It is a ground sown with difficulties and precipices, destruction is unavoidable; all other wars leave some opening to a reconciliation and peace; this none, it is inexpiable.

PART THE FOURTH.

CHAPTER I

OF THE CAMP. *plate 4.*

TO judge of a Camp, you must draw a line from one wing to another, extending it a mile beyond them which will mark the front of it, and shew you all its advantages and imperfections at one view, and the points which command: any one of those being carried, forces the enemy to retire, and insures the victory.

SECONDLY, You must draw three more lines, perpendicular to the camp line above, toward both wings and the center, which gives you the profile of the ground before the camp. The consideration of these four lines will shew you what points you ought to attack, and how, and with what species of troops, as in fig. 4.

SOMETIMES an army is not encamped on a right line, but forms an irregular one, as in fig. 5. It is evident that the parts of it which project must be attacked, because you can envelope them, whereas if you leave them behind you, and advance against the inward parts, the enemy envelopes you, and attacks one or both your flanks. This rule is equally true, whether the line be natural

ral or artificial, as those of a fortress. The bastion must be attacked before the curtain: the first being taken, the other parts cannot resist. The same thing will happen in every species of irregular lines.

If on examining the four lines, which give the front and profile of the enemy's camp, you find it too strong, and you cannot force him by any direct attack to abandon it, you must leave him there, and place yourself on the one or the other of his flanks, as in fig. 6. and extend your line, so that it may act on his line of communication, which will soon force him to change his position, and fall back. The least delay or neglect on his part will enable you to attack him with advantage, and, if you act with vigour, to defeat him intirely, particularly if his other flank is posted on a river, a morass, a precipice, &c. which is generally the case, to secure, as they say, the flanks. A very dangerous method, because, if an enemy post himself on the other wing, you cannot avoid a total overthrow, if he attack you with vigour; wherefore, contrary to the general opinion, I advise that your flanks may be secured by the natural strength and disposition of them, which may be easily effected rather than by such adventitious and dangerous methods.

If instead of acting on the enemy's flanks and line of operation, you advance in front against him, it is plain, that though you are much superior to him, yet if the country is close and favourable to him, you may not in a whole campaign have an opportunity to attack him with advantage; and thus no action can in such circumstances be either general or decisive, which must ever be the main object of a general who acts on the offensive, as that of him on the defensive must be to avoid it. No solid and important operation can be executed while the enemy can keep the field; you must therefore by a decisive victory, or by good manœuvres, force him to retire, and give you room to act uncontrolled.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE MARCH OF AN ARMY;
AND
OF THE FRONT OF THE MARCH.

THERE is quackery in every thing. A quarter-master general is very proud, if he can put in the Gazette that the army has marched in a great number of columns, as if that was the result of his wisdom. The number of columns on which an army marches, depends intirely on the number of practicable roads.

IN a populous and cultivated country there are many roads, because there must necessarily be communications between the villages, towns, &c. whereas in a close country, intersected by narrow passes, mountains, ravins, valleys, torrents, rivers, woods, &c. there are few practicable roads, and those not very good, which of course oblige an army to march in few columns.

IF in such a country you pretend to march in many, the army cannot easily be formed in order of battle in front, or on the flanks. A vigilant enemy may oppose it in front, and prevent the forming, while at the same time he attacks the columns on the flanks, retards your march, and perhaps defeats your army intirely, which has frequently happened. Much caution is required in making war in a close country. In an open country you march in several columns, see the enemy at a distance, and therefore have time to form your line, and prepare for his reception.

IN marching, as well as in every other operation, it is an axiom, that you must perform them in the least time possible.

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THE purpose and direction of your march must determine the mode and manner of executing it.

SUPPOSING you are opposite the enemy, in a parallel line, as in fig. 7.

It is evident, that the direction of your march must be either towards him, from him, on one or other of your flanks, or in an oblique direction, to place yourself on one or other of his flanks.

THE mode in which your army is encamped, will facilitate the execution of your march: I therefore recommend that represented in fig. 6. which is that in which I would have you fight, for the reasons assigned in the preceding chapter. Your march must be always analogous to the mode in which you encamp and fight, and be regulated by them.

THE facility and celerity of the march depend on the mode of forming the columns.

FIRST, The line is divided into so many columns as there are roads; then by a demi-tour to the right or left, each column marches by the road assigned to it.

THE line being formed in three ranks, it follows, that the front of each column has only three men in front, which renders the march slow and difficult, in proportion to the length of the columns. A column of horse will, according to this method, occupy in marching more than double the ground it does in order of battle, because the length of a horse is more than double his breadth or thickness; for which reasons, an army should never march in this manner, excepting in two cases only; that is, when you propose placing yourself on the enemy's flank, as in fig. 7, or that both

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enemies

enemies march in parallel directions; because in whatever point of the march the enemy approaches you, your army is in order of battle in a moment, by making the front to the right or left, as the enemy stands. Your march in this, as in every other case, must be covered by your light troops, placed between you and the enemy, particularly towards that flank of the enemy where you intend going, and the rear of your march, that he may not attack either the head or rear of your columns, both which are very weak, having no more than three men each in front, and being as near as may be to each other. They are all easily enveloped, even by a small body, and defeated. You can never form a line in the front or rear of your march, capable of making the least resistance.

SECONDLY, The second method of forming a column is, by dividing the battalions into several parts, each consisting of eight or ten men in front, more or less, as the roads permit. Then each division wheels to the right or left, as in fig. 8. and marches off to the roads assigned them, leaving an interval between each division.

THIS method is generally made use of by the Prussian; though improper for all marches in whatever direction they are made. In a review they do very well, because you can thereby discover the position and march of the ranks.

A COLUMN formed in this manner with intervals, occupies the same ground as in order of battle, so that nothing is got by it. After a march of a few miles, the distances are lost; some will be found greater, others lesser, than they ought to be; therefore it is impossible to restore the order of battle, if the enemy approaches either flank: and if you intend to form the front, perpendicular to your line of march, it is evident that operation requires equal time, whatever may be the front of your several divisions, because
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the distance from the van to the rear will be the same, whether their fronts be of three or thirty men, as the intervals between them are equal to the front they occupy, when ranged in order of battle, in three ranks. From whence it follows, that this method has no one advantage, and is attended with many difficulties, both in marching and in forming the line, and therefore must be entirely exploded.

THIRDLY, The third method of forming the column of march is the same as the second, viz. by divisions, wheeling to the right or left, with this difference, that the several divisions close and leave no interval between them, excepting very small ones, to distinguish the battalions and regiments, as in fig. 9.

By this method it is plain, that if the front of each division is nine or twelve men, the length of your column will be only the third or the fourth part of what it will be if formed in the first or second manner above-mentioned, though composed of an equal number of men, and consequently requires only a third or fourth part of the time to be restored and formed in order of battle; therefore I prefer it to all others, excepting in the two cases above-mentioned, viz. when you march on the enemy's flank, or when both armies march on parallel lines, and so near, that an attack on either side may be intended, or possible, because in such circumstances it is necessary that an army should in an instant be in order of battle.

VARIOUS methods may be adopted to form columns of march, that is, supposing a battalion is divided in five or more parts, it is plain that either of them may be made the van of it, fig. 10, 11, 12.

M. GUYBERT, whose writings do him and his country honour, if I remember well, proposes the divisions on the right and left should

march by the diagonals, as marked in fig. 10. those of the right before that of the center, and those of the left behind it; because he supposes this the shortest and most expeditious method of doing it, which is true only in part; that is, it is shorter than if the right or left division was made the head of the column, as in this case the other divisions must march double the ground.

THIS method is subject to one very great inconvenience, both in forming the column and in opening it. The division which forms the head, marches before the front to take its place, covers it so intirely, that no part of it can act if the enemy advances, which is a capital fault, because every motion made near the enemy must be supported by some corps in order of battle. Moreover, those different motions, some forward and others backward, will easily produce confusion.

THE best methods I know is, either to order the division of the center to advance briskly, and the other divisions to the right and left, as in fig. 11. to march behind it alternately, or rather from the right or left, which is the best of all.

WHEN the columns come to the ground, where they are to perform the line, the head marches slowly, and the other divisions march to the right and left alternately, or to the left in the second case, as in fig. 12. to take up their ground, which is done with simplicity and quickness.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

WHEN, like the Tartars, you enter an enemy's country, with an intention only to ravage and plunder it, you must, like them, be mounted on light cavalry, enter at one part, sweep all before you, and retire with your booty by another as fast as you can.

If this cruel and inhuman method of making war was adopted, hundred thousand horsemen, so equipped, would in a short time lay all Europe waste, and cover it with desolation, in spite of your fine armies, artillery, heavy squadrons, &c. because activity is every thing in war, in which our armies are totally deficient, being chained to some fortress where their depots are lodged, they cannot advance a hundred miles, and are continually turning about in a narrow circle, of which the magazines are the center.

THE Tartars neither have, nor want depots; by the rapidity of their motions they must and do find every thing on the spot. But when we penetrate, with our great and very heavy armies, into an enemy's country, it is with a view to conquer some provinces, fortresses, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to subsist upon, we have fixed and determined points to lodge our stores and provisions, from whence they are transported to the army, which must proceed from those given points to other fixed and determined points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offensive war; or
from

from a given point in your own, towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defensive.

THE line which unites these points, on which every army must act, is called *The Line of Operation*; and, of all those we have mentioned, is the most important. For on the good or bad choice of this line the final event of the war chiefly depends. If it is ill chosen all your successes, however brilliant, will, in the end, be found useless.

LET us illustrate this doctrine by an example; we will suppose an army of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, besides those required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horses, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is at Exeter, and proposes to advance to London, and has its magazines all at Exeter. I have only thirty thousand men: I encamp as near Exeter as I can, and by occupying advantageous posts, I will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to Dorchester or Blandford; till then I oppose the enemy in front with small parties only in his flanks, but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles from Exeter, from which place alone he draws his subsistence, instead of opposing him in front with all my forces, I place ten thousand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his depots at Exeter. The last will be distributed in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, so that a single waggon cannot pass unobserved, and consequently will be taken or attacked by some one or other of these parties. A hundred men will destroy as many waggons by dispersing the drivers, taking away or killing the horses, breaking the carriages, &c. The enemy must, therefore, send a strong body of troops, ten thousand men for example, to escort a great convoy. I then make a motion

tion to the right with my whole army ; so that my left comes across his left, my center and right go many miles beyond it. In whatever manner the escort is distributed, as part in the front, part in the center, and part in the rear of the convoy ; I say, that neither ten nor even twenty thousand can preserve it ; because these are chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the station they occupy ; whereas my troops can engage and attack, how, when, and where they please : they can attack and amuse the escorts in a pass or a wood, which of course obliges the whole to stop, while two or three thousand men, dispersed in small parties, attack the chain of waggons from one end to the other. If they succeed in some places only, the whole will be soon dispersed.

It would be advisable to attack that part, which proceeds at the head of the convoy, with the greatest part of your forces, if it goes ten or twelve miles from the camp ; because you may then cut it off intirely, and the whole convoy and the remaining part of the escort, unless the enemy falls back immediately to assist them, which is no easy matter, as you have the center and left of your army on his flank and rear in his retreat ; and most certainly he will arrive too late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our object.

If instead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as we suppose, he is a hundred, at Salisbury, for example ; I always suppose that all his provisions, without exception, come from thence, or from any where else, a hundred miles off. I say, that such an enemy as we suppose, cannot remain a fortnight in that camp, though the convoys meet with no other difficulty, but such as arise from the length of the road, bad weather, accident, &c. &c.

It is impossible to collect and maintain a sufficient number of horses, carriages, &c. to supply an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, including those who follow the camp, with provisions, stores, forage, &c. and to supply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey to and from the camp: two hundred miles, we suppose, which cannot be performed in less than twenty days. I am so convinced myself of this, that if you place twenty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, on any spot, so that they subsist only upon what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they must in a week go and meet their convoy, disperse, or perish.

Now, if to these natural and insurmountable difficulties, you add those which an able leader can create by acting on the principles we have established above, it will appear evident, beyond contradiction, that no army, great or small, can act in a line of operation of a hundred miles, provided you can keep the field; of course you must avoid a general action.

THE more the country is inclosed and intersected by woods, mountains, rivers, passes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will meet with: the more cross roads, the more advantageous for you; because they enable you to act continually on his line of operation. In such a country, you may in almost every spot lay snares for his parties, even for his whole army, with success. Whoever weighs what we have said, will be convinced that the ideas and fears of an invasion were vain and absurd.

THIS reasoning, which from experience we are persuaded is just, will shew why our efforts in America have not been crowned with success; and why, though in every respect infinitely superior to the Rebels, we have never been able to penetrate fifty miles into the country, nor keep any one given point, though but twenty or
thirty

thirty miles within land. From all which we deduce the following conclusions.

FIRST, That in the choice of your line of operation, when the nature of the frontier you intend to attack, and the position of your depots, leave you any choice, you must chuse the shortest and the least difficult.

SECONDLY, That the direction be such that the enemy cannot act on your flanks, and of course on your said line, which must happen if the provinces on the right or left of your march are in his possession. The longer you proceed on such a series, the more certain is your destruction; for in a little time you will have no line at all; you will be intirely surrounded, and you are lost.

THIRDLY, That it leads you to some decisive object, otherwise ten campaigns, however fortunate, will give you nothing worth having.

If the difficulties are always in proportion to the length of your line of operation, it follows, that when other circumstances are nearly equal to that army which acts on the shortest lines, must from that circumstance alone prevail; even though much inferior, provided it is conducted with prudence and activity.

FROM these conclusions we deduce the principles of an offensive war.

CHAPTER IV.

OF AN OFFENSIVE WAR.

WHEN you enter an enemy's country, it is with a view to raise contributions, destroy his magazines, &c. or make a diversion to favour and facilitate the operations of an army which acts in another line ; or finally to conquer some province.

THE mode of acting, in these three different cases, will be different of course, and must be regulated by the different objects you have in view. In the two first cases, prudence, and above all, celerity : in the last, prudence, activity, and solidity must be employed.

IN order to explain what I have to say on the subject we are discussing, I must propose the following questions.

FIRST, Is the province you propose to conquer fortified or not ?

SECONDLY, Is it separated from the other provinces of your enemy, by some considerable river which never freezes, or by some very high and difficult mountains, which have few roads and narrow, as is usually the case ?

THIRDLY, or finally, Has it no fortrefs, river, or mountains, but is like the provinces contiguous to it, open more or less ?

ALL provinces whatever come under one or other of these denominations, and therefore your mode of carrying war into them, and the result of your operations, will be analogous to them.

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IN the first case you must take the fortrefs, because that alone can enable you to separate your army, and take your quarters there during the winter.

IF the place is considerable, and your enemy has a good army in the field, it will be a very difficult enterprize, and require much vigour and sagacity to execute it with success, particularly if the country is close and favourable for a defensive war; and your line of operation is long and intersected by rivers, mountains, passes, &c.

TO facilitate your undertaking, I advise you to march up to the enemy, and force him to a battle; or by skillful manœuvres drive him so far beyond the fortrefs, that he cannot trouble you in the siege.

THIS supposes you are much superior to the enemy, and that you can keep him at a distance with one part of your forces, while with the remainder you prosecute the siege, escort the convoy, &c.

IF you are superior to him only by a third part, and he is an able man, ten to one you will miscarry, and be obliged to raise the siege with shame and loss.

IF the place is situated close on the frontier, then by marching eight or ten miles into the country, you put it behind you, and carry on your siege, without any great obstacle on his part, because your line of operation is short and easily guarded. He cannot force you to abandon your enterprize, but by a victory.

BUT if the place is situated thirty or forty miles within the country, by avoiding a general action, and acting with the greatest part of his forces on your line, he will probably take your convoys,

and cut off your communication with your depots, and by that means oblige you to abandon the enterprize; and your retreat will be attended with great difficulties, because your army will or may be attacked in front, flank, and rear.

FROM this I draw one conclusion; if your situation is such, that in general you mean to attack your enemy on a given frontier, your fortresses can never be too near them, because your line of operation will be the shorter.

BUT if such places are intended to cover the country, they must be placed thirty or forty miles from the frontier, unless some particular circumstances intervene, as a great river, a pass, &c.

If you attack a place forty miles within the enemy's country, I would advise forming a camp in the Roman manner, about half way, with some redoubts before your entrenchments, to prevent the enemy from approaching them, and throwing shells and combustibles into your camp, and burn your stores, while you are employed in keeping the enemy at a distance and foraging the country. All your stores, provisions, artillery, &c. are placed in this camp, and from thence brought to that you occupy about the place without danger or difficulty, which could not be done if they were brought forty miles off, because a line of that length cannot be guarded.

IN order to force your enemy to a battle, or to abandon the country, you must naturally employ all your forces united. Detachments, excursions, &c. must of course be avoided, because they weaken your army, are exposed to be cut off, and ruin the country, which you must preserve, if you mean to stay there.

INSTEAD

INSTEAD of attempting to ruin his small depots, scattered about the villages, which are the only your detachments can attack, preserve your own, and secure all that lays behind you in some place as you advance. You can act only on one line, which must be determined by the position of the enemy, until you have drove him beyond the place you propose besieging. From that moment you act in the defensive, and your line is then determined from the camp you occupy to your depots: your whole attention must be directed to carry on the siege, protect your convoys, &c. It is then that the enemy changes his system from a defensive to an offensive war: you are chained to your line, whereas he is perfectly at liberty, and will employ that liberty to act against you day and night, how, when, and where he pleases.

It is probable the enemy may have several lines of operation drawn from his camp, wherever it is, to the different fortresses and depots which he may have behind him. In this case he will play with you a whole campaign, shifting from one line to another, without a possibility of bringing him to a battle, or of driving him out of the country. Your army will be soon exhausted and wore out with marching and counter-marching, continually changing your line to follow him, till your provisions fail, and oblige you to retire without attempting any thing with an army now half ruined. This is exactly the case in America.

In such circumstances nothing remains for you to do, but to march against the place you intend besieging, which of course will force the enemy to follow you; and if you can secure your line of operation, he must risk a battle, or suffer you to take the place, which is the object you have in view.

IF the enemy has several lines behind him, you must endeavour to force him to act in one only, which must be done, if it can be done at all, by acting on one or other of his flanks, which will force him to leave his camp and take another. Supposing the enemy has three lines behind him, and that he is encamped on the middle ; while he is on that line he laughs at you, and consequently you must force him to take that on the right or left. If that on the right appears more advantageous to your views, of course you encamp athwart his left flank, and act in his rear, as is marked in Plate IV. fig. 6.

THIS will force him to quit his camp, and retire on his right flank : by repeating this operation, you will drive him where you please. The success, however, depends on superior velocity, which you cannot have, if the line you act upon is longer than his, and he is in any degree an able man ; so that unless you are much superior to the enemy in numbers, goodness, and your army so constituted, as to be also superior in velocity, he will undoubtedly baffle all your attempts, and oblige you to return home.

IF the country has no fortresses, but is separated from the other provinces by a great river or mountains, as we have supposed, is not very extensive and open, and you are superior in cavalry, you may, by skillful manœuvres, force him to pass the river or mountains, and by placing your troops properly, keep possession of it, otherwise not ; of course, if the country has neither fortresses nor rivers, &c. you may, like Barbarians, ravage and plunder the country, and like them abandon it in haste, but you can never make war on a solid foundation.

THESE are, in my opinion, the principles of an offensive war, deduced from reason and experience. Whenever generals have
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been regulated by them, for the most part they have been crowned with success; and on the contrary, have generally been unfortunate, when they have deviated from them, which is confirmed by history. It remains with the general to know how to supply them as circumstances require.

CHAPTER V.

OF A DEFENSIVE WAR.

IF the principles of an offensive war are such as we have indicated in the preceding chapter, it follows, that those of a defensive war are exactly the reverse. If he who attacks you must immediately bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to besiege some place of importance, form new depots, and advance further into the country, until he forces you to abandon the whole, or make peace on the terms he prescribes, it is your part to avoid a general action; for while you have an army in the field, and know how to manage it with advantage, he may, though much superior, be forced to abandon his project, and retire with a ruined army. Were you in a condition to venture an engagement with probable hopes of success, you must not do it, because if you are beat, the consequence may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him to retire, which you may do without any risk, if you adhere to what I shall say on the subject. The enemy has chose his line of operation, which of course determines yours; you advance as far as you can to meet him: if you can anticipate his motions, pass your frontier, destroy his small depots, carry off the horses and cattle, and the corn if threshed; when he advances, you retire gradually from

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from a given point in your own, towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defensive.

THE line which unites these points, on which every army must act, is called *The Line of Operation*; and, of all those we have mentioned, is the most important. For on the good or bad choice of this line the final event of the war chiefly depends. If it is ill chosen all your successes, however brilliant, will, in the end, be found useless.

LET us illustrate this doctrine by an example; we will suppose an army of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, besides those required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horses, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is at Exeter, and proposes to advance to London, and has its magazines all at Exeter. I have only thirty thousand men: I encamp as near Exeter as I can, and by occupying advantageous posts, I will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to Dorchester or Blandford; till then I oppose the enemy in front with small parties only in his flanks, but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles from Exeter, from which place alone he draws his subsistence, instead of opposing him in front with all my forces, I place ten thousand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his depots at Exeter. The last will be distributed in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, so that a single waggon cannot pass unobserved, and consequently will be taken or attacked by some one or other of these parties. A hundred men will destroy as many waggons by dispersing the drivers, taking away or killing the horses, breaking the carriages, &c. The enemy must, therefore, send a strong body of troops, ten thousand men for example, to escort a great convoy. I then make a mo-
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the country is mountainous, for you may probably cut off his communication with the main army, and destroy it totally, which I have seen done. In short, one way or other, you must get rid of this corps, because no man, or body of men, can long withstand an attack in front, and another in flank at the same time, or remain in any given post, if a powerful corps is placed so as to be able to act on its line of operation.

AN enemy may be situated with regard to you, in three different manners; 1st, in front; 2dly, in front and flank; 3dly, in front and rear. In the first case, you may find numberless strong camps, where you can stop him, though much superior, and where you may risk a battle, because as our armies are constituted, a defeat is dangerous only to a certain degree, whereas in the second and third cases they must be fatal; if you remain on the spot until the enemy approaches and attacks you. No army conquers merely by resisting; you may repel an enemy, but victory is the result of action.

WE have said already that when an enemy advances against you in front and flank, you must beat that body which comes on your flank, preferable to the other in front, because you can always oppose this with success, but not the other: if you drive the army back a march or two, and leave the corps on your flank or behind you, so far from reaping any advantage from your success, it may be fatal to you, because the corps in your flank may occupy some pass behind you, and cut off your army intirely, inasmuch, that the enemy ought to fall back and draw you after him, that his corps may act in the manner we hinted at.

If you are inclosed by two armies, you must march by the right or left, and slip away if you can, if not, you must fight. Ancient history furnishes us with two events of this nature, from whence

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we shall draw a general rule for the conduct of a general who may happen to find himself in such an unhappy situation.

THE Gauls had invaded Italy, and having plundered it, were usual returning homewards loaded with spoils. A consular army followed them, in hopes of some favourable opportunity to attack them and retake the plunder. Being arrived in Tuscany, they were alarmed by the approach of another army coming accidentally to meet them. Thus on the point of being attacked in front and rear, they formed their army, so that it presented a double front, and waited the event. They were attacked, and all cut to pieces.

THE other is in the history of the Jews; Jonathan and his brother, I think (no matter who) commanded the Jewish army, which was in the same situation as that of the Gauls. Jonathan divided his army in two parts, formed a line of chariots, waggons, &c. behind which he placed the weakest part under his brother to oppose one army; with the other, and best part, he advanced against the other army of the enemy, which he attacked with that vigour and fury, which such a situation inspires, and of course defeated the enemy totally; that part opposed to his brother, on seeing this event, gave over attacking the chariots, and ran away. There is not a finer manœuvre recorded in history: imitate this noble example.

WHEN two armies march against you, in the manner just mentioned, and come from a considerable distance; if your country is strong, and has some good fortrefs in it, where your depots lay, occupy a strong camp and be quiet; such numerous armies in such a situation cannot remain a fortnight; they must separate for want of provisions. In this manner the king of Prussia baffled the attempts of the Austrians and Russians for four campaigns.

If your country has no such fortress to cover you, of course you must either beat one of the armies which marches against you, or by placing yourself on the outward flank of one of them; force them to unite, and act upon one line: avoid a battle, which you may then do as long as you please. They must separate and retire, because two such armies cannot subsist on the stores provided for one only.

If finally two armies act in different lines, and attack distant provinces, you must of course oppose an army to each of them. If you cannot do it, abandon that which is far off, collect your forces, and attack that which is nearest to you, and most dangerous. When your forces do not permit you to oppose your enemies at once in every point, you must act in part on the defensive, and in the other offensively. If you are too weak to act in many points at once, you must abandon some of them, that you may act with more vigour in others.

HAVING pointed out all the different situations in which an enemy, with one or more armies, can be with regard to yours, and shewn what you are to do in such different circumstances, we now return to our subject; and we will also shew, how you may check the progress of the most powerful adversary.

WHEN he has penetrated thirty or forty miles into your country, and you cannot or will not oppose him in front; when you cannot defend your own line, you must either retire as he advances, till he has drove you out of the country, or attack his. The method of doing this with success, we say, is, to leave on your line, to oppose the enemy in front, a fifth of your army, chiefly cavalry; three-fifths on the flank of his march; the remaining fifth, all of light troops, horse and foot, must be placed along his line of operation in small bodies of one or two thousand men, who occupy the most

advantageous spots, as woods, passes, &c. where they remain concealed. Parties must be sent from one to the other of about a hundred men, so that there is not a single point of the enemy's line which you cannot attack with success in an instant. Half his army cannot protect his convoys on a line of thirty miles. If he sends two or three strong detachments to escort a capital convoy, perhaps of three thousand waggons, because you have taken or dispersed his small ones, such a convoy will occupy near thirty miles: I suppose the escort to consist of twenty thousand men; these will be posted in several corps, in front, rear, and along the flanks of the march; you are informed of his disposition, you may reinforce that part which we suppose already placed on his line, whether you do or not. I say, that the ten or twelve thousand light troops may unite in a short time, and be superior to the enemy's escort in any given point, and beat it; stop the front of the convoy, while your small parties break the carriages, take away the horses or kill them. If a hundred only of the carriages are destroyed, all those which are behind must stop. The escort is chained to the convoy, even to particular points of it. If you cannot beat it, amuse it by skirmishing; your parties in the mean time do the business.

By acting exactly in this manner, the Austrians took or destroyed a great convoy going from Neiss to Olmutz, which obliged the king to raise the siege of that place next morning, and to abandon Bohemia in a few days.

If in the conduct of a defensive war you adhere to the principles we have laid down, and the enemy's line of operation is only thirty or forty miles long, much more if it is a hundred, you will triumph in the end, and enjoy the fruits of your prudence and activity, which is every thing in war, particularly in a defensive one, where they must supply the want of force.

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FROM the nature of a defensive war arises the utility and necessity of light troops, of which we shall treat in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

OF LIGHT TROOPS.

DURING the wars which we describe, the Austrians had, I believe, near thirty thousand of this kind of troops distributed in the different armies and corps. The only use I ever saw made of them was to observe the enemy placed, as they generally were, before the front of our armies, they could do no more, and even this they did very imperfectly, because they were too numerous, encamped in such considerable bodies, that they were totally deficient in activity, and preserved nothing but the names of light troops. Observed by the enemy, he marked them whenever he chose to march by his flanks, or to retire, so effectually, that for the most part we had no intelligence of his motions, till it was too late to avail ourselves of any favourable circumstance which might offer, insomuch, that I do not remember we ever attacked his rear guard with success, though great bodies of light troops, and very often the main army, were near enough to do it with advantage.

WHEN the enemy advanced towards us, after skirmishing a little, these light troops dispersed and retired where they pleased; and if a battle ensued, they disappeared, and were lost for several days. Many of these corps observed so ill, that very often they were surprized, made prisoners, or totally dispersed. From whence I conclude, that a regiment of Hussars, and a few hundred Croats, will observe

observe an enemy much better than so many thousands, for this plain reason, they are or ought to be invisible, and so posted near the high roads, before the enemy's front, and on his flanks, that he cannot move without their knowledge. It is therefore absurd to employ ten thousand to do that which a thousand can do much better.

THE number and use of light troops depend on the nature of the war chiefly. In an offensive war, whose principles is to seek and fight the enemy, you must center your forces, and by no means disperse them, and lose time in fruitless and laborious excursions : your enemy is before you, advance in front : your army must have strength and consistency, of course it must have a heavy cavalry, infantry, and artillery, so that your real and physical force is superior to that of the enemy.

In such circumstances, you can want no more light troops than are necessary to explore the front and flank of your march : but if you are on the defensive, you must avoid a battle, because you are too weak, and must act on his flanks in the manner we have prescribed, which can be done only with light troops, as is evident from the nature of this service ; you cannot therefore have too many of them. An army of forty thousand men, half of which being light troops, if ably conducted, in a close country, when the enemy's line is of any considerable length, will most certainly force him to abandon his projects and retire.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE FRONTIER LINE.

SUPPOSING this line to be like that marked in Plate V. x. x. x. &c. which as most lines of any considerable extent projects in many parts: I say, that however extensive such a line may be, the points on which it can be attacked are determined by the number and quality of the roads which lead to it, and by the position and distance of the respective capitals, and other strong places within a hundred miles of it, beyond which no army can act with advantage; that is, no army constituted as ours are, can act, if its depots are distant above a hundred miles, unless there is water-carriage.

IF there are no such places of arms at all, or on the one side of the frontier line only, it is evident, that no solid operation can be executed, and that they can tend only to ravage the country and retire, or to facilitate the operations of some other army, acting on another line, which was the case with the Russians, during this whole war we are describing. They could not, and the Austrians would not avail themselves of the victories the former had gained at Palrig and Franckfurt on the Oder; so that the Russians, unable to fix themselves on or near that river, were always obliged to retire after a short campaign, because their line of operations was too long.

WE suppose the frontier before us to be three hundred miles in length; yet the enemy can act against it from three points only, where his depots are lodged, as in F. G. H. and even from these
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he can attack the two points C. E. on our frontier alone ; when he has taken either of them, he must proceed next to B. or D. and from thence to the capital A. and not before. I have already shewn, in treating of a defensive war, how you must counteract and check his progress, so shall conclude the subject.

WE can no way better explain our principles, than by applying them to the different frontiers of Europe and America, accordingly, in the following part, we shall give a military analysis of them, viz. of that of France, Austria, the Prussian dominions, Turkey, Russia, Poland, England, and North America.

PART THE FIFTH.

OF THE

FRONTIERS OF THE DIFFERENT SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE FRONTIER OF FRANCE.

IN describing this and other frontiers, we do not pretend to point out the different positions and camps which may be taken on either side, because it would require a more perfect knowledge of the countries than we are masters of; and moreover, would be useless, because these must be determined by the motions of the enemy, and many other occasional circumstances, by which a general must regulate his operations: what we shall say will, however, enable the sovereigns, ministers, and generals, to form their plans of war, offensive and defensive; these last must know how to conduct them.

We have already said, that the absolute force of a frontier consists in natural obstacles, which an enemy would find in approaching and attacking it. These arise from numberless causes, as
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mountains, rivers, woods, defiles, the greater or lesser fertility of the soil, the direction of it, &c. &c.

THE relative force of a frontier line depends on the distance of the capitals and fortresses, where the depots are lodged, of those who attack or defend it, from whence their different lines of operations must proceed; as these are long or short, the operations will be more or less difficult; insomuch, that it may, I think, be established as an axiom, that when the respective forces and abilities of the commanders are nearly equal, those who act on the shortest line, must from that circumstance alone prevail in the end, because being nearer their depots, they can open the campaign sooner, act with more vigour and activity, and for a longer time than those whose line of operation is at a greater distance.

THE frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Basil, in Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. I shall divide this long line into three parts, and consider each of them separately. The first part goes from Basil to Landau, and covers Alsatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The second part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Moselle, covers Lorrain on the side of the electorate of Treves, the duchies of Deux-Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan down the Meuse to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; so that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

THE first part of this line is covered by the Rhine, on which are placed Hunninghen, New Brisac, Strasburg, and Landau, all which are very strong. Strasburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back part of Alsace runs a chain of mountains, which separates it from Franche Comté and Lorrain; the distance between these mountains

mountains is from ten to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Straßburg, covered by the Rhine and the fortresses above-mentioned, could with ease prevent an enemy from passing that river, or at least from besieging any of them, and without taking them all, he could not possibly separate his army and take his winter quarters in Alsace, while the French have any considerable force encamped or cantoned in the mountains above-mentioned. I am therefore surprized the Austrians ever made any attempt on that side, and much more so, that the French were so very much alarmed at it. For my part, I am confident, that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty thousand men, so far from being terrified at the approach of an enemy, or opposing his passing the Rhine, would wish to see him shut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortresses; because he would see the facility of preventing his repassing it at all, and of cutting him off intirely. Look at the map and judge.

THE second part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes from Landau to Sedan, is very strong both by nature and art, having several strong places on it; and the country before it is no less difficult, being very mountainous, and consequently full of narrow passes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of Germany; so that an enemy who advances on that side must have his depots on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maestricht and Namur on the Meuse; in both cases the army, which I suppose encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that side, while another of forty thousand men, placed on the Meuse near Sedan, will prevent any army from advancing into Lorraine or Champaign on that side, as is evident from the inspection of the map.

CHAPTER IV.

OF AN OFFENSIVE WAR.

WHEN you enter an enemy's country, it is with a view to raise contributions, destroy his magazines, &c. or make a diversion to favour and facilitate the operations of an army which acts in another line ; or finally to conquer some province.

THE mode of acting, in these three different cases, will be different of course, and must be regulated by the different objects you have in view. In the two first cases, prudence, and above all, celerity : in the last, prudence, activity, and solidity must be employed.

IN order to explain what I have to say on the subject we are discussing, I must propose the following questions.

FIRST, Is the province you propose to conquer fortified or not ?

SECONDLY, Is it separated from the other provinces of your enemy, by some considerable river which never freezes, or by some very high and difficult mountains, which have few roads and narrow, as is usually the case ?

THIRDLY, or finally, Has it no fortrefs, river, or mountains, but is like the provinces contiguous to it, open more or less ?

ALL provinces whatever come under one or other of these denominations, and therefore your mode of carrying war into them, and the result of your operations, will be analagous to them.

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considerable defeat at Denain obliged prince Eugene to raise the siege of that place, and in a short time abandon his conquests, the fruits of many victories.

I know most people suppose, that this was owing to the defection of the English: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and sent parties to the Seyne: but will any officer suppose, that any army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could separate and take winter quarters on the above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in possession of Picardy, Normandy, and Champaign? No, it is impossible: the great fault of the French generals, when on the defensive, was to oppose the enemy in front, whereas they should have operated against their flanks.

THE final event of this long and bloody war shews the strength of this frontier, and the prodigious resources of the house of Bourbon. From the description we have of the French frontier, towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears, that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, opposite to Alsace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impossible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorrain, &c.

THAT the second part of the French frontier, from Landau to the Meuse, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moselle, between the Rhine and the Meuse, the event of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the superiority of the French. I mean the superior advantages they possess in acting on that frontier, which are indeed so very great, that no forces can be collected and supported in Flanders by the house of Austria, the English, Dutch, and the German princes, which can preserve that:

and cut off your communication with your depots, and by that means oblige you to abandon the enterprize; and your retreat will be attended with great difficulties, because your army will or may be attacked in front, flank, and rear.

FROM this I draw one conclusion; if your situation is such, that in general you mean to attack your enemy on a given frontier, your fortresses can never be too near them, because your line of operation will be the shorter.

BUT if such places are intended to cover the country, they must be placed thirty or forty miles from the frontier, unless some particular circumstances intervene, as a great river, a pass, &c.

IF you attack a place forty miles within the enemy's country, I would advise forming a camp in the Roman manner, about half way, with some redoubts before your entrenchments, to prevent the enemy from approaching them, and throwing shells and combustibles into your camp, and burn your stores, while you are employed in keeping the enemy at a distance and foraging the country. All your stores, provisions, artillery, &c. are placed in this camp, and from thence brought to that you occupy about the place without danger or difficulty, which could not be done if they were brought forty miles off, because a line of that length cannot be guarded.

IN order to force your enemy to a battle, or to abandon the country, you must naturally employ all your forces united. Detachments, excursions, &c. must of course be avoided, because they weaken your army, are exposed to be cut off, and ruin the country, which you must preserve, if you mean to stay there.

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can pursue you in the retreat, and render your future attempts still more difficult.

WHAT we have said, regards the Austrian's line of operation only, as to its length and the obstacles which arise from thence alone; we shall now consider those that proceed from the nature of the country, through that the different lines, on which it can march to act on the Rhine.

PARALLEL to this river, on the German side, at the distance of ten or fifteen miles, runs a chain of very high mountains, called the Black Forest, from Switzerland to Heidelberg on the Neckar, and from thence to the Main. Through the first of these mountains there goes from the Rhine to the Danube only one capital road; it passes over the Neckar, goes by Stutgard, the capital of the dutchy of Wirtemberg, along the Neckar to Ulm: it is one continual pass or defile, between fifty and sixty miles in length, and of course offers numberless positions, where a small army can stop the most numerous.

THE country between the Rhine and the said mountains belongs to the Elector Palatine, several lesser princes, and free cities. The mountains themselves comprehend the dutchy of Wirtemberg, some other principalities and free cities. On the east side of these mountains lies Bavaria, which now likewise belongs to the Elector Palatine, and some free cities. This prince, by the acquisition of Bavaria, is now so very powerful, that in conjunction with the duke of Wirtemberg, or even alone, he can hold the balance of Germany between the Austrians and the French, and hinder them from approaching each other.

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THE second road goes from Francfort on the Main to Wurtzburg, Nuremberg, and Ratisbon on the Danube, and is no less difficult than the former. The Austrians can approach the Rhine only by the one or the other; if they advance by the first, the French may pass the Rhine, and by occupying some posts in the duchy of Wirtemberg, stop their progress and force them back into Bavaria; and if they go on the other road, by occupying the heights on the left of the Rhine, between Mentz and Offenburg, prevent their passing that river, and force them down towards Coblentz and Cologne, or by passing the Rhine, and marching to Wurtzburg, prevent their approaching the Rhine at all; or finally, let them advance towards Coblentz and the Lower Rhine, and then pass to the Main, and cut off all communication between the Low Countries and the Austrian dominions in Germany and Italy, which would prevent them from making any considerable efforts in Flanders.

WE have already shewn, that France has great advantages in attacking Flanders, from the proximity of its depots, which are greatly increased, by the Austrian's line of operation, from Vienna to Brussels, which makes it impossible for them to preserve that country. It was, no doubt, owing to this circumstance chiefly, if not intirely, that the house of Austria could not preserve Alsace, Franche Comté, and Lorrain, which finally will bring on the loss of Flanders.

THE French would find nearly the same difficulties in passing from the Rhine to the frontiers of Austria and Bohemia, and in all probability would lose their army, as they have always done, whenever they went as far as the Danube. The French have however some very considerable advantages over the Austrians: they can invade and over-run Flanders, before it is possible for the Austrians to collect any forces there, capable of opposing their progress; and, moreover,

moreover, can form such alliances in Germany, as would greatly embarrass the Austrians; whereas these can form none that could in any degree affect the safety of the French monarchy.

It would therefore seem adviseable, and perhaps necessary, that the house of Austria should exchange all its possessions from Luxemburg to Flanders for Bavaria, the present possessor of which might find it very eligible, as he might draw a line from Manheim to Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Namur, and establish an easy communication between the whole: the Austrians no longer engaged in such distant provinces, might turn their thoughts elsewhere with more advantage.

THE French frontiers towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are too strong to be invaded by those powers: the idea of passing the Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deserve a serious discussion. We shall consider the coast of France on the British channel and the ocean on another occasion.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERS.

THE frontiers of the house of Austria are of prodigious extent, having many separate provinces, as those in Flanders and Italy. Here I shall consider only that frontier line, which begins in the Tirol, goes along the bishopric of Brixen, Carinthia, Stiria, Austria, round Bohemia, Moravia, the new acquisitions in Poland, Transilvania, and passing the Danube near Belgrade, goes up the Save, along Sclavonia and Croatia, which separates those provinces from Bosnia in Turkey.

FOR greater accuracy, we shall divide this immense line in several parts, relative to the different points, on which it may be attacked by the neighbouring powers.

THE first part is that which goes from the county of Tirol to Passau on the Danube, and from thence to Egra in Bohemia. All this line, as far as the Danube, runs along and through the Alps, and is therefore impervious to any army, even light troops could not act against it with success. The remaining part, from the Danube to Egra, is nearly as strong, being covered by very high mountains almost inaccessible. Over this line go three great roads, one from Inspruck into Bavaria, towards Augsburg; another from Vienna up the Danube, to Passau and Straubing, &c. The third from Egra into the Upper Palatinate, towards Nuremberg in Franconia; from each of which there runs a few cross roads that lead into the adjacent countries. It is, however, on these three only that an army can act; though an enemy cannot pretend to enter the first road, nor could any operation on that side be of use to him; yet the Austrians might assemble a very considerable force at Inspruck, and behind the Inn, and from thence penetrate into Bavaria as far as the Danube.

THE second road, which goes along that river, is extremely difficult; a small corps, posted on the left of the Inn, near Passau, would stop an army, while the light troops would pass that river higher up, and act on the enemy's flank and rear. All this country is most particularly adapted to light troops; moreover, the road runs close to the Danube in many places, and as this river is there very narrow, and contracted by high mountains, a few troops on the opposite shore stops the march of an army as well as the navigation, so that while the Austrians have any force at all, and particularly light troops on the above-mentioned line, no enemy can,
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however numerous, attack it with success, ; nor could he march down the left side of the Danube, leaving Egra and that part of Bohemia behind him, and on his flank : moreover the direction of this frontier line being concave towards the enemy, is extremely favourable to the Austrians, for independent of the prodigious strength of the country, which alone enables them to oppose him in front with success, he cannot advance against any given point of this circle without exposing one or both his flanks, he would soon lose his communication with his depots, must retire and change his line of operation.

FROM what we have said, it appears that Egra is the only point of this line which can be attacked ; this place neither is nor can be made strong. It were advisable to build a capital fortress on that frontier so placed, that an army posted near it might advance and take a central position between the source of the Maine and Ratisbon on the Danube, so as to be on either river immediately, as circumstances might require. Whatever enemy approaches this frontier, can have no other line of operation than one drawn from Nuremberg, Ratisbon, or some other place on the Danube to Egra.

AN army covered by such a fortress, as we propose, would undoubtedly render every attempt on that side fruitless, particularly if a body of fifteen or twenty thousand men of light troops and Hussars would enter Bavaria from the Inn.

AT the death of Charles the Sixth, the French and Bavarians entered Bohemia by Egra, which confirms our observation on this frontier ; had there been such a fortress as we propose, it is probable they could not have taken it, nor could they have left it behind them.

THE relative force of this line consists in this: the Austrians can in a very little time collect such forces as are able to defend it; whereas the Bavarians and French (for the first alone cannot contend with the Austrians) cannot be on that frontier in a year; these last can draw nothing from France at such a great distance; the Bavarians cannot supply them with subsistence and stores for any considerable time, they must separate and will be beat in detail: the French will lose their army, and Bavaria will be ravaged and ruined.

THE history of the war of the succession, and of that begun in 1741, carried on in this country, shews, that any future attempts against the house of Austria on this side will be equally unsuccessful.

FROM Egra to the Elbe there is but one line of operation, viz. that which goes from Dresden to Prague, from the Elbe to the Queiss, which separates Bohemia from Lusatia, no line can be drawn from the one to the other. From Friedland to the road, which goes from Olmuts in Moravia towards Neiss, there are two lines of operations, one from Schweidnitz to Prague, the other from Neiss to Olmuts: Glatz is a post rather than a fortress, from whence a line of operation might be drawn into Bohemia. However, if a considerable body of troops were placed in the county of Glatz, they would greatly facilitate the operations from Schweidnitz to Prague, and those from Neiss to Olmuts; and on the contrary, very much retard and check those which the Austrians might carry on those lines into Silesia. This advantage arises from the situation of this province, which projects into Bohemia, and is the vertex of a triangle formed by lines drawn from Glatz to Neiss and Schweidnitz, and another between these two last places.

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IN the preceding part of this volume, which was printed in 1766, I gave a military description of this frontier, pointed out the three lines of operation above-mentioned, and indicated the camps which the Austrians might occupy to frustrate the attempts of the Prussians: I there said, by occupying the passes on the road, between Lowositz and Dresden, no army coming from thence could enter Bohemia. Secondly, that by camping behind the Elbe, between Königgratz and Königshoff, the Prussians coming from Schweidnitz would be stopped there: and thirdly, that an enemy coming from Lusatia by Rumburg and Gabel into Bohemia, would also be stopped by an army posted behind the Iser.

THE king of Prussia, in alliance with Saxony, resolved to enter Bohemia, from Schweidnitz with one army, and from Dresden with another. The first, very numerous, he commanded in person; the second, composed of Prussians and Saxons, was no less so.

THE Austrian forces were likewise divided into two armies, something inferior to the Prussians; the emperor commanded that opposed to the king, and marshal Laudon that destined to act against prince Henry. The result of all these dispositions was, that the king entered Bohemia, and advanced to the Elbe, where he found the emperor encamped behind that river, exactly as we proposed, in such a manner, that the king could neither bring him to an action, nor by any manœuvre force him to quit his position. Prince Henry advanced towards the passes above-mentioned, but the dispositions of marshal Laudon were so just, that he could not attempt forcing them. Thus these two mighty armies, conducted by such able generals, as the king of Prussia and prince Henry, were stopped short in their careers unable to advance a step.

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THE king naturally impatient, grew tired and ashamed of his situation ; the only probable means to extricate himself, and proceed in the execution of his plan, was to order prince Henry to leave Saxony, and enter Bohemia from Lusatia by the passes of Rumburg and Gabel, which would bring him on the emperor's flanks, and of course force him to abandon his strong camp, retire, and so leave the king an opening to advance and pursue his plan. Accordingly prince Henry entered Bohemia by the passes above-mentioned : in the mean time marshal Laudon, informed of the prince's motion, likewise quitted his camp, passed the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and advanced to the Iser, behind which he encamped, with his right extended towards Turnau, by which means he stopped once more prince Henry, and effectually covered the Emperor's left flank.

THE king was again disappointed, but did not despair ; he formed another project, which he hoped would displace the emperor, the object of all his manœuvres : higher up the Iser, in the mountains, is a place called Arnau, which the emperor had occupied, because it covered his left ; this the king proposed attacking ; accordingly he ordered his army to march on his right, while that of prince Henry marched on its left.

THE emperor reinforced this post, and the Prussians were repulsed. The season was far advanced, and every attempt of the Prussians baffled, the king resolved to put an end to the campaign ; accordingly his army retired in several columns, that on his left, or rather on the right in his retreat, was isolated. The emperor availed himself of this circumstance, and ordered general Wurmser to attack it, which he did with such success, that he defeated, killed, and made prisoners above 2000 men.

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It was natural to suppose, that prince Henry should have retreated into Lusatia by the same roads he came; but to the astonishment of every officer, a little acquainted with his profession, he chose another route, long, difficult, and extremely dangerous; he marched by marshal Laudon's left flank, advanced to the Elbe, passed that river at Leitmeritz, and from thence through the passes into Saxony, and executed his retreat with success, because nobody offered to molest him: why such a general as Laudon, at the head of a numerous army, did not cut him off entirely at the passage of the Elbe, is a mystery which cannot be explained, and the more so, as prince Charles of Lichtenstein commanded a corps at Melnick, which could have opposed this passage in front, while marshal Laudon with his whole army attacked his rear.

Thus ended this campaign and the war, as glorious to the emperor as it was shameful to the Prussians. Barren of events, it offers only one observation, which is this; in Bohemia, and I believe in most other countries, there are certain points, which being occupied, will baffle the attempts of much superior forces. It is surprising that in the several great wars carried on in Bohemia, these points should have escaped the eyes of so many able generals.

The Austrians, by their acquisitions in Poland, have formed a new frontier on that side; it runs from Teschen in Silesia, close by Cracow on the Vistula, and from thence almost in a right line to the Niester, within a few miles of Chotzim in Moldavia, on the same river; its length is about four hundred miles, its breadth various.

This country, like all Poland, is plain and open, has no fortresses, nor any enemy, which for the present can render it necessary: however, as Poland may probably hereafter become the field of battle between

tween those great powers, who divided a great part of it among them. The Austrians, like the Prussians, who are building a capital place on the Vistula, should likewise build one on their new frontiers.

THIS country is no otherwise useful to the Austrians, than by its productions; we must examine, however, whether it may not furnish means to carry on any future war against the Prussians with more advantage than heretofore.

THE wars between these two powers have been chiefly carried on on the frontier which separates Bohemia from Silesia; and as things then stood, could not be prosecuted on any other lines than those before-mentioned. That frontier is more advantageous to the Prussians than the Austrians, for the reasons we assigned in the description of that country, to which we refer: the back part of Silesia towards Poland, from the Oder to the Warta, as far as Custrin, is intirely open, having no one place of strength on it, excepting Gros-Glogaw on the Oder and Custrin: this line is near 300 miles in length. It is well known that the king of Prussia draws infinite advantages from Poland—horses, cattle, recruits, corn, &c. without which he could not maintain his armies in Silesia, nor form such depots there as enable him to wage war in Bohemia.

THIS being premised, it seems clear, that if the Austrians built a place of arms on the line, between Teschen and Cracow, a little further back, and opened a communication from thence to Hungary, through the passes of Tablunka, and some other roads through the mountains, which separate that country from Poland, a powerful army might be assembled near the fortrefs, we suppose, to act on the back part of Silesia along the Oder to Francfort, a very interesting point to the Prussians.

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It is needless to point out all the advantages which the Austrians would reap from the operations of such an army ; I will therefore only say, that unless they find out a new line of operation, their attempts on Silesia will be fruitless ; and I see not how it is possible for them to establish any other, but that which we propose.

THE next part of the Austrian frontier runs from the Niefter to the Danube, and separates Transilvania and the Bannat of Temeswaer, from Moldavia and Walachia : it is a chain of prodigious high mountains almost impenetrable, insomuch, that there is but one pass, through which wheel carriages can go ; it leads to the Pruth. The Austrians have acquired here a tract of land, and have built a bridge over that river, a few miles behind Chotzim, and of course will open a good communication into Moldavia. They should open two more roads through these mountains, the one from Hermanstadt, the capital of Transilvania, close by the river Alut, which runs into Walachia ; and a third from the Bannat of Temeswaer, through the pass of Meadia into Walachia, close to the Danube, opposite Widin.

THIS being done, nothing can hinder the Austrians from conquering Moldavia and Walachia in one campaign. The Turks have in those countries only Giurgewa and Ibrailow on the Danube, Chotzim and Bender on the Niefter, neither of which can resist a fortnight's regular siege. As things now are, Austria holds the balance between the Turks and Russians ; for neither can pass the Niefter without her consent.

THE last part of the Austrian frontier runs from the Danube up the Save, and separates Sclavonia from Bosnia. The country on both sides of this river, particularly Bosnia, is extremely mountainous, insomuch, that a regular army cannot move without great
Y difficulty.

difficulty. The direction of this line is very favourable to the Turks. It is, I think, impossible to advance beyond Belgrade towards Constantinople, while they are masters of Bosnia: whereas they may pass into Sclavonia, and by forcing a passage over the Drave, open a communication into Lower Hungary, the Bennat of Temeswaer and Transilvania; with such fruitful countries behind them, they might proceed into Upper Hungary and Austria, as formerly.

IN the present state of the two empires, nothing of this can happen; on the contrary, the Austrians are in every thing infinitely superior to the Turks: the line of operations of the first goes from Vienna down the Danube to Peterwaradin, where, and at Temeswaer, depots may be formed without trouble, and with very little expence, because they would require scarce any horses, carriages, &c. whereas the Turkish line must come from Constantinople, is 450 miles long, in many places very difficult; so that this distance may make an essential difference in the operations of the two armies.

IN case such a war should happen, I would propose placing one army on the Save, with the left towards the Danube, and a strong body of cavalry on the other side of that river; another, consisting of 30,000 men, chiefly light troops, two regiments of Hussars, some howitzers and field-pieces, should assemble in Croatia, and enter Bosnia on that side: this would oblige the Turks to abandon the Save, and fall back towards Servia, which will give the army, we suppose placed on the other side the Save, room to pass it; and by thus acting in front and flank of the enemy, you will force him to abandon every province successively, or fight you on your own terms.

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IN a war with the Turks, I beg leave to recommend the use of the pikes, the order of battle proposed in the preceding part of this work, with a numerous artillery and howitzers. The Turks always act in front with all their forces, and often with such impetuosity, that it is no easy matter to resist their attacks; and if they succeed, it is no less difficult to avoid a total overthrow, which makes the order of battle we propose absolutely necessary as well as the mode of acting on their flanks; more especially at the time they are occupied in front: in this manner a column of near eight thousand Turks, while engaged in attacking a redoubt, where there were seven hundred men, were totally dispersed in five minutes time by three hundred horse, who attacked them in flank in a loose manner à la debandade.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE TURKISH FRONTIER.

WE have already described that part of this line towards the Austrian dominions, it remains we now examine, that which confines on Poland and Russia. If the Poles, like their ancestors, the Tartars, made war with 100,000 horsemen, far from being a prey to their ambitious neighbours, they would make them tremble: all Poland, and the countries adjacent, from the Oder to the Dwina and Niester, on the frontier of Russia, and even beyond the latter to the Wolga, are intirely open and defenceless, and abundantly provided with corn, horses, cattle, &c. 100,000 horse, divided into smaller bodies, would over-run this immense space in a few months, and leave not a living creature behind them to cultivate the ground, which would become a desert, and these mighty monarchs shut up with a few subjects in and about their fortresses. What would you

do with your immense armies of infantry, heavy squadrons, and your thousand cannons against such an enemy? Nothing: their superior velocity gives them every thing, and leaves you nothing but the ground on which you encamp, which you must soon abandon, if you can, or perish.

REMEMBER Peter the Great on the Pruth! By following this method, the Tartars under Genfis Chan and his successors made greater conquests than any people in the world; but all this is a vision, the Poles are nothing: a bad government destroys the resources of the most powerful kingdoms; we shall therefore consider the Turkish frontier so far as it relates to a war with Russia.

THIS frontier runs from Chotzim on the Niefter to the Black Sea, and from thence to Oczakow on the Nieper, along the Crimea towards the Don. It is true, that the Tartars, who inhabit the country from the Niefter to the Don, along the Black Sea, are not subject to the Grand Seignior, but they are so far dependent on him, that they have always acted with him, and always will. On this frontier the Turks possess Chotzim, Bender, Oczakow, and Precop on the Isthmus, which separates the Crim from Little Tartary; in all which he can form his magazines with ease from Asia and Europe.

THE Russian frontier runs, on this side, from Kiow on the right of the Nieper as far as Kinsburn, opposite Oczakow, on the mouth of that river. On this frontier the Russians have only one fortress, Pultawa, where Charles the Twelfth found the term of his victories and glory. This line is above five hundred miles in length.

THE Turkish and Russian's principal line of operation must go from Chotzim to Kiow, which is two hundred and fifty miles: if either

either did not occupy Poland, and draw their subsistence from thence, it would be impossible for either to act on this line, and of course their wars would be confined to Little Tartary and the Crim, in which the Russians have the advantage, as well from the position and direction of their frontier, which enables them to attack that country in different parts, as from the proximity of their resources, the course of the rivers, &c. &c.

BUT as Poland has, and ever will be the property of those who occupy it, both powers will act on the principal line from the Niester to Kiow. From the direction of the Turkish frontier, it is evident, that the Russians cannot approach the Niester, if the Turks order thirty or forty thousand Tartars to advance into Poland, between the Bog and the Nieper, and between this river and the Don, even the Tartars of Cuban might be made to act between the Don and the Wolga. If such a disposition was made and executed, the Russians, far from advancing into Moldavia, would find it difficult to preserve their own country, which is plain and open, and therefore cannot be defended by any armies whatever, constituted as ours are, against the incursions of a hundred thousand horsemen. We saw lately a miserable vagabond, at the head of a few thousand rabble, over-run a great part of the Russian empire: our armies, I repeat it, are formed to act only on a very contracted line, and in a close country they never can perform great things, or make extensive conquests.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EUROPE.

THIS line begins at a small river called Kymen in Finland, and is the limit between the Russians and the Swedes; it runs along the gulph of Finland, and part of the Baltic as far as the mouth of the Dwina, on which is Riga, a very strong place, and considerable for its trade: from hence it goes up the above said river to its springs, and then to Smolensko on those of the Nieper, from whence finally it follows the course of that river to the Black Sea, opposite Oczakow; the Russians have appropriated some provinces on the right of it. We shall divide this line into three parts. First, that in Finland opposite the Swedes. Secondly, that from the mouth of the Dwina to Smolensko. And thirdly, that from the last place to the Black Sea.

RUSSIAN FINLAND is quite a savage country, having nothing in it but forests, marshes, lakes, rocks, and mountains, is extremely poor, and does not furnish wherewith to feed the inhabitants, though few in number, and do not exceed a hundred thousand persons. This country is so very strong, that three or four regiments, which generally are quartered here, are sufficient to defend it against four times that number; and the more so, as the Russians can from Cronstadt send any number they think proper over the gulph, and land them behind the Swedish army, that would advance towards the Kymen: in whatever position the Swedes place themselves, the Russians may act against them in front and on either flank, and force them into the sea, as in the last war in this country, or to abandon it

it and retire up the gulph of Bothnia towards Torneo, where they must perish for want of subsistence.

The Russian's line of operations goes from Petersburg through Wyburg; the capital of Finland to David's Stadt, a new fortress, and thence to Fredericksham near the Kymen; all which places are well fortified: the Swedish line goes from the same Kymen to Abo, and from thence over the gulph of Bothnia to Stockholm on the Baltic: the first line is about 150 miles in length, and the second near 400. The first is a good road by which the army may be supplied, as also by water from Cronstadt, Nerva, Revel, &c. whereas the Swedes must bring every thing from Stockholm and other places beyond the gulph of Bothnia.

WHOEVER considers these circumstances, the great difference there is in the length of the respective lines of operations, and finally, the superiority of the Russian forces, will conclude that the Swedes, so far from being able to attack the former with advantage, cannot preserve their possessions on this frontier a month, if they are attacked: it would therefore seem prudent to give them up rather than keep them on such precarious conditions; such a measure would greatly increase the power of the Swedes, who would have the Danes only to contend with, to whom in every respect they are much superior. It was to the circumstances above-mentioned only, we can attribute the loss of the Swedish provinces, on that side of the Baltic, by Charles the Twelfth: how could that prince suppose it was possible, with any forces Sweden could raise and maintain, to preserve them at such a distance, over a very difficult sea, frozen for six months in the year, against the superior forces of the Russians, who were limitrophes, and able to act continually, almost during the whole year? The event of that, and I believe

believe of most wars, carried on on such an extensive line, confirms the doctrine we have established ; that is, they miscarry and ruin those who undertake them.

FROM Petersburg to Riga, on the Dwina, there are Narva and Revel, which are stations for the Russian squadrons ; the coast is high, and by no means safe for great ships, which dare not shut themselves in the upper part of the Gulph of Finland, where a westerly wind would keep them longer than they would wish ; so that the Russians have nothing to fear on that side, and the less so as they have from Finland along the coast to Riga, at least fifty thousand men always in quarters.

THE country on the Russian side of the Dwina, from Riga, is something better than Finland, though like it, for the most part covered with lakes, forests, marshes, &c. and of course is very thinly inhabited. On all this frontier an enemy can only advance towards Riga, and from thence to Petersburg, or towards Pleskow, which is the key into Novogorod and Moscow ; the loss of Pleskow, on the lake Peipus, brought on that of the Swedish provinces. Had Charles the Twelfth been able to keep it, he might have prevented the Russians from supporting themselves on the Nieva in Ingria, and by acting on their line from Moscow to Novogorod, have forced them to Tweer behind the Wolga. This Pleskow is a very important post, if they had a powerful enemy to contend with on that frontier, but they have none : for the Prussians, however formidable, were they totally disengaged on the side of Germany, can never advance to the Dwina : their main forces are behind the Oder, and must be supported from thence, and by land, because the Prussian monarch has no fleet.

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THE Russians can, first, send a fleet to ravage the coast from Memel to Stetin. Secondly, can advance in front into Prussia, and occupy it before the Prussians can send a sufficient army to prevent it. Thirdly, they can send a considerable body of troops, particularly light troops, to act on the Prussian's line, from Königsberg to the Vistula; and even pass this river and advance towards the Warta—such troops want no magazines.

SMOLENSKOW is fortified, but not so as to be able to make any considerable resistance; this is the most important point on all the Russian frontiers, it is only two hundred miles from Moscow, through which the communication between Petersburg and the southern provinces passes; by occupying Moscow, the empire is overturned. It was through this pass the Poles always entered Russia, and for a long series of years contended with success with the Russians, and even set up an impostor on the throne of that empire.

If Charles the Twelfth, being master of Poland, instead of going to Puttawa, had taken Smolenskow, and from thence advanced to Moscow, a victory would have given him that important place, and for some time the empire. He could not however have preserved it while connected with Sweden, for the same reasons he could not preserve his provinces on the Baltic; one unfortunate event, which must finally happen at such an immense distance, would necessarily have ruined him.

IN speaking of the Turkish frontiers, we have already described that which goes from Smolenskow to Kiow, and from thence to the Black Sea. We shall conclude what we have to say on this subject, by observing, that however desirous the Russians may be to interfere in the affairs of Germany, they can only act an auxiliary part,

and that for a few months only in the year ; they can never maintain any conquests beyond the Vistula, so far they may proceed, because their fleet might co-operate with success, even this would become difficult, since the Prussians have made acquisitions in Poland, which unites Prussia with the other provinces of the house of Brandenburg, and this communication is secured by a capital fortress now building on the Vistula, near Marien Werder : when we consider the map, we see that the Turks and Prussians are the only powers that can approach the Russian frontier, and that Austria must be attentive to their motions ; it seems that an alliance between the two empires would be useful to both.

THE rest of the Russian frontier, from the Don to the Wolga, along the provinces of Orenbourg, Siberia, and Irkutch, has for the most part several hordes of Tartars in the neighbourhood, who now and then make incursions into the Russian provinces to plunder, which having accomplished, they retire with the utmost expedition.

THE Chinese are on the limits of Irkutch, and separated from it by a small river, which runs through a Town called Kiachta, inhabited by the subjects of both empires. They could by means of the Tartars of Great Tartary be troublesome to the Russians, but are afraid of them, averse to war in general, and do not wish to see the Tartars armed.

ON the north of Siberia, towards the Frozen Sea, the inhabitants are savages, and live by hunting, pay a small tribute in skins, which is all they have to pay.

THE Persian monarchy has for many years been torn by civil dissensions, which subsided during the reign of Gherim Khan, a
very

very able and just prince, who died lately ; and the civil wars, as usual, are broken out afresh, so that the Russians have nothing to fear on that side : moreover, the mountains of Caucacus, which run from the sea of Asoph to the Caspian, present so many difficulties, that neither can make war beyond them.

HAVING described the frontiers of the principal European powers on the Continent, we must now return to consider that of France on the British channel. This frontier extends from Dunkirk to Ushant, and round that point, along the Bay of Biscay, to Bayonne ; on this line, however, there is but one harbour, where a great fleet can be built, equipped, and ride in safety, which is Brest ; ships of the line are also built at Rochfort, and equipped there, but few in number, and only few can be kept there with safety ; they soon perish, because the water is sweet, though the tide runs very high and violent up the Charante.

IN speaking of the line of operation, on which an army acts, we have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it is of any considerable length, or intersected by mountains, passes, and rivers, and of course, if it goes over a considerable branch of the sea, no solid enterprize can be executed on such a line, though your forces are much superior to those who oppose you. A pirate may land twenty men on the coast of France, or any other, rob a hen-roost, burn a few houses, and run away to their ship, in spite of France and its two hundred thousand men, because such an expedition is executed in a few hours.

IN the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made several attempts on the coast of France, the result was burning some fishing-boats, and, by accident, I believe, some houses, and were happy to come off. Their last exploits at St. Cas, was, we know,

very unfortunate. Whose fault was it? No doubt it was the fault of those who planned these fine expeditions. Could we have burnt the enemy's docks, stores, &c. at Brest and Rochfort, it would have been of great importance and worth trying; but every other object was by no means equal to the risk or the expence, and never ought to be undertaken. No forces the English can bring on the coast will be sufficient to take Brest, or any other capital place: but for a moment I will suppose the French are asleep; that the English fleet and fifty thousand men are at Brest. What then? Why, then they must in a short time return home, if they can; for surely they cannot remain at Brest, which in a short time will be surrounded by a French army, who will besiege you in it, you must therefore abandon it, or advance into the country: advance, in the name of God! you are at Rennes, the capital of Britany; What then, I ask once more? Why, you will be surrounded, your communication with Brest and your fleet cut off, and your army perishes by the sword or by famine.

WHAT I say of Brest, which indeed is the only place on the coast where a fleet can for any considerable time ride with safety, is equally applicable to every other point on this coast, or any other coast whatever. If your army meets with any, though very considerable resistance; for while your enemy can keep the field, and act on your flanks, you cannot remain on any given spot; and if you advance, you only precipitate your ruin.

ON the coast of England there are three harbours, where a great fleet may ride with safety. The enemy must take one of them. Suppose it done, and that the English have not a ship left. Suppose further, that there is a French army of sixty thousand men encamped on Black-Heath, and off London bridge.

I say,

I say, there are two hundred thousand men in England who have bore arms ; I will put the half on horseback, and the other half remains on foot ; mix them as circumstances may require, then I place fifty thousand men in Surry and Suffex, and as many in Effex, who act on the enemy's line, which on that supposition must go towards the Downs, there being no other place where his fleet can anchor ; such a disposition being made, and only half the number of men we propose employed, I ask any officer, any man of sense, what will become of the enemy's army on Black-Heath, or in any other given point, sixty or seventy miles from the coast ? It must perish ; for undoubtedly no army can subsist on a line of such length as is that, from France to Black-Heath, over a branch of the sea, and penetrate into the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty thousand men only to oppose their supplies. No army can subsist in a country, unless it draws all, or the greatest part of its subsistence from the country itself, and of course possesses a great tract behind it, and on every side to the right and left ; for if you can act on the enemy's line, he must retire ; and though he should be in possession of such a tract of country as we suppose, he cannot keep it, unless he is master of one or more strong places, to enable him to separate his troops and put them into winter quarters.

WHEN the combined fleet appeared on our coast, the nation unaccustomed to see an enemy so near, seemed much alarmed, I then thought it my duty to examine the possible results of an invasion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted, had he landed, and the different positions the English army must have occupied on such lines to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast. When I consider this subject in a military light only, I wished almost that the enemy had made
such

such an attempt; because once for all they would have seen the absurdity and danger of it, and we should for ever have been cured of our fears.

CHAPTER V.

OF AMERICA.

I TAKE it for granted, that every body has or may have a map of the seat of war in this country, and therefore have not given it here. Politics have not in the least contributed to bring this important war to a happy conclusion, probably have retarded it. In general I have observed, that when they interfere with military operations, they have rather retarded than accelerated them: when an army is once in the field, and the plan of the campaign settled, let the general go on his own way, he is on the spot, and with the assistance of his officers alone, can determine what is to be done, and how it is to be done.

As I am totally unacquainted with the face of the country, it is impossible for me, even supposing I was a competent judge, to form any opinion of the different actions which have happened there, during this long war; most, if not all of them, have been successful; it is therefore just to conclude, they were conducted with wisdom and valour: why, the result of them did not answer the expectations of the public, will appear from what we shall say on the subject.

WE must beg the reader will recollect what we have said in Chap. III. pag. 133 to 137, on the line of operation, and Chap. IV. pag. 138 to 143, on the nature and principles of an offensive war,

war, and compare the doctrine therein established with the manner in which the American war was conducted : it will, we think, appear, that the want of success did not arise from want of honour, valour, or of wisdom, in planning or executing the various actions which happened ; but from those difficulties which arose from the nature of the country, and perhaps likewise from the defects in the general plan of war, that was adopted and pursued with so little success.

THE country is open, that is, it has no fortresses excepting Boston, New-York, and Charles-Town ; it is very extensive, and very thinly inhabited in proportion to its extent ; so that there is no one province, I believe, which could maintain a fleet and an army for a month, which of course must be supported from England, that is, on a line of above three thousand miles. Whoever considers this circumstance only, and calculates the infinite difficulties in transporting and maintaining an army of forty thousand men, at such an immense distance, will find many reasons, which have concurred to retard and frustrate the progress of our arms. Posterity will admire the activity and vigour of our counsels, and be astonished at the resources of our country. The ministry could do no more than place and maintain a prodigious army on the spot where it was destined to act : no fault can justly be imputed to them ; they are acquitted by every wise and moderate man, who considers their conduct as to this point with impartiality. Though the country has no fortresses, it is however very strong by nature, and has very few good roads ; it is still in its infancy.

LET us now examine, what seems to me, the real causes of our little success in this long and unhappy war.

NEW-

NEW-YORK is the point from whence our army must advance into the country ; from this point, with a radius of a hundred miles, for example ; describe a semi-circle, whose diameter is the sea coast ; as there is not, within that circumference, any one fortrefs whose possession will render you master of a certain tract of country between it and the coast, it follows you cannot establish a certain line of operation ; the enemy is encamped on that portion of circle, and on whatever direction you proceed, he meets you, and if you press him, retires where he pleases, having an immense country behind him, which furnishes him with provisions from every point of the compass ; whereas you are chained to New-York, you cannot follow the enemy too far, because you have not a sufficient number of horses and carriages for that purpose ; and moreover, the enemy may attack your line behind you and cut off your army, or force you to retire. While he has an army in the field, you cannot separate yours, without the greatest danger, twenty miles from New-York. If within the supposed circle, or any other circle, there was a capital fortrefs, your line of operation is of course determined between New-York and such a fortrefs, in which case you march and act on that line, the enemy must follow you or anticipate you, he must fight you or let you take the place : whereas, as things now are, you are reduced to marching and counter-marching, advancing and retiring within a circle a whole campaign, even for twenty campaigns, without a possibility of bringing the enemy to a decisive action, which the principles of an offensive war require, or of fixing yourselves on any one point. After much trouble and loss you must necessarily return to New-York, and so on for twenty campaigns, unless you or the enemy, totally exhausted, give up the quarrel for want of means to keep it up.

WHAT

WHAT I have said of New-York, is equally applicable to any other point from Boston to Georgia, and, indeed, to every other coast in the world. If your enemy can keep the field, if the country is open, extensive, and destitute of fortresses, within reach of the shore and the harbour you occupy, you can never carry on a war with success. The history of all wars, and of all expeditions, the fix fruitless campaigns we have made in America, confirm the truth of our principles.

YET by the singular position of this country, the possession of Canada, the superiority of our fleet, and the activity of his majesty's ministers, I think, that notwithstanding the difficulties which arise from the distance, the face of the country, and the nature of the war, it might with the forces, which have been sent into that country, have been concluded in one campaign with glory and success.

THE head, the heart, and support of that rebellion, revolt, insurrection (do not dispute with me about names) are the four provinces included between Hudson's River and Boston: if we could or can subdue these four provinces, the war is at an end.

LET us therefore examine, whether with an army of thirty or forty thousand men, supported by a powerful fleet, we could or can conquer these provinces? I say we could, and always can; if we can be masters of Boston; from that harbour draw a line to Albany, or some given point on Hudson's River, not far from it, which is 150 miles, a corps of six or eight thousand men advance from Canada towards Albany, leaving Hudson's River always on the right; take possession of Rhode-Island and of Newport on the Continent, with as many men; chiefly light troops, with very few field-pieces, and some howitzers, and as few carriages as possible; the more light horse the better, because they can forage at a great

A a

distance.

distance, and act with vigour and celerity. The main army, twenty thousand men, at Boston. If this army advances to Hudson's River ; I say, that another of equal goodness and force cannot prevent it, if the enemy leaves that river, and goes to meet you towards Boston, one or both of the above-mentioned corps from taking possession of Albany, and of some other posts upon it, and by moving about and avoiding a general action, he is surrounded and must perish. If he beats your main army, or quits his line of operation, to pursue either of the above-mentioned corps, he cannot avoid his fate. It is evident, that the more he advances on the line, from Hudson's River towards Boston, the more certain is his ruin, for this reason ; an army acting upon one line must relinquish it, if the enemy can oppose it in front, and at the same time on its flank and rear.

IN short, to conquer America, you must draw a line from Boston to Albany, and act on that line in the manner we have proposed : all operations on lines, drawn from the coast into the country, from Boston to Charles-Town, will prove hereafter, as they have already done, unsuccessful.

END OF THE SECOND PART.

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Order of Battle.


each formed three deep will occupy in front allowing
 an about 1340 the whole Line..... 400

$$\begin{array}{r} 1340 \\ \hline 1740 \text{ yards} \end{array}$$



1.

2.




Order of Battle.


equal to the front out flank ten Squadrons
 viz. by a batt. and a Squadron,
 the Plate.

Barby sculp.


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The line of Cavalry is omitted to avoid confusion.



1970
1971
1972
1973
1974




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
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